Jones v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 16 March 2016
• Docket Number: 12-CV-4051 (JS) (GRB)
• Citation: 170 F.Supp.3d 420
• Parties: Charles W. Jones, Plaintiff, v. Bay Shore Union Free School District, Peter J. Dion, individually and as Superintendent of the Bay Shore Union Free School District, Evelyn Bloise Holman, individually and as the former Superintendent of the Bay Shore Union Free School District, and Robert Pashken, individually and as Principal of Bay Shore High School, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

170 F.Supp.3d 420

Charles W. Jones, Plaintiff,

v.Bay Shore Union Free School District, Peter J. Dion, individually and as Superintendent of the Bay Shore Union Free School District, Evelyn Bloise Holman, individually and as the former Superintendent of the Bay Shore Union Free School District, and Robert Pashken, individually and as Principal of Bay Shore High School, Defendants.

12-CV-4051 (JS) (GRB)

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed March 16, 2016

For Plaintiff: E. Christopher Murray, Esq., Laura Nazginov, Esq., Ruskin Moscou Faltischek, P.C., East Tower, 15th Floor, 1425 RXR Plaza, Uniondale, NY 11556.

For Defendants: Steven C. Stern, Esq., Kaitlyn R. McKenna, Esq., Mark A. Radi, Esq., Susan Hull Odessky, Esq., Sokoloff Stern, LLP, 179 Westbury Avenue, Carle Place, NY 11514.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SEYBERT

, District Judge

Plaintiff Charles W. Jones (“Jones” or “Plaintiff”) commenced this action against defendant Bay Shore Union Free School District, (the “District”), Peter J. Dion (“Dion”), Evelyn Bloise Holman (“Holman”), and Robert Pashken (“Pashken”) (collectively “Individual Defendants”, and taken together with the District, “Defendants”), alleging violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments and for deprivation of Plaintiff's equal protection and due process right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as New York State constitutional and statutory violations and common law causes of action. (Sec. Am. Compl., Docket Entry 22, ¶¶ 38-53.) Currently pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Docket Entry 47.) For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND¹

I. Factual Background²

This action arises out of Plaintiff's previous employment at Bay Shore High School, current activism, and desire to establish a minority parents' organization within the District. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt., Docket Entry 41, ¶¶ 1, 187-190.) Plaintiff claims that in retaliation for his criticism of the District and that he intended to speak about the treatment of minority students, he was prohibited from attending or speaking at a December 14, 2011 meeting of the District's Board of Education. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 230, 235-44; Pl.'s 56.1 Counterstmt., Docket Entry 42, ¶ I at 4.) Defendants' dispute this, claiming that Plaintiff was prohibited from attending the meeting because of the prior practice of restricting Plaintiff's presence on campus, and the serious safety concerns raised by his desire to appear on campus and have access to students. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 233-253.)

A. Plaintiff's Employment with the District

Plaintiff was a girls' junior varsity softball coach in the District between 1983 and 1985. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 1, 13.) Plaintiff coached girls who were in the eighth through tenth grades and who ranged in age from thirteen to fifteen years old. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 14-15.) In 1985, two female students told James McGowan (“McGowan”), a social worker for the District, that they had been to Plaintiff's house and that several girls had engaged in sexually explicit acts with Plaintiff.³ (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 12, 16, 18-19.)

On April 30, 1985, the District Superintendent at that time met with Plaintiff, (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 36), and informed him that a parent was alleging that he was either “having sex or giving drugs to her daughter.” (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 38; Jones Tr.,⁴ 166:14-167:18.) The Superintendent also informed Plaintiff that he was not to see or contact any of the students, nor attend practice or be on school grounds until further notice, and that Plaintiff was suspended with pay during the pendency of an investigation. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 37; May 1, 1985 Insubordination Letter, Defs.' Ex. N, Docket Entry 47-11, at 2-3⁵ .) Plaintiff denies ever meeting with the Superintendent on April 30, 1985, and denies being told that he was suspended with pay and not to see or contact any students during the investigation of the charges. (Pl.'s 56.1 Counterstmt. ¶¶ 36-38; Jones Tr., 157:9-159:8.)

On May 7, 1985, the District charged Plaintiff with: (1) entertaining four minor female students of the District at his home; (2) engaging “in kissing, hugging, and other sexual acts, including fondling the breasts of, kissing the breasts of, rubbing his genital area against the genital area of a minor female student,” and on two occasions “permitting, and/or causing, said student to rub his penis through his clothes,” and (3) engaging “in kissing, hugging and touching of a minor female student” of the District. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 77-78; Notice of Charges and Hearing, Defs.' Ex. O, Docket Entry 47-11, at 4-9.) A hearing was held on November 15, 1985, and Plaintiff and the District reached an agreement in which Plaintiff agreed to resign.

(Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 79, 81-82; Nov. 15, 1985 Meeting Minutes, Defs.' Ex. P, Docket Entry 47-11, at 10-27.) As part of the agreement, the parties exchanged mutual releases and agreed that the records would be kept in confidence by the District. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 84; Nov. 15, 1985 Meeting Minutes, at 15.) The parties further agreed that Plaintiff would not seek or accept future employment with the District, while the District agreed to withdraw all the pending charges and acknowledge that Plaintiff denied any wrong doing and had maintained his innocence regarding the charges. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 83; Nov. 15, 1985 Meeting Minutes, at 14-15.)

Plaintiff disputes Defendants' allegations regarding the misconduct and denies “ever engaging in any improper conduct with any student or underage minor, whether at the Bay Shore High School, Middle School, or any other place.” (Jones Aff., Pl.'s Ex. 4, Docket Entry 49-4, at 2, ¶ 2.)

B. Plaintiff's Return to Bay Shore

In 1997 or 1998, McGowan asked to meet with Holman, the District Superintendent at the time, to discuss Plaintiff. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 5, 87.) It had come to McGowan's attention that Plaintiff had either been appointed or volunteered to be the education liaison for the NAACP. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 88, 90.) McGowan shared with Holman some of the information he knew about Plaintiff's history with the District from the 1980s. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 91, 93-94.) Holman was also informed by McGowan and others that Plaintiff was spotted on the girls' track field. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 96-97.)

After her meeting with McGowan, Holman requested and reviewed all the written material that documented Plaintiff's employment with the District. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 99-101.) Holman also reached out to the former Superintendent who handled the allegations against Plaintiff and his resignation, as well as the District's counsel, who had handled Plaintiff's disciplinary matter for the District in 1985. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 103-05.) Additionally, on January 22, 1998, Holman and McGowan met with one of Plaintiff's former students and an alleged victim, to discuss the events of the spring of 1984 involving Plaintiff. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 107-08.)

In response to receiving the information regarding Plaintiff, Holman informed the NAACP representative that she would prefer not to have Plaintiff as the educational liaison, and through counsel, informed Plaintiff that he was not permitted on campus. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 121.) Holman also sought clarification as to what her responsibilities were with respect to reporting Plaintiff's alleged misconduct, which she had just become aware of. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 121.)

C. Report to the N.Y.S. Department of Education

In June 1998, the N.Y.S. Department of Education advised the District that it “was required to file a Part 83 Report once he received information which led him to reasonably conclude that a certificate holder had engaged in conduct which exhibited poor moral character. The passage of time would not, in my opinion, relieve the obligation.” (June 15, 1998 Letter, Defs.' Ex. S, Docket Entry 47-11, at 32-33; Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 124.) Part 83 of the N.Y.S. Commissioner of Education's Regulations provides that:

Any information indicating that an individual holding a teaching certificate has been convicted of a crime, or has committed an act which raises a reasonable question as to the individual's moral character, shall be referred by the chief school administrator having knowledge thereof to the professional conduct officer of the department.

(Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 126; 8 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 83.1

.) The N.Y.S. Department of Education advised Holman that the Superintendent is required to report any sexual misconduct by a teacher or counselor. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 127.) Once reported, the N.Y.S. Department of Education is obligated to investigate accusations of sexually inappropriate behavior between staff and students. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 128.)

In 1990, Plaintiff applied to the N.Y. State Education Department for a provisional certificate as a school social worker (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 129), and in 1993 applied for a permanent school social work certificate. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 130.) From 1990 through 2002, Plaintiff was employed as a school social worker with Western Suffolk BOCES. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 131.)

On July 28, 2000, the Commissioner of Education issued a Notice of Substantial Question as to Moral Character pursuant to Part 83 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education based on allegations that Plaintiff had failed to truthfully answer the following questions on his licensing applications: (a) “Have you ever resigned from a position rather than face disciplinary action?” and (b) “Has any disciplinary action been brought against you which resulted in your being discharged from employment?” (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 132-33.) Plaintiff requested and was granted a hearing concerning these allegations. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 134-35.) The hearings were held on December 7, 2000 and February 15, 2001, and in a decision issued on June 18, 2011, the hearing officer determined that Plaintiff gave false answers on...