Jones v. Buckingham Slate Co. Inc
| Decision Date | 12 March 1914 |
| Citation | 116 Va. 120,81 S.E. 28 |
| Parties | JONES et al. v. BUCKINGHAM SLATE CO., Inc. |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
A decree is final, so as to be appealable, when it either refuses or grants the relief sought by the complaining party.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 429. 432, 433, 450, 456, 457, 494-509; Dec. Dig. § 80.*]
Where complainant filed a bill of interpleader to have determined, as between defendants, who were adverse claimants, the right to royalties from a slate quarry which complainant held
and offered to bring into court, a decree overruling a demurrer to the bill, and directing complainant to deposit the funds held to the court's credit, and awarding it costs out of the fund, was final as to complainant, so as to be appealable by one of the defendants.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Apneal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 484-493; Dec. Dig. § 79.*]
A decree may be final and appealable as to one party, without being final as to all.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 484-493; Dec. Dig. § 79.*]
The boundaries between two tracts, the owners of which claimed royalties under their respective conveyances to complainant of the right to quarry slate thereon, is merely incidental to the ownership of the royalties, so far as concerns the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Appeals, in a suit of interpleader by the common grantee to have determined the adverse claims of (he grantors to certain royalties, so that the royalties involved must amount to at least $300 to give that court jurisdiction.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 773, 774, 778, 779; Dec. Dig. § 250.*]
While, where a judgment has the effect of drawing in question the validity of a claim to an amount greater than the jurisdictional sum of the Supreme Court of Appeals, an appeal will lie, though the amount involved in the present action is less than $300, and where the judgment appealed from involved the right to royalties from a slate quarry in a sum less than $300, and it does not affirmatively appear from the appellate record that the quarry operation will continue, so that a sum greater than that amount will ever be involved, the Supreme Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction of the appeal.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2310, 2311; Dec. Dig. $ 503.*]
The jurisdiction of the appellate court must affirmatively appear from the record.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2310, 2311; Dec. Dig. S 503.*]
Appeal from Circuit Court, Buckingham County.
Bill of interpleader by the Buckingham
Slate Company, Incorporated, against Jennie S. Jones, A. L. Pitts, and others. Decree that defendants interplead was granted, and on the issues between them decree was entered in favor of Pitts, and Jennie S. Jones and others appeal. Appeal dismissed.
F. C. Moon, of Lynchburg, and W. M. Justis, for appellants.
Smith & Gordon, of Richmond, E. W. Hubbard, of Buckingham, A. L. Pitts, Jr., of Scottsville, and Jas. F. Minor, of Richmond, for appellee.
KEITH, P. The Buckingham Slate Company filed a bill in the circuit court of Buckingham county, from which it appears that by deed dated November 23, 1904, Jennie S. Jones and others granted to the plaintiff theright to enter in and upon a certain tract of land for the purpose of searching for, quarrying, manufacturing, buying, and selling roofing slate. The deed provided for the payment by the Buckingham Slate Company, in March, June, September, and December of each year, certain royalties on the roofing slate manufactured, and for the termination of the rights thereby conveyed upon the failure of the Buckingham Slate Company to pay the royalties as agreed. Under this deed, the company took possession of what is known as the Dutch Gap quarry, which was the portion of the tract especially in contemplation of the parties, and situated on the southern part of the tract. By deed dated August 7, 1909, one A. L. Pitts conveyed to the Slate Company the right to enter upon land therein described, for the purpose of searching for, quarrying, and manufacturing roofing slate, with similar provisions as to payment of royalties to those contained in the deed from Jones and others, above mentioned.
After the execution of the deed from Pitts, the Slate Company proceeded to develop the Dutch Gap quarry in a southerly direction, and manufactured 332 squares of roofing slate, on which, at 15 cents per square, the stipulated royalties amounted to $49.80. Thereupon a controversy arose between Jennie S. Jones and others, grantors in the first deed, and A. L. Pitts, the grantor in the second deed, as to the true boundary line between their respective properties, and as to which of them was entitled to the royalties of $49.80 due on September 10, 1910; Mrs. Jones and her co-owners claiming that the true dividing line is some distance to the south from the southern end of the Dutch Gap quarry, as it existed on August 7, 1909; that the development at the southern end of the quarry was on their land; and that they are entitled to the whole of the $49.80, and any further royalties arising from that part of the quarry. On the other hand, Pitts claimed that the true dividing line between him and Mrs. Jones and her co-owners is just along the southern end of the Dutch Gap quarry, as it existed on August 7, 1909, and that he is entitled to the royalties of $49.S0, and to any further royalties arising from that part of the quarry.
The Slate Company avers and charges that it has no interest whatever in the controversy about the dividing line, or about the ownership of the royalties; that it now has in hand the sum of $49.80, which it holds as a stakeholder, and is ready and willing and now offers to pay into court, or to either one of the claimants, as the court may direct; that from time to time, as provided in the said deeds, it will have in hand further royalties, which will be payable to one or the other of the claimants, and which it is ready and willing, as they accrue, to pay into court or to either of the claimants, as the court may direct; that it has not colluded and is not colluding with either of the claimants; that it does not know which of the conflicting claims is correct, and is in doubt as to which of the claimants is entitled to receive the royalties; that the said conflicting claims have placed it in jeopardy of suits by both of the claimants for the recovery of the royalties of $49.80, and for the recovery of further royalties from time to time, and also subjects it to the risk of defaulting in the payment of royalties, all of which would harass and oppress it, and work irreparable loss and damage to it. It therefore prays that the grantors in the two deeds under which it holds may be made parties defendant and required to answer; that the conflicting claimants may be required to interplead as to the royalties of $49.80, and as to any other sums arising from the disputed boundary pending in this suit; that they may be required to adjust and settle their controversy; that complainant may be permitted to bring into court the royalties of $49.80, and any other such royalties which may arise pending this suit; that claimants may be enjoined and restrained from bringing any suit or suits against it on account thereof; and for further and general relief.
Mrs. Jones and her co-owners demurred to this bill as not sufficient in law, and, for special grounds of demurrer, say that the plaintiff is their tenant for years and leases from them, and has no right to attorn to any other person or to dispute or deny their title, and is estopped from so doing; nor has the plaintiff a right to file a bill of interpleader to require defendants to litigate their title.
Pitts answered, in substance admitting all the charges of the bill, denying all the allegations in the answer of Mrs. Jones and her co-owners inconsistent with his own answer, and praying that his answer may be treated as a cross-bill; that Mrs. Jones and her co-owners may be required to answer the same, answer under oath being waived.
Mrs. Jones and her co-owners took depositions to maintain her contention, and also asked leave to file an amended and supplemental answer; and, the case coming on to be heard on March 16, 1911, the court refused to read the depositions filed by Mrs. Jones and her co-owners, overruled the demurrer filed by them, and decreed that they and A. L. Pitts should interplead as to the true boundary line between the properties mentioned in their respective deeds, as set out in the exhibits filed with the plaintiff's bill; and, as to the royalties which had been brought into court, the Slate Company was directed to deposit them in bank to the credit of the court in settlement of the royalties due to defendants as...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- City of Chesapeake v. Cunningham
-
Shelton v. Sydnor
...the court rendering the judgment was given cognizance (Ritter Lumber Co. v. Coal Co., 115 Va. 370, 79 S. E. 322; Jones v. Buckingham Coal Co., 116 Va. 120, 81 S. E. 28), and the want of such jurisdiction of the trial court will be noticed by this court ex mero motu (South. & W. R. Co. v. Co......
-
Capell v. Capell
...of any court when the controversy is for a matter less in value or amount than $300, exclusive of costs." In Jones v. Buckingham Slate Co., 116 Va. 120, 81 S. E. 28, 31, are these statements of the law in Virginia: "It is true that we have held that 'where the effect of a judgment in a part......
-
Witt v. Witt's Ex'r
...it determined that he had no interest in the land, and that was the only question in which he was interested. In Jones v. Buckingham Slate Co., 116 Va. 120, 81 S. E. 28, a decree was held final as to Buckingham Slate Co., a stakeholder. It had brought money into court, which the court recei......