Jones v. Carroll

• Citation: 628 F.Supp.2d 551
• Decision Date: 24 June 2009
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 06-129-SLR.
• Parties: Charles P. JONES, Plaintiff, v. Warden Thomas CARROLL, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

628 F.Supp.2d 551

Charles P. JONES, Plaintiff, v. Warden Thomas CARROLL, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 06-129-SLR.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

June 24, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jeffrey K. Martin, Esquire, of Martin & Associates, P.A., Wilmington, DE, for Plaintiff.

Ophelia Michelle Waters, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, DE, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROBINSON, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Charles P. Jones ("plaintiff"), a former inmate at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, formerly known as the Delaware Correctional Center ("DCC"), Smyrna, Delaware, filed this civil rights complaint as a pro se inmate pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on February 27, 2006. (D.I. 2) On March 5, 2008, 536 F.Supp.2d 507 (D.Del.2008), this court granted summary judgment¹ in favor of State defendants former Warden Thomas Carroll ("Warden Carroll"), Staff Lt. Alisha Profaci ("Profaci"), Lt. Peter Forbes ("Forbes"), and Correctional Officer Joseph Pomella ("Pomella") (collectively, "State defendants"). (D.I. 73, 74) The court subsequently granted plaintiffs motion for reargument on August 20, 2008, "based on the fact that plaintiff is now represented by counsel who has garnered more facts for the court's review." (D.I. 78 at 1) On October 15, 2008, plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to State defendants' motion for summary judgment. (D.I. 80) State defendants filed their supplemental reply on November 5, 2008. (D.I. 84) For the reasons set forth below, the court will grant in part and deny in part State defendants' motion for summary judgment.

II. BACKGROUND

It is undisputed that plaintiff sustained a serious injury after another inmate, Anibal Melendez ("Melendez"), stabbed him in the right eye with a sharpened toothbrush on September 12, 2005 at the DCC. (Id. at ¶ 1) It is also undisputed that Melendez and plaintiff were housed in close proximity to each other on the same tier at the time of the attack. (D.I. 68 at ¶ 5; D.I. 80 at ¶ 2) Plaintiff claims that encounters between Melendez and him began several months before the attack. Plaintiff asserts that, prior to July 2005, he stepped in and prevented several physical confrontations between Melendez and other inmates. (D.I. 80 at ¶ 2; D.I. 81, ex. A at 41-46) Melendez then directed his anger toward plaintiff, cursing and threatening him. (D.I. 80 at ¶ 3; D.I. 81, ex. A at 49) In or around July 2005, Melendez told plaintiff that Melendez was going to kill him. (D.I. 80 at ¶ 4; D.I. 81, ex. A at 50) The next day, as plaintiff exited his cell for recreation, Melendez began "swinging" at plaintiff. (D.I. 80 at ¶ 4; D.I. 81, ex. A at 50) "After [Melendez] started swinging on me ... I beat him up, [but] I really only wanted him to back up," plaintiff stated in his deposition. (D.I. 82, ex. A at 2)

Following the fight, which plaintiff claims was witnessed by several other inmates, Melendez continued threatening to kill plaintiff. According to plaintiff, another inmate named "Puno" informed plaintiff that Melendez was going to stab plaintiff. (D.I. 80 at ¶ 5; D.I. 82, ex. A at 2) While performing his tier-cleaning duties, plaintiff conversed with Melendez who told plaintiff that "I'm going to get you." (D.I. 82, ex. A at 8) Around late August or early September 2005, after Melendez continued threatening, plaintiff asserts that he told defendant Pomella that "[Melendez] keep[s] threatening me . . . he['s] going to kill me." (Id.) Pomella maintains that, prior to the September stabbing, he had no knowledge of any aggravating circumstances between Melendez and plaintiff. (D.I. 68, ex. F at ¶ 6)

Plaintiff asserts that, shortly after his alleged conversation with Pomella, he told defendant Forbes that "[Melendez] keep[s] threatening to kill me, and we already done had an altercation, been in a fight. You need to split us up." (D.I. 80 at ¶ 8; D.I. 82, ex. A at 8-9) Forbes denies having any knowledge of the relationship between Melendez and plaintiff and also states that he does not recall the alleged conversation between plaintiff and him. (D.I. 68 at ¶ 20; Id., ex. D at ¶ 4) Defendant Profaci also denies that plaintiff ever told her that Melendez was a violent person. (D.I. 68 at ¶ 20; Id., ex. E at ¶ 5)

On September 12, 2005, Melendez, plaintiff, and other inmates were released from their cells for a recreation period. (D.I. 80 at ¶ 9; D.I. 82, ex. A at 14) During recreation, while plaintiff and another inmate named "Chicken George" were playing cards, Melendez approached plaintiff from behind and stabbed him in the eye with a sharpened toothbrush. (D.I. 80 at ¶ 9; D.I. 82, ex. A at 16-18) Plaintiff asserts that "[t]here were absolutely no corrections officers in the area [where the stabbing occurred] supervising the inmates." (D.I. 80 at ¶ [sic] 10; D.I. 82, ex. A at 19)

Plaintiff sues State defendants under a failure to protect theory and seeks both lifelong medical care with regard to his eye and damages in the amount of $16 million. (D.I. 2 at 9) In his October 15, 2008 memorandum, plaintiff conceded that his claim against Warden Carroll should be dismissed. (D.I. 80 at ¶ 27) State defendants renew their motion for summary judgment on the bases that plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, that plaintiff fails to prove any set of facts to support a claim that State defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiffs need for protection, and that State defendants are immune. (D.I. 68) Plaintiff asks the court to deny the motion on the bases that he should be excused from the exhaustion requirement, that State defendants failed to protect him despite their knowledge of prior incidents, and that State defendants are not immune. (D.I. 80)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court shall grant summary judgment only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 n. 10, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir.2007). "Facts that could alter the outcome are `material,' and disputes are `genuine' if evidence exists from which a rational person could conclude that the position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct." Horowitz v. Fed. Kemper Life Assurance Co., 57 F.3d 300, 302 n. 1 (3d Cir.1995) (internal citations omitted).

If the moving party has demonstrated an absence of material fact, the nonmoving party then "must come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). However, a party opposing summary judgment "must present more than just `bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions' to show the existence of a genuine issue." Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Indeed, to survive a motion for summary judgment, plaintiff cannot rely merely on the unsupported allegations of the complaint, and must present more than the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case with respect to which it has the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

State defendants argue that summary judgment is appropriate because plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this action pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA").² Before filing a civil action, a plaintiff-inmate must exhaust his administrative remedies, even if the ultimate relief sought is not available through the administrative process. See Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 300 (3d Cir.2000), aff'd, 532 U.S. 731, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001); see also Ahmed v. Sromovski, 103 F.Supp.2d 838, 843 (E.D.Pa.2000) (quoting Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 73 (3d Cir.2000) (stating that § 1997e(a) "specifically mandates that inmate-plaintiffs exhaust their available administrative remedies")). Under Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006), exhaustion means proper exhaustion, that is, "a prisoner must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court." Id. at 88, 126 S.Ct. 2378. Prison conditions have been held to include the "environment in which prisoners live, the physical conditions of that environment and the nature of the services provided therein." Booth, 206 F.3d at 295. Because an inmate's failure to exhaust under the PLRA is an affirmative defense, the inmate is not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in his complaint. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies must be pled and proved by defendant. Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir.2002).

Plaintiff concedes that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in the literal sense as outlined by the Delaware...