Jones v. Caruso

Decision Date27 September 2012
Docket NumberCase No. 2:11-CV-65
PartiesRAMONE JONES Plaintiff, v. PATRICIA CARUSO, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

HON. GORDON J. QUIST

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On July 30, 2012, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (R & R) (Docket no. 47) recommending that this Court grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket no. 32) because Plaintiff, Ramone Jones, failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies. On August 10, 2012, Plaintiff filed a timely Objection to the Report and Recommendation (Docket no. 51), to which Defendants responded. (Docket no. 54.)

When a party properly objects to any part of a magistrate judge's disposition, this Court must review the disposition de novo. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). After conducting a de novo review of the R & R, Plaintiff's objections, and the pertinent portions of the record, the Court concludes that the R & R should be rejected. However, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on other grounds presented in Defendants' brief in support of the motion. (Docket no. 33.)

I. The Report and Recommendation Will Be Rejected

The R & R recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's claims for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies through the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)grievance process. The R & R relies upon on an affidavit from the Manager of the Office of Legal Affairs, Richard D. Russell. In his affidavit, Russell attests, "I have caused a search of the database relevant to step III grievance appeals filed by the plaintiff. Plaintiff has not filed any Step III Grievance appeals to date." (Docket no. 33-2, Page ID 219.) However, after Plaintiff's Objection, Defendants now concede that Russell's affidavit "contains some erroneous information" upon which the Magistrate unknowingly relied, and Plaintiff has exhausted the necessary grievance procedures. (Docket no. 54, Page ID 298.) Therefore, through no fault of the Magistrate Judge, this Court will reject the R & R. This Court will now address Defendants' alternative arguments presented in their Motion for Summary Judgment.

II. First Amendment Retaliation
A. Plaintiff's Allegations Arising from the Seizure of Legal Documents on October 26, 2007, Fail to State a Claim

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Jenkins violated Plaintiff's First Amendment rights when Jenkins seized Plaintiff's legal documents during a search of Plaintiff's cell on October 26, 2007. (See Docket no. 1, Page ID 16-17.) Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, Plaintiff must allege that "(1) he engaged in protected conduct; (2) the defendant took an adverse action against him 'that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct'; and (3) that the adverse action was taken (at least in part) because of the protected conduct." Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 440 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Thaddeus X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (a court shall dismiss a complaint at any time if it fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted).

Plaintiff's retaliation claim fails to state a claim for two reasons. First, Plaintiff does not allege that he engaged in any protected conduct before the October 26, 2007, search occurred.Second, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Jenkins searched Plaintiff's cell or seized legal documents as a result of any protected conduct.

Moreover, even if Plaintiff did allege that Jenkins acted as a result of protected conduct, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment would be granted. First, Plaintiff does not offer evidence to show that Jenkins searched Plaintiff's cell or confiscated Plaintiff's materials because Plaintiff engaged in protected conduct. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 475 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant's adverse actions were motivated, at least in part, by a plaintiff's protected conduct). Second, Jenkins has satisfied his burden to show that he would have confiscated Plaintiff's materials regardless of any protected conduct in which Plaintiff engaged. Id. ("If the prisoner can show that the defendants' adverse action was at least partially motivated by the prisoner's protected conduct, then the burden shifts to the defendants to show that they would have taken the same action even absent such protected conduct.") (citing Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 399). Jenkins attests that he confiscated Plaintiff's material because he believe it to be contraband—specifically, "a threat to the security of the institution." (Docket no. 33-4, Page ID 229.) Plaintiff's complaint, which is properly considered an affidavit for purposes of the summary judgment motion, see Miller v. Jones, No. 10-5282, 2012 WL 2044366, at *1 (6th Cir. June 6, 2012), does not refute Jenkins's statement. Hill, 630 F.3d at 475 ("'[C]onclusory allegations of retaliatory motive unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state a . . . claim.'") (quoting Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2005)). Jenkins's statement that he acted regardless of protected conduct is also supported by the conclusion of an administrative hearing that the seized materials violated MDOC policy. See Ruiz v. Bouchard, 60 F. App'x 572, 574 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding plaintiff failed to state a viable retaliation claim where he was convicted of misconduct charges through a grievance process).

B. Plaintiff's Allegations Arising from the Seizure of Legal Documents on January 10, 2008, Fail to State a Claim

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Jenkins violated Plaintiff's First Amendment rights when Jenkins seized Plaintiff's legal documents during a search of Plaintiff's cell on January 10, 2008. (See Docket no. 1, Page ID 22.) Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Among other things, Plaintiff must allege "that the adverse action was taken (at least in part) because of the protected conduct." Thomas, 481 F.3d at 440. Plaintiff does not allege that Plaintiff's prior protected conduct motivated Jenkins to search Plaintiff's cell on January 10, 2008.

Even if Plaintiff did state a claim, Defendants' motion for summary judgment would be granted. Defendant Jenkins attests that he confiscated Plaintiff's materials because it appeared to be "contraband" and "a threat to the security of the institution." (Docket no. 33-4, Page ID 229.) In other words, Jenkins asserts that he would have taken the same action absent Plaintiff's conduct. See Hill, 630 F.3d at 475 (citing Thaddeus-X, 174 F.3d at 399). Plaintiff's response is to rely on his sworn complaint1 and attached exhibits. (Docket no. 36 at Page ID 242.) However, Plaintiff's complaint and exhibits do not contain evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in favor of Plaintiff. See Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1048 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that no genuine issue of material fact exists "unless a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"). In fact, Plaintiff's affidavit and exhibits are replete with evidence that Defendant Jenkins did not act with a retaliatory motive. For example, the Administrative Hearing Report found that Plaintiff's paperwork violated MDOC policy Directive 05.0.118 paragraph HH(prisoner mail) because it advocates or promotes the violation of state or federal laws.2 (Docket no. 1-1, Page ID 65.) Again, this strengthens Jenkins's contention that his reason for confiscating materials was not retaliation. See Ruiz, 60 F. App'x at 574.

C. The Court Will Grant Summary Judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff's Allegations Arising from a Denial of Entry into the Law Library on January 10, 2008

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiff's First Amendment rights when Jenkins, in conjunction with Defendants Blamer, Sindles, and Beseau, stopped Plaintiff while he was on his way to the law library. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants searched Plaintiff's person and Defendants noticed that Plaintiff possessed paperwork for a civil complaint against Defendant Jenkins. (See Docket no. 1, Page ID 22.) Defendants then refused to allow Plaintiff to proceed to the law library and confiscated his legal documents.

Plaintiff's retaliation claim arising from January 10, 2008 does state a claim. As distinguished from the preceding First Amendment retaliation claims, Plaintiff specifically alleges that Defendants had a retaliatory motive for denying library access and confiscating his documents:Defendants had just discovered that Plaintiff had filed a civil complaint against Jenkins.3 However, the Court will grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim because the Court finds there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" regarding an essential element of the non-moving party's case and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Kocak v. Cmty. Health Partners of Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Genuine issues are those which could persuade a reasonable person to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. The standard for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. McGowan, 421 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986)); see also Tucker v. Union of Needletrades Indus. & Textile Emps., 407 F.3d 784,...

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