Jones v. Bernanke
| Decision Date | 11 June 2007 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 04-1696 (RMU). |
| Citation | 493 F.Supp.2d 18 |
| Parties | Charles Blaine JONES, Plaintiff, v. Ben S. BERNANKE,<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> in his capacity as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Michael Gerard Kane, David Robert Cashdan, Cashdan & Kane, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
John L. Kuray, Katherine H. Wheatley, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
The plaintiff, Charles Blaine Jones, brings a four-count employment discrimination complaint2 against his former employer, the Federal Reserve Board. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant discriminated against him on account of his age and gender in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 633a et seq. and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 et seq., respectively and retaliated against him after he filed an age discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). In response, the defendant moves for dismissal and for summary judgment on the age and gender discrimination counts. Because equitable estoppel is applicable, the court denies the defendant's motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. Because the plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proof for age and gender discrimination, however, the court grants the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiff, a certified public accountant, was born on May 3, 1948. He began working at the defendant's Division of Reserve Bank Operations and Payment Systems in April 1991. First Am. Compl. ("Compl.") at 2. In July 1993, the plaintiff transferred to the Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation at a level FR-27. Id.; Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Counts I & II of the First Am. Compl. or, in the Alternative, for Summ. J. ("Def.'s Mot.") at 3.
The plaintiff alleges that in March 1998, Michael Martinson, his then-supervisor, did not promote him to a managerial position at the FR-29 level and instead selected Heidi Richards, a "woman in her early thirties." Compl. at 3-4. Concerned that Martinson was "effectuating [d]efendant's policy of promoting young women to positions of management," the plaintiff approached Martinson after Richards' selection. Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss and for Summ. J. ("Pl.'s Opp'n") at 6. In response to the plaintiff's concerns, in May 1998, Martinson allegedly promised the plaintiff a promotion to a FR-28 level. Compl. at 3. When the plaintiff inquired about his promised promotion in September 1998, Martinson allegedly assured him that he "would be promoted with the next group of promotions." Id. In May and June of 1999, the plaintiff confronted Martinson yet again and Martinson gave him the same response. Id. at 4. Based on Martinson's assurances of a promotion, the plaintiff did not pursue the matter with the defendant's EEOC office. Id. at 3.
Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff was sent abroad on a teaching assignment. Id. at 4. During this time period, a group of employees was promoted while another group received pay increases. Id. at 4. The plaintiff, however, was not among those employees that were promoted or received pay increases. When the plaintiff confronted Martinson about his failure to promote him, Martinson stated that he was unable to justify a promotion for the plaintiff because of "the limited nature of [the plaintiff's] work and responsibilities." Id. As a result, in November 1999 the plaintiff filed an informal charge with the defendant's EEOC office alleging retaliation. Id. at 4-5.
The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on August 29, 2006. Id. at 1. The complaint alleges that the defendant unlawfully retaliated against him by lowering his performance ratings in 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 and that the defendant discriminated against him on the basis of his age and gender by failing to promote him. Id. The defendant moves to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment. Def.'s Mot. at 1. The court now turns to the defendant's motion.
II
The defendant moves to dismiss counts I and II3 of the plaintiff's complaint, which allege that the plaintiff was not selected for the FR-29 position based on gender and age discrimination, on the basis that the plaintiff did not pursue his administrative remedies in a timely manner. Def.'s Mot. at 2, 10. For the reasons that follow, the court denies the defendant's motion to dismiss.
In actions brought under Title VII and the ADEA, a court has authority over only those claims that are (1) contained in the plaintiffs administrative complaint or claims "like or reasonably related to" those claims in the administrative complaint and (2) claims for which the plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies. Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C.Cir.1995); Caldwell v. ServiceMaster Corp.; 966 F.Supp. 33, 49 (D.D.C.1997). It is the defendant's burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Brown v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 8, 13 (D.C.Cir.1985) (). Meager, conclusory allegations that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies will not satisfy the defendant's burden. Id. at 12. ( that a mere assertion of failure to exhaust administrative remedies without more is "clearly inadequate under prevailing regulations to establish a failure to exhaust administrative remedies").
Dismissal results when a plaintiff fails to exhaust administrative remedies. Rann v. Chao, 346 F.3d 192, 194-95 (D.C.Cir.2003) (); Gillet v. King, 931 F.Supp. 9, 12-13 (D.D.C.1996) ().
The defendant urges the court to dismiss the plaintiffs claim that the defendant discriminated against him when he was not promoted in March of 1998 because the plaintiff did not timely pursue his administrative remedies. Def.'s Mot. at 2, 10. The plaintiff concedes that he did not file his complaint with the EEOC in a timely manner, but he explains that the defendant dissuaded him from filing a timely complaint because Martinson promised him a promotion, albeit to a lower level than he originally sought. Compl. at 4; Def.'s Mot. at 10.
Equitable estoppel "prevents a defendant from asserting untimeliness where the defendant has taken active steps to prevent the plaintiff from litigating in time." Currier v. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc., 159 F.3d 1363, 1367 (D.C.Cir.1998) (emphasis in original). The defendant maintains that the court should not apply equitable estoppel to the instant facts because Martinson did not promise to promote the plaintiff to the FR-29 position, but rather, promised to promote him to the FR-28 level. Def.'s Mot. at 11-12. This promise of a promotion to a lower level than that sought by the plaintiff, the defendant argues, does not trigger equitable estoppel. Id.
An employer's misleading statements suggesting that a grievance will be resolved in the plaintiffs favor can establish equitable estoppel. Currier, 159 F.3d at 1368 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Because an employee in the plaintiffs position would be understandably reluctant to file an EEOC charge once he received a promise of a promotion, even if that promotion is not the same as the one the plaintiff originally sought, id.; see also Sanders v. Veneman, 131 F.Supp.2d 225, 230 (D.D.C.2001) (), the court denies the defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis of failure to exhaust administrative remedies in a timely fashion.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Diamond v. Atwood, 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 (D.C.Cir.1995). To determine which facts are "material," a court must look to the substantive law on which each claim rests. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A "genuine issue" is one whose resolution could establish an element of a claim or defense and, therefore, affect the outcome of the action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor and accept the nonmoving party's evidence as true. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of its position. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that the nonmoving party "f...
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