Jones v. Bradley, 41744

• Decision Date: 17 March 1966
• Docket Number: No. 1,No. 41744,41744,1
• Citation: Jones v. Bradley, 113 Ga.App. 338, 147 S.E.2d 853 (Ga. App. 1966)
• Parties: Anne M. JONES, by Next Friend, v. Marie BRADLEY
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 853

147 S.E.2d 853

113 Ga.App. 338

Anne M. JONES, by Next Friend, v.Marie BRADLEY.

No. 41744.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1.

March 17, 1966.

Vincent P. McCauley, Columbus, for appellant.

Foley, Chappell, Young, Hollis & Schloth, Howell Hollis, Columbus, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

FRANKUM, Judge.

This is a damage suit brought on account of personal injuries sustained by the minor plaintiff when an automobile driven by her collided with an automobile driven by the defendant.The collision occurred when the plaintiff drove her automobile out of a side street into the path of the defendant's automobile, and the defendant's automobile struck the plaintiff's automobile in the left side thereof and thereby threw the plaintiff from her car and inflicted injuries to her person for which she sued.The plaintiff contended that the defendant was negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout; in failing to keep her vehicle under control; in failing to bring her automobile to a stop before striking plaintiff's; in driving her automobile at a high, reckless and hazardous rate of speed of 60 miles per hour in violation of applicable speed laws, and in failing to use due care for the safety of other persons on the highway.The defendant filed a cross action seeking to recover from the plaintiff on account of damages to her automobile and for personal injuries.In her cross action the defendant contended simply that the collision was the proximate result of the plaintiff's failure to yield the right of way to the defendant and in disregarding a stop sign erected at the intersection.On the trial of the case the only real issue was whether the collision was the proximate result of excessive speed on the part of the defendant, or the result of the plaintiff having driven her automobile into the intersection so closely in front of the defendant's approaching automobile as to create a hazardous situation resulting in the collision.The jury returned a verdict 'in favor of the defendant', and the plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial which was amended by the addition of three special grounds.The trial court overruled the motion, and she appealed to this court enumerating as error four rulings of the trial court.

1.Two witnesses for the plaintiff sought to testify as to the speed of the defendant's automobile and to state as the basis for their conclusion as to speed, not only their observation of the vehicle immediately prior to the collision, but also the impact itself, the movement of the vehicles after the impact and the damage to the vehicles.The trial court, while permitting the first witness to state his opinion as to the speed, refused to permit him to testify that his opinion was based on any factor other than his observation of the movement of the automobile immediately prior to the collision.We think that in so ruling the court erred.Code§ 38-1708;Lamb v. Sewell, 20 Ga.App. 250(1), 92 S.E. 1011;Rentz v. Collins, 51 Ga.App. 782(4), 181 S.E. 678;Ellison v. Evans, 85 Ga.App. 292(2), 69 S.E.2d 94.However, for an error to be grounds for reversal it must not only be error but harmful error.It is fundamental that harmless error is not cause for reversal.In this case the real issue was as to the speed of the defendant's automobile.There was testimony by a police officer, who investigated the accident, that the defendant stated to him that she was traveling 50 to 55 miles per hour at the time.The defendant, in her testimony, admitted making this statement to the officer.The first of the two witnesses was permitted to state his opinion as to the speed of the defendant's automobile, as was the other witness, with whose testimony we shall presently deal.Pictures of the plaintiff...