Jones v. Bessemer Bd. of Educ., 2:20-cv-00044-LSC

• Decision Date: 23 June 2020
• Docket Number: 2:20-cv-00044-LSC
• Parties: ELEANOR M. JONES, Plaintiff, v. BESSEMER BOARD OF EDUCATION & DR. KEITH A. STEWART, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

ELEANOR M. JONES, Plaintiff, v. BESSEMER BOARD OF EDUCATION & DR. KEITH A. STEWART, Defendants.

2:20-cv-00044-LSC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA WESTERN DIVISION

June 23, 2020

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

PlaintiffEleanor M. Jones("Jones") brings this age discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., against Defendants Bessemer Board of Education(the "Board") and Dr. Keith A. Stewart("Dr. Stewart"), the Board Superintendent(collectively "Defendants").Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a viable claim for age discrimination.(SeeDoc. 7.)The motion is fully briefed and ripe for decision.For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion to dismiss is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

I.BACKGROUND¹

Jones, a 56-year-old female, has been employed by the Board since August 1998 in various capacities, including her current role as a business teacher.(Doc. 1at 4.)In May 2018, she applied for the position of Work Force Coordinator, as did Reba Caffee, a cosmetology teacher at the time of the vacancy who Jones believes to be under the age of 40 with less than 8 years of experience.(Id.)After receiving a complaint from Jones that she overheard the interviewing supervisor guaranteeing the Work Force Coordinator job to Ms. Caffee, Dr. Stewart and the Board decided to re-interview the applicants for the position, including Jones and Ms. Caffee.(Id.)After the second round of interviews, Jones scored higher than Ms. Caffee, but Ms. Caffee was hired.(Id.)

Jones timely filed written charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission("EEOC").(Doc. 1at 3.)By notice dated June 25, 2019, Jones was advised by the EEOC that she was entitled to institute a civil action in the appropriate court within 90 days of receipt of said notice.(Id.)That 90-day period would have lapsed on September 23, 2019.On November 22, 2019, Jones and the Board enteredinto the "Tolling Agreement for Statute of Limitations" that purports to retroactively toll the 90-day statute of limitations for Jones to file suit from September 23, 2019, until midnight on January 10, 2020.(Doc. 1-2at 1.)

Jones filed this action on January 10, 2020, alleging that the Board and Dr. Stewart discriminated against her on the basis of age when they failed to promote her to the position of Work Force Coordinator in favor of a less qualified, younger applicant.(SeeDoc. 1.)Jones sued Dr. Stewart in both his official and individual capacities.The Board and Dr. Stewart moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).(Doc. 7at 1.)Dr. Stewart claims there are no allegations that support a viable claim against him.(Id. at 2.)The Board claims that all claims contained in the complaint are time-barred because the Jones missed the statute of limitations, notwithstanding the Tolling Agreement.(Id. at 3.)

On March 31, 2020, this Court directed the parties to submit briefs addressing the impact of the Tolling Agreement's conflicting language on the Defendants' statute of limitations defense.(SeeDoc. 15.)Dr. Stewart and Jones each submitted supplemental briefs (see docs.18 & 19).The Board, however, did not submit a supplemental brief.

II.STANDARD

In general, a complaint must present "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).To withstand a motion to dismiss, the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"Lord Abbett Mun. Income Fund, Inc. v. Tyson, 671 F.3d 1203, 1207(11th Cir.2012)(quotingAshcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678(2009)).The plaintiff need not put forth "detailed factual allegations" in support of the claim, but there must be enough to "allow[]the court to draw the reasonable inference that the Defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."Iqbal, 555 U.S. at 678(citingBell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556(2007))."This necessarily requires that a plaintiff include factual allegations for each essential element of his or her claim."GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc., v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1254(11th Cir.2012).

In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, this Court"begin[s] by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth."Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.Next, this Court"assume[s] the veracity" of well-pleaded, factual allegations to "determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief."Id.Mere "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" are insufficient.Id. at 678.Finally, only the complaint itself and any attachments theretomay be considered, even when the parties attempt to present additional evidence.SeeAdinolfe v. United Techs. Corp., 768 F.3d 1161, 1168(11th Cir.2014);see alsoFed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

III.DISCUSSION

A.Dr. Stewart

Jones sues Dr. Stewart in both his individual and official capacities.The Eleventh Circuit has held there is no individual liability under either the ADEA or Title VII.Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772(11th Cir.1991);see alsoSmith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 403 n.4(11th Cir.1995).Additionally, official capacity suits represent "another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an [official] is an agent."Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165(1985)(quotingMonell v. N.Y. City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55(1978)).As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, official capacity suits are the "functional equivalent" of claims against the entity that employs the official and, therefore, no longer necessary because the entity can be sued directly.Busby, 931 F.2d at 776.The Board is an agency of the State of Alabama.SeeEnterprise City Bd. of Educ. v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 782, 783(Ala.1977)("[City boards of education and county school boards] are agencies of the state . . . .")."[W]hen a suit is filed against both a governmental entity and the entity's employees in their official capacity, a court may dismiss the individualdefendants in their official capacities as 'redundant and possibly confusing to the jury.'"Underwood v. Boisot, 7:07-CV-01228-LSC, 2008 WL 11422055, at *4(N.D. Ala.Mar. 4, 2008)(quotingBusby, 931 F.2d at 776)(recognizing that having as defendants both the city and its officers sued in their official capacities would be redundant and therefore dismissing the officers).

The individual capacity claim against Dr. Stewart should be dismissed because there is no individual liability under either the ADEA or Title VII.SeeBusby, 931 F.2d at 772.Additionally, the official capacity claim should be dismissed as "redundant" of the claims against the Board and "possibly confusing to the jury."SeeUnderwood, 2008 WL 11422055, at *4;see alsoBusby, 931 F.3d at 776.Finally, the claims against Dr. Stewart appear to be time-barred, and it does not appear that the Tolling Agreement would operate to toll the applicable statute of limitations with respect to him.It is undisputed that the Agreement was entered into between Jones's counsel and then-counsel for the Board.(Doc. 18at 2.)However, there is no reference to Dr. Stewart in the Agreement, and Dr. Stewart did not sign or authorize anyone to sign the Agreement on his behalf.(Id.)There is no allegation that Dr. Stewart or his counsel were involved in any way in the execution of the Agreement.(Id.)

In sum, the Board is a Defendant; there is no individual liability under the ADEA or Title VII; and Dr. Stewart is not named in, did not sign, and was not involved in the execution of the Tolling Agreement.Therefore, the claims against Dr. Stewart are due to be dismissed.

B.Bessemer Board of Education

The Board argues for dismissal on the grounds that Jones's claim is barred by the statute of limitations, and it insists that the Tolling Agreement did not waive or toll the statute of limitations due to the conflicting language in the agreement.(SeeDoc. 7.)Jones claims the limitations period was both equitably tolled and tolled by the parties' Agreement.The Supreme Court has held that "filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling."Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393(1982).Therefore, this Court must address whether equitable tolling or waiver apply.

Equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy which is typically applied sparingly.Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96(1990).Equitable tolling is allowed "where the claimant . . . has been induced or tricked by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass."Id."Equitable tolling has alsobeen followed where the court led the plaintiff to believe she had done all that was required of her."Browning v. AT&T Paradyne, 120 F.3d 222, 227(11th Cir.1997).Further, equitable tolling is permitted "when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence."Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1270-71(11th Cir.1999).The Supreme Court has "generally been much less forgiving in late filings where the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights."Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96.Finally, "the burden is on the plaintiff to show that equitable tolling is warranted."Justice v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1479(11th Cir.1993).

Jones claims the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled because she retained legal counsel, timely filed her EEOC charge, and obtained a tolling agreement through her legal counsel, who engaged...