Jones v. Broomfield

• Decision Date: 30 September 2021
• Docket Number: Case No.: CV 98-10318 JLS
• Citation: 562 F.Supp.3d 652
• Parties: Ronald Anthony JONES, Petitioner, v. Ron BROOMFIELD, Acting Warden, California State Prison at San Quentin, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

562 F.Supp.3d 652

Ronald Anthony JONES, Petitioner,

v.Ron BROOMFIELD, Acting Warden, California State Prison at San Quentin, Respondent.

Case No.: CV 98-10318 JLS

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Signed September 30, 2021

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER GRANTING RELIEF AS TO CLAIM 4(1) PURSUANT TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

JOSEPHINE L. STATON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Jury selection in Petitioner's 1991 trial was incurably tainted by race-based discrimination. On federal habeas review, on the record, and under clearly established federal law, as discussed at length in the pages that follow, the Court determines that Petitioner is entitled to a new trial.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner Ronald Anthony Jones ("Petitioner") is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County, following his April 11, 1991 conviction on charges of first-degree murder, kidnapping for robbery, second-degree robbery, forcible rape while acting in concert, and forcible oral copulation. The jury found true the special circumstances that the murder was committed during the commission of the crimes of robbery, kidnapping, rape and oral copulation, and that Petitioner personally used a firearm to commit the murder. (CT 2141-46, 2152-54.) On May 7, 1991, the jury recommended that Petitioner be sentenced to death. (CT 2276, 2278.) The court accepted the jury's recommendation and sentenced Petitioner to death on June 4, 1991. (CT at 2325-30.)

On January 29, 1998, the California Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction and death sentence. People v. Jones , 17 Cal.4th 279, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890 (1998). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 13, 1998. Jones v. California , 525 U.S. 932, 119 S.Ct. 343, 142 L.Ed.2d 283 (1998). On November 4, 1997, while the initial appeal was still pending, Petitioner filed his first petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Dkt. No. 208-33 through 208-37.) On December 16, 1998, the state court denied the petition on the merits and on procedural grounds. (Dkt. No. 209-3.) On October 26, 2000, Petitioner filed his second state petition for writ of habeas corpus (his "exhaustion petition") in the California Supreme Court. (Dkt. Nos. 209-4 through 209-53.) The state court denied the exhaustion petition on the merits and on procedural grounds on March 28, 2001. (Dkt. No. 209-54.)

Petitioner filed the operative federal habeas corpus petition in this matter on October 26, 2000. (Dkt. No. 37 ("Pet.").) Respondent filed an Answer to the petition on November 24, 2008, and Petitioner filed a Traverse on June 15, 2009. (Dkt. Nos. 116 & 123.)

On July 8, 2009, this Court signed the parties' proposed order on their Joint Stipulation Regarding Schedule for Filing Petitioner's Evidentiary Hearing Motion and Joint Litigation Plan. (See Dkt. Nos 124-25.) The parties subsequently began conducting discovery, and the Court authorized one extension of the discovery deadline. (Dkt. No. 142.) On April 19, 2011, Respondent filed a Motion to Stay Remaining Discovery in light of Cullen v. Pinholster ,¹ and the Court issued a minute order on April 20, 2011, ordering the parties to conduct no further discovery pending determination of the impact of Pinholster and other recent United States Supreme Court decisions. (Dkt. Nos. 147-48.)

On September 28, 2012, Respondent filed his Brief Re: The Impact of Harrington v. Richter² and Cullen v. Pinholster on the Claims and Subclaims in the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and a renewed Motion to Dismiss on Procedural Default Grounds. (Dkt. No. 153.) On April 1, 2013, Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Claim Four, Subsection One, of His Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and an Ex Parte Application for Order for Suspension of Briefing Schedule Pending Outcome of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 161 ("MSJ") & 162.) Respondent filed an Opposition to the ex parte application on April 2, 2013, and the Court denied the application on April 9, 2013. (Dkt. Nos. 164 & 168.) Respondent subsequently filed an Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on April 30, 2013, and Petitioner filed a Reply on May 14, 2013. (Dkt. Nos. 172-173 ("Opp.") & 175 ("Reply").) On June 10, 2013, Petitioner filed his Brief Re: 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), Harrington v. Richter , and Cullen v. Pinholster , and Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. No. 179.) Respondent filed a Reply on December 6, 2013, and Petitioner filed a Sur-Reply on February 14, 2014. (Dkt. Nos. 192 & 194.)

Because of nature of habeas proceedings, as a general rule, neither motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) nor summary judgment motions under Rule 56 are particularly appropriate. See Anderson v. Butler , 886 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1989) (modern habeas corpus procedure has the same function as an ordinary appeal); O'Neal v. McAninch , 513 U.S. 432, 440, 442, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947(1995) (federal court's function in habeas corpus proceedings is to "review errors in state criminal trials" (emphasis omitted)). Motions for summary judgment are generally unnecessary because petitions may be decided immediately by the Court following submission of the pleadings provided no material issues of fact exist. See 1 R. Hertz & J. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure , § 17.3 (1988) ("The habeas corpus statute authorizes—indeed, it seems to require—the court treat the petition itself as the equivalent of a petitioner-initiated summary judgment motion ...."); cf. Rizzolo v. Puentes , No. 119CV00290SKOHC, 2019 WL 1229772, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2019) ("Because the Court's analysis of the merits of a habeas petition is equivalent to a summary judgment motion, motions for summary judgment are inappropriate in federal habeas cases.") (internal alteration marks and quotation marks omitted).

Nevertheless, because the merits briefing on the present matter is complete, because Petitioner's constitutional rights were clearly violated, and because the relief granted herein is long overdue, the Court construes the parties' briefing on Petitioner's motion for partial summary judgment as additional merits briefing on Claim 4(1). As set forth below, the Court grants Petitioner relief thereon.

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR FEDERAL HABEAS REVIEW

Because Petitioner's original § 2254 habeas petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254, applies to Petitioner's claims. Woodford v. Garceau , 538 U.S. 202, 210, 123 S.Ct. 1398, 155 L.Ed.2d 363 (2003) (holding that applicability of the AEDPA depends on whether the petitioner filed an application for habeas relief seeking an adjudication on the merits before or after the AEDPA's effective date). Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner whose claim has been "adjudicated on the merits" cannot obtain federal habeas relief unless that adjudication: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Richter , 562 U.S. at 98, 131 S.Ct. 770.

The "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses of § 2254(d)(1) have separate and distinct meanings. Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 404-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). The Supreme Court has explained that a state court decision is "contrary to our clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases" or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent." Id. at 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495 ; see Lockyer v. Andrade , 538 U.S. 63, 73, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (same). A state court decision is an "unreasonable application" of federal law "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the [petitioner's] case." Williams , 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495 ; Andrade , 538 U.S. at 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166. "The ‘unreasonable application’ clause requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous.... The state court's application of clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable." Andrade , 538 U.S. at 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166 (internal citation omitted); see Richter , 562 U.S. at 101, 131 S.Ct. 770. The United States Supreme Court made clear in Richter that "[a] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court's decision." Richter , 562 U.S. at 101, 131 S.Ct. 770 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado , 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004) ).

Where a petitioner satisfies either subsection (1) or (2) for a claim, then the federal court considers the claim de novo. See Panetti v. Quarterman , 551 U.S. 930, 953, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007) (when section 2254(d) is satisfied, "[a] federal court must then resolve the claim without the deference AEDPA otherwise requires"); Wiggins v. Smith , 539 U.S. 510, 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) ; Frantz v. Hazey , 533 F.3d 724, 737 (9th Cir. 2008) (where a federal court concludes that a petitioner has satisfied § 2254(d), it "review[s] the substantive constitutionality of the state custody de novo").

In making this assessment, a district court must ascertain the reasonableness of the decision by a state supreme...