Jones v. Barlow

• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Parrish
• Citation: Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, 154 P.3d 808 (Utah 2007)
• Decision Date: 16 February 2007
• Docket Number: No. 20041031.,No. 20040932.,20040932.,20041031.
• Parties: Keri Lynne JONES, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Cheryl Pike BARLOW, Defendant and Appellant.

154 P.3d 808

2007 UT 20

Keri Lynne JONES, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Cheryl Pike BARLOW, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20040932.

No. 20041031.

Supreme Court of Utah.

February 16, 2007.

Kathryn D. Kendell, San Francisco, CA, and Lauren R. Barros, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

Frank D. Mylar, Midvale, for defendant.

On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals

PARRISH, Justice:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 Defendant Cheryl Barlow asks this court to overturn the district court's order granting Barlow's former domestic partner, Keri Jones, visitation of Barlow's daughter. Because Jones has no biological or legal relationship with the child, she has no statutory standing to seek visitation. The district court, however, granted standing under the common law doctrine of in loco parentis. We must now decide whether Utah courts have recognized, or should adopt, a common law doctrine granting standing for domestic partners of fit legal parents¹ to seek visitation of children for whom they had acted as parents.

¶ 2 We hold that the doctrine of in loco parentis, as recognized by the courts of this state, does not independently grant standing to seek visitation after the in loco parentis relationship has ended. Although this court recognized the right of stepparents to seek visitation in Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978), standing in that case arose out of an interpretation of statutory law granting such rights, not from an independent common law source. We decline to extend the common law doctrine of in loco parentis to create standing where it does not arise out of statute. We accordingly overturn the trial court's grant of visitation rights and hold that the common law doctrine of in loco parentis does not independently grant standing to seek visitation against the wishes of a fit legal parent.

BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Cheryl Pike Barlow and Keri Lynne Jones began a romantic relationship, and in time, they moved in together. They ultimately traveled to Vermont, where they entered into a civil union.

¶ 4 In November 2000, around the time they made their decision to enter into a civil union, Barlow and Jones decided to have a child together. They planned that Barlow would be artificially inseminated and bear the child and that Jones would be artificially inseminated and bear a second child at a later date. Jones and Barlow selected a sperm donor who shared both of their characteristics and began the artificial insemination process. Barlow conceived in February 2001. During the pregnancy, Jones participated in prenatal care with Barlow and her physician.

¶ 5 On October 4, 2001, Barlow gave birth to a baby girl (the "child"). The birth certificate listed the child's surname as "Jones Barlow." For the first two years of her life, both Barlow and Jones cared for the child. And in May 2002, the parties obtained an order from the Third District Court designating Jones and Barlow as co-guardians of the child.

¶ 6 Jones and Barlow ended their relationship around October 2003, soon after the child's second birthday. Subsequently, Barlow and the child moved to a separate residence, and Barlow eventually ended all contact between Jones and the child. Barlow also petitioned the district court for an order removing Jones as the child's co-guardian. Jones objected, but the district court granted the petition.

¶ 7 In December 2003, Jones brought suit in district court seeking a "[d]ecree of custody and visitation," claiming that she had standing under the common law doctrine of in loco parentis. The district court found that the doctrine of in loco parentis could confer standing and ordered that the proceedings be bifurcated. First, the parties would participate in an evidentiary hearing to assess whether Jones stood in loco parentis to the child. If the court found that Jones established the elements of in loco parentis, then the court would proceed with a best interests of the child analysis to determine visitation and custody.

¶ 8 At the conclusion of the first phase of trial, the district court held that Jones was in loco parentis to the child and thus had standing to argue that visitation was in the child's best interest. The district court limited the second phase of the trial to issues of visitation and child support after finding that Utah's adoption statutes precluded a consideration of custody. Following the conclusion of the second phase of trial, the district court found that continued contact with Jones would be in the child's best interest and ordered visitation. In addition, the court ordered Jones to provide financial support to the child.

¶ 9 Barlow appeals the district court's decision.² She presents five arguments: (1) the trial court lacks jurisdiction in this case because the in loco parentis doctrine does not grant Jones standing to seek visitation; (2) the trial court's application of the in loco parentis doctrine violates Barlow's constitutional rights; (3) the visitation order violates Barlow's right to privacy; (4) Jones was never truly in loco parentis to the child; and (5) Jones' claims are barred by res judicata. Because we hold that Jones lacks standing, we reverse the trial court's order and decline to reach the merits of the remaining arguments.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 10 In reviewing questions of common law standing, this court recognizes three possible standards of review. Determinations of the legal requirements for standing are reviewed for correctness. Wash. County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, ¶ 18, 82 P.3d 1125. However, we give deference to the district court on factual determinations that bear upon the question of standing. Id. (citing Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997)). Finally, we give minimal discretion to the district court in its application of the facts to the law. Id.

¶ 11 Because we confine our review to the district court's interpretation of the doctrine of in loco parentis and do not address its findings of fact or application of those facts to the law, the appropriate standard of review is correctness. We therefore grant no discretion to the district court.

ANALYSIS

¶ 12 "[S]tanding is a jurisdictional requirement that must be satisfied" before a court may entertain a controversy between two parties. Wash. County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, ¶ 6 n. 2, 82 P.3d 1125; accord Harris v. Springville City, 712 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1986) ("[L]ack of standing is jurisdictional."); Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983)

("[T]he moving party must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court."). Under the traditional test for standing, "the interests of the parties must be adverse" and "the parties seeking relief must have a legally protectible interest in the controversy." Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1148. A party may assert an interest that is legally protectible under either statute or the common law. See Morgan, 2003 UT 58, ¶ 17, 82 P.3d 1125. Recognizing that no Utah statute confers a right to seek visitation of the child, Jones bases her claim of a legally protectible right on the common law doctrine of in loco parentis.

¶ 13 The doctrine of in loco parentis is applied when someone who is not a legal parent nevertheless assumes the role of a parent in a child's life. Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah 1978) ("The term `in loco parentis' means in the place of a parent . . . ."); Black's Law Dictionary 803 (8th ed. 2004) ("Of, relating to, or acting as a temporary guardian or caretaker of a child, taking on all or some of the responsibilities of a parent."). An individual attains in loco parentis status by assuming the "status and obligations of a parent without formal adoption." Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66; accord Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 Utah 261, 236 P. 457, 459 (1925). While an individual stands in loco parentis to a child, he or she has the "same rights, duties, and liabilities as a parent." Sparks v. Hinckley, 78 Utah 502, 5 P.2d 570, 571 (1931); accord Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66; McDonald v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 267 S.W. 1074, 1076 (Tex.App. 1924) ("All such are said to stand in loco parentis, and, as long as the relation exists, the rights and duties with reference to the child are the same as those of the natural parent.").

¶ 14 The central question now presented to us is whether the in loco parentis doctrine contemplates perpetuating these parent-like rights and obligations after a legal parent has ended the in loco parentis relationship. Because at common law all rights and obligations end with the termination of the in loco parentis relationship, and because the doctrine in no way abrogates a parent's right to terminate such a relationship, we conclude that Jones lacks standing to seek visitation. And we decline to expand the in loco parentis doctrine to permanently diminish parental rights.

I. THE IN LOCO PARENTIS DOCTRINE DOES NOT CONFER STANDING TO SEEK VISITATION AFTER THE PARENT-LIKE RELATIONSHIP HAS ENDED

¶ 15 Unlike the relationship arising from adoption, the in loco parentis relationship is temporary in nature. 59 Am. Jur.2d Parent and Child § 9 (2002); Babb v. Matlock, 340 Ark. 263, 9 S.W.3d 508, 510 (2000). In Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 Utah 261, 236 P. 457 (1925), we endorsed the common law principle that where an individual enters into an in loco parentis relationship with a child, "the reciprocal rights, duties, and obligations of parent and child continue as long as such relation continues." Id. at 459; accord 59 Am.Jur.2d Parent and Child § 9 (2002) ("Once the person alleged to be in loco parentis no longer discharges all the duties incident to the parental relationship, the person is no longer in loco parentis."). Thus, the termination of the in loco parentis relationship also terminates the corresponding parent-like rights and responsibilities. 59 Am.Jur.2d Parent and Child § 9 (2002); State v. Randall S. (In re Interest of Destiny S.), 263 Neb.255, 639 N.W.2d 400,...