Jones v. California Interscholastic Federation

Decision Date11 January 1988
Citation243 Cal.Rptr. 271,197 Cal.App.3d 751
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Parties, 44 Ed. Law Rep. 431 CALIFORNIA INTERSCHOLASTIC FEDERATION, Defendant and Appellant, v. Demetrius JONES, a Minor, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent. Civ. B024235.
Patterson & Miller, Andrew Patterson and Robert C. Miller, West Covina, for defendant and appellant KLEIN, Presiding Justice

Jones alleged he was a 16-year old minor attending Calabasas and expecting to graduate in June 1987. Until June 1983, when Jones completed the ninth grade, he lived in Chicago with his mother. Jones then moved to California to join his father. He completed the tenth and eleventh grades in 1983-84 and 1984-85, respectively, in California.

Due to academic difficulties, Jones elected to repeat the eleventh grade during the 1985-86 school year. In 1986-87, his senior year, Jones sought to participate in Calabasas' varsity athletic and football program, but was precluded from doing so by Calabasas' enforcement of the CIF's Rule 202, the eight semester limitation (Rule 202). 1

Jones pled the CIF is an instrumentality of the state with respect to interscholastic athletics, and its Rule 202 is arbitrary and capricious both on its face and in its application to him. He maintained the rule was facially invalid because it provides for a possible waiver of the eight semester limitation where a student is required to return to grade eight from grade nine, without making such provision for similarly situated students in the upper grades.

Jones averred Rule 202 was overboard as applied to him on the ground his delayed graduation was due to academic reasons, and was not the result of "redshirting," 2 and he was thus being deprived of the opportunity to enjoy and participate fully in the programs offered by Calabasas.

The trial court granted the preliminary injunction and enjoined the CIF from enforcing Rule 202 against Jones with the rationale he was not a student in a CIF school for the first year of his eligibility 3 The CIF appeals.

and that Rule 200 makes Rule 202 applicable only to CIF schools. 4

CONTENTIONS

The CIF contends: (1) the issue presented is not moot, even though Jones will have completed his senior year by the time the case is resolved; (2) Rule 202 bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose; (3) the grant of the preliminary injunction upset the consistent and even application of Rule 202 throughout California and was an abuse of the trial court's discretion; and (4) the trial court erred in its construction of the subject rule.

DISCUSSION

1. Appellate principles.

Although Jones obtained the relief he sought and will have completed his senior year by the time this matter is heard, the appeal is not moot as it presents questions of continuing public interest " 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' " (Roe v. Wade (1973) 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 713, 35 L.Ed.2d 147), making resolution of the issues presented herein appropriate. (Steffes v. California Interscholastic Federation (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 739, 745, 222 Cal.Rptr. 355.)

An order granting or denying a preliminary injunction is appealable, as being within the meaning of the provision for appeals in cases involving injunctions. (Code Civ.Proc., § 904.1, subd. (f); Socialist Workers etc. Committee v. Brown (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 879, 885, fns. 4, 5, 125 Cal.Rptr. 915.)

" 'Whether a preliminary injunction shall be granted rests largely in the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion.' " (Ingrassia v. Bailey (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 117, 125, 341 P.2d 370.) However, the ultimate interpretation of a statute or administrative regulation is a question of law, and we are not bound by the trial court's determination. (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 699, 170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856; Shoban v. Board of Trustees (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 534, 541, 81 Cal.Rptr. 112; Westfall v. Swoap (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 109, 114, 129 Cal.Rptr. 750.)

2. Rule 202 passes constitutional muster.
a. Background.

The CIF was organized at a high school athletic convention held at the Y.M.C.A. Field House in Los Angeles on March 28, 1914. It is now one of 50 state associations that belong to the National Federation of State High School Associations. Generally, the rules recommended by the national body are adopted by the CIF. (CIF Southern Section 1986-87 Blue Book, p. 16.)

The CIF was legislatively recognized in 1981 as a voluntary organization with responsibility for administering interscholastic athletics in California secondary schools. (Ed.Code, § 33353.) 5 Enforcement of its rules constitutes "state action" for purposes of constitutional analysis. ( Steffes v. California Interscholastic Federation, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 746, 222 Cal.Rptr. 355.)

b. Rational basis standard of review appropriate.

While the right to public education has been determined to be a fundamental right under the California Constitution (Serrano v. Priest (1976) 18 Cal.3d 728, 765-766, 135 Cal.Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929), in a later case of first impression, Steffes held participation in interscholastic athletics does not involve a fundamental right so as to invoke strict scrutiny review standards. Therefore, an equal protection challenge involving such right is properly tested by the rational basis standard. (Steffes v. California Interscholastic Federation, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at pp. 747-748, 222 Cal.Rptr. 355.)

Under the rational basis test, Rule 202 need only be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. ( Id., at p. 748, 222 Cal.Rptr. 355.) " ' "If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.' " Once a rational relationship exists, ..., judicial scrutiny must cease. Whether the rule is wise or creates undue individual hardship are policy decisions better left to legislative and administrative bodies. Schools themselves are by far the better agencies to devise rules and restrictions governing extracurricular activities. Judicial intervention in school policy should always be reduced to a minimum.' " ( Id., at p. 749, 222 Cal.Rptr. 355.)

Mindful of Steffes ' directive, we are unmoved by Jones' argument the rule is facially invalid due to its more favorable treatment of students who are compelled to return to the eighth grade, as opposed to upperclass students who are held back in the later years. Equal protection guarantees are not offended by slightly more lenient treatment of younger students who have more time to remedy any academic deficiencies.

Separately, Jones concedes Rule 202 promotes academic pursuits by discouraging unnecessary delays in graduation for athletic reasons, but urges its application to him is arbitrary and capricious because he repeated the eleventh grade solely for academic reasons. However, Jones' recognition that Rule 202 has a rational basis makes his argument untenable, as judicial scrutiny ceases once a rational relationship is established. ( Steffes v. California Interscholastic Federation, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 749, 222 Cal.Rptr. 355.)

Further, Jones overlooks the fact that at least two important goals of the rule would be furthered by holding him subject thereto. Rule 202 creates interscholastic athletic opportunity for younger students more recently arrived at Calabasas. In addition, competitive equity among CIF member schools is advanced by averting a situation where teams of more veteran athletes encounter teams from schools where athletes have not been held back.

Rule 202 with its eight semester limitation bears a rational relationship to the various legitimate state purposes set forth above and is valid both on its face and in its application to Jones.

3. Trial court's construction of the rule erroneous.

Education Code section 35179 authorizes voluntary associations such as the CIF to enact and enforce rules relating to eligibility for, and participation in, interscholastic athletics. In the CIF's Rule 202 requiring eligibility for athletic competition to be used during a student's first eight consecutive semesters at that school or any other school, the disputed language is "any other school." The CIF interprets the phrase as applying to any school other than the current school of attendance, whenever situated, and whether or not said school is a CIF school.

The rationale behind the CIF's interpretation is the rule's promotion of a high school education over high school athletics. This priority requires Rule 202's eight semester requirement to be strictly adhered to, whether the semesters are spent in California, Illinois, a CIF school, or a nonCIF school.

Applying the same rules of construction to administrative rules and regulations as are applied to as statutes ( Westfall v. Swoap, supra, 58 Cal.App.3d at p. 114, 129 Cal.Rptr. 750), "[i]nterpretive constructions which render some words surplusage, defy common sense, or lead to mischief or absurdity, are to be avoided" (California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities...

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