Jones v. Bd. of Trs. for Ala. Agric. & Mech. Univ.
| Decision Date | 09 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 5:17-cv-01723-MHH |
| Citation | 526 F.Supp.3d 1100 |
| Parties | Dr. Edward L. JONES, Plaintiff, v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR ALABAMA AGRICULTURAL & MECHANICAL UNIVERSITY, d/b/a Alabama A&M University, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
Stanley Bernard Stallworth, The Stallworth Legal Group LLC, Evergreen, AL, for Plaintiff.
A. Redmond Debro, Roslyn Crews, Alabama A&M University, Normal, AL, Matthew B. Reeves, William R. Lunsford, Kenneth S. Steely, Maynard Cooper & Gale PC, Huntsville, AL, for Defendant The Board of Trustees for Alabama Agricultural and Mechanical University.
In this employment discrimination lawsuit, Dr. Edward Jones, a former tenured professor at Alabama A&M University, has sued the Board of Trustees for the university and the university's president, provost, and dean of the College of Education. Dr. Jones alleges that the Board violated Title VII by discriminating against him based on his sexual orientation and that the individual defendants discriminated against him based on his sexual orientation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 29).1
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, the defendants have asked the Court to dismiss Dr. Jones's third amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 36). In this opinion, the Court will discuss the procedural history of the case, explain the rules that govern the defendants’ motion to dismiss, recount the factual allegations in Dr. Jones's third amended complaint, and then decide whether Dr. Jones may pursue his claims.
In this action, Dr. Jones initially sued Alabama A&M University. (Doc. 1).2 A week after he filed his original complaint, he filed his first amended complaint. (Doc. 2). A&M moved to dismiss Dr. Jones's first amended complaint. (Doc. 5). Because the parties did not consent to a magistrate judge's dispositive jurisdiction, the case was transferred to the undersigned's docket. (Doc. 12).
After reviewing A&M's motion to dismiss, the Court found that Dr. Jones's pleading deficiencies could be addressed through an amended pleading and offered Dr. Jones 14 days in which to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 16). The Court noted that the issue of whether Title VII afforded a cause of action for discrimination based on sexual orientation was pending before the Supreme Court and stated that the Court would not "reach that issue until the Supreme Court issue[d] a decision ...." (Doc. 16). When Dr. Jones filed his second amended complaint, he added as defendants Dr. Andrew Hugine, Dr. Daniel Wims, and Dr. Curtis Martin. (Doc. 22). Dr. Jones amended his complaint again, and that third amended complaint is the subject of the defendants’ pending motion to dismiss. (Docs. 29, 36). In his third amended complaint, Dr. Jones substituted the Board of Trustees for Alabama A&M University as the employer defendant for his Title VII claim. (Doc. 36, p. 1).3
After reviewing Dr. Jones's third amended complaint, the Court ruled sua sponte that Dr. Jones did not allege a viable retaliation claim because he did not allege that he suffered an adverse employment action because he participated in the investigation of conduct prohibited by Title VII or because he opposed an employment practice prohibited by Title VII. (Doc. 30). Accordingly, the Court dismissed Dr. Jones's retaliation claim against the Board of Trustees. (Doc. 30). The Court then stayed the deadlines in the case pending the outcome of the Supreme Court's decision in in Bostock v. Clayton , a Title VII sexual orientation discrimination case. (Doc. 30).
Following the Supreme Court's June 15, 2020 decision in Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Ga. , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 1731, 207 L.Ed.2d 218 (2020), the Court permitted Dr. Jones to proceed with his claims for discrimination based on sexual orientation. (Doc. 35). The defendants then filed the pending motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 36).4
Rules 8 and 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) enables a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint against the "liberal pleading standards set forth by Rule 8(a)(2)." Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). "Generally, to survive a [ Rule 12(b)(6) ] motion to dismiss and meet the requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a complaint need not contain ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but rather ‘only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Maledy v. City of Enterprise , 2012 WL 1028176, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 26 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ " Erickson , 551 U.S. at 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).
"Thus, the pleading standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 evaluates the plausibility of the facts alleged, and the notice stemming from a complaint's allegations." Keene v. Prine , 477 Fed. Appx. 575, 583 (11th Cir. 2012). "Where those two requirements are met ... the form of the complaint is not significant if it alleges facts upon which relief can be granted, even if it fails to categorize correctly the legal theory giving rise to the claim." Keene , 477 Fed. Appx. at 583.
The defendants have raised several affirmative defenses in their motion to dismiss. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "[g]enerally, the existence of an affirmative defense will not support a motion to dismiss," but a district court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) when the plaintiff's allegations "indicate the existence of an affirmative defense, so long as the defense clearly appears on the face of the complaint." Quiller v. Barclays American/Credit, Inc. , 727 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir. 1984) ; see also Hunt v. Aimco Properties, L.P. , 814 F.3d 1213, 1225 n.8 (11th Cir. 2016). Qualified immunity, an affirmative defense on which the individual defendants rely in support of their motion to dismiss, is a defense that district courts must examine at the 12(b)(6) stage to determine whether a plaintiff's claims against state officials may proceed. When a defendant asserts the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, "unless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery." Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U.S. 511, 525, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). "Absent such allegations, ‘it is ... appropriate for a district court to grant the defense of qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage.’ " Cottone v. Jenne , 326 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Gonzalez v. Reno , 325 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2003) ).
When evaluating a motion to dismiss, a district court accepts as true the factual allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Brophy v. Jiangbo Pharms. Inc. , 781 F.3d 1296, 1301 (11th Cir. 2015). Therefore, the Court will view Dr. Jones's factual allegations in his favor and will draw inferences from the factual allegations in his favor.
Dr. Jones taught at Alabama A&M University for more than 25 years. (Doc. 29, p. 6, ¶ 11). In 2015 and 2016, Dr. Jones was a tenured professor and Director of Teacher Certification in the College of Education, Humanities, and Behavioral Science. (Doc. 29, p. 2, ¶ 3). Dr. Martin was the dean of the College of Education. (Doc. 29, p. 2, ¶ 3). Dr. Hugine was the president of the university, and Dr. Wims was the provost of the university. (Doc. 29, p. 2, ¶ 3).
On October 13, 2015, Dr. Jones received a letter from Dr. Wims, explaining that as of October 13, 2015, per the recommendation of Dr. Martin, Dr. Jones's immediate supervisor, the Board was placing Dr. Jones on paid administrative leave. (Doc. 29, p. 8, ¶ 17).5 The letter stated that "serious concerns [were] raised by the Alabama State Department of Education (ALSDE) as to the sufficiency of our administrative processes along with other administrative compliance issues identified by your immediate supervisor." (Doc. 29, p. 8, ¶ 17). Dr. Jones met with Dr. Martin, and Dr. Martin "indicated specifically that he ‘did not know what this was about’ and that the Plaintiff would ‘probably be back in just a few days’." (Doc. 29, p. 8, ¶ 17).
Later that day, university officials confiscated Dr. Jones's computer and changed the locks on his office door. (Doc. 29, pp. 8-9, ¶ 18). Dr. Jones "was advised that Dr. Martin wanted to meet with him and his staff on October 14, 2015." (Doc. 29, p. 9, ¶ 18). When Dr. Jones's attorney contacted counsel for the university to request additional information, Dr. Jones's attorney "was advised that the administrative leave was because Dr. Jones ‘was a threat to the College of Education's accreditation’." (Doc. 29, p. 9, ¶ 18).
Several months later, in January 2016, Dr. Wims wrote a second letter to Dr. Jones, notifying him that the Board intended to fire him for ...
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