Jones v. Cargill, Inc., 05-CV-129-LRR.

• Decision Date: 06 March 2007
• Docket Number: No. 05-CV-129-LRR.,05-CV-129-LRR.
• Citation: 490 F.Supp.2d 994
• Parties: Glynn JONES, Plaintiff, v. CARGILL, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

Page 994

490 F.Supp.2d 994

Glynn JONES, Plaintiff, v. CARGILL, INC., Defendant.

No. 05-CV-129-LRR.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Cedar Rapids Division.

March 6, 2007.

Thomas Andrew Newkirk, Fiedler & Newkirk, PLC, Urbandale, IA, for Plaintiff.

Mark A. Zaiger, Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Defendant.

ORDER

READE, Chief Judge.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

                TABLE OF CONTENTS
                I.  INTRODUCTION ..........................................................996
                  II.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND .................................................996
                 III.  JURISDICTION ..........................................................996
                  IV.  STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT .........................................997
                   V.  SUMMARY JUDGMENT FACTS ................................................998
                       A.  Background Facts ..................................................998
                       B.  Early Years .......................................................998
                       C.  Modhouse Job Bid ..................................................998
                       D.  First Months on the Modhouse Job ..................................998
                           1.  Players .......................................................998
                           2.  Training ......................................................998
                           3.  Testing .......................................................999
                       E.  Racist Language ...................................................999
                       F.  Early 2002 Complaints .............................................999
                       G.  Facial Hair ......................................................1000
                       H.  Overtime Allegation ..............................................1000
                       I.  November of 2002 Complaint .......................................1000
                       J.  "J.R." Comment ...................................................1000
                       K.  Locker Incident ..................................................1001
                       L.  PM Incident ......................................................1001
                       M.  Eric Fisher ......................................................1002
                  VI.  CONTINUING VIABILITY OF MCDONNELL-DOUGLAS ............................1002
                

                VII.  DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS ................................................1003
                       A.  Prima Facie Case .................................................1004
                           1.  Membership in a protected class ..............................1004
                           2.  Qualification ................................................1004
                           3.  Adverse employment action ....................................1005
                           4.  Circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination ..1005
                           5.  Conclusion ...................................................1006
                       B.  Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason ............................1006
                       C.  Pretext ..........................................................1006
                       D.  Conclusion .......................................................1007
                VIII.  RETALIATION CLAIMS ...................................................1007
                       A.  Prima Facie Case .................................................1007
                           1.  Protected activity ...........................................1007
                           2.  Adverse employment action ....................................1008
                           3.  Causal connection ............................................1008
                       B.  Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason ............................1010
                       C.  Pretext ..........................................................1010
                       D.  Conclusion .......................................................1010
                  IX.  DISPOSITION ..........................................................1010
                

I. INTRODUCTION

The matter before the court is Defendant Cargill, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion") (docket no. 13).

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 26, 2006, Plaintiff Glynn Jones filed a two-count Complaint against Defendant.¹ In Count I, Plaintiff alleges racebased discrimination and retaliation, in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965, Iowa Code ch. 216 ("ICRA"). In Count II, Plaintiff alleges race-based discrimination and retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. On December 22, 2005, Defendant filed an Answer, in which it denied the substance of the Complaint.

On January 2, 2007, Defendant filed the Motion. On February 5, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Resistance. On February 15, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Reply.

Neither party requests oral argument, and the court finds that oral argument is not necessary. The Motion is fully submitted, and thus the court turns to consider it.

III. JURISDICTION

The court has federal question jurisdiction over Count II. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the ... laws ... of the United States."). The court has supplemental jurisdiction over Count I. See id. § 1367(a) ("[T]he district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action with such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy."). But see id. § 1367(c) (granting district courts discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under certain circumstances).

IV. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "An issue of fact is genuine when `a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party' on the question." Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir.2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). A fact is material when it is a fact that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. The court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and afford it all reasonable inferences. Baer Gallery, 450 F.3d at 820 (citing Drake ex rel. Cotton v. Koss, 445 F.3d 1038, 1042 (8th Cir.2006)).

Procedurally, the moving party bears "the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which show a lack of a genuine issue." Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir.1992) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Once the moving party has successfully carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the nonmoving party has an affirmative burden to go beyond the pleadings and by depositions, affidavits, or otherwise, designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see, e.g., Baum v. Helget Gas Prods., Inc., 440 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir.2006) ("Summary judgment is not appropriate if the non-moving party can set forth specific facts, by affidavit, deposition, or other evidence, showing a genuine issue for trial."). The nonmoving party must offer proof "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "`Evidence, not contentions, avoids summary judgment.'" Reasonover v. St. Louis County, Mo., 447 F.3d 569, 578 (8th Cir.2006) (quoting Mayer v. Nextel W. Corp., 318 F.3d 803, 809 (8th Cir.2003)).

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has cautioned that "summary judgment should seldom be used in employment-discrimination cases." Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir.1994) (citing Johnson v. Minn. Historical Soc'y, 931 F.2d 1239, 1244 (8th Cir.1991)). Summary judgment is appropriate in employment discrimination cases only in "those rare instances where there is no dispute of fact and where there exists only one conclusion." Johnson, 931 F.2d at 1244. To put it another way, "[b]ecause discrimination cases often depend on inferences rather than on direct evidence, summary judgment should not be granted unless the evidence could not support any reasonable inference for the nonmovant." Crawford, 37 F.3d at 1341.

Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has also observed that, "[a]lthough summary judgment should be used sparingly in the context of employment discrimination cases, the plaintiff's evidence must go beyond the establishment of a prima facie case to support a reasonable inference regarding the alleged illicit reason for the defendant's action." Landon v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 72 F.3d 620, 624 (8th Cir.1995) (citation and internal citation omitted); accord Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1134, 35 (8th Cir.1999) (observing that the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), must be used to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate).

V. SUMMARY JUDGMENT FACTS

Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and affording him all reasonable inferences, the summary judgment facts are these:

A. Background Facts

Defendant operates a corn milling plant in Cedar Rapids, Iowa ("Plant"). Defendant employs approximately 250 people at the Plant. Presently, only three full-time employees are African-Americans. There are no African-Americans in management at the Plant.

The Chauffers, Teamsters and Helpers, Local Union No. 238 ("Union") represents workers at the Plant, pursuant to a Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA"). The CBA permits Defendant to fire any employee without notice for dishonesty. Consistent with the CBA, Defendant's General Code of Conduct allows the immediate termination of an employee for "committing a dishonest act ... or acting improperly ... in completing or falsifying [Defendant's] records or reports."

B. Early Years

On February 26, 1990, Defendant hired P...