Jones v. Caruso

Citation569 F.3d 258
Decision Date23 June 2009
Docket NumberNo. 07-2393.,07-2393.
PartiesWalter JONES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Patricia L. CARUSO, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

Linda Olivieri, Assistant Attorney General, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellants. Walter Jones, Kincheloe, Michigan, pro se.

Before: KEITH, COLE, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.

COLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which KEITH, J., joined. McKEAGUE, J. (pp. 279-81), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

OPINION

COLE, Circuit Judge.

Defendants-Appellants Patricia L. Caruso, Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections ("MDOC"), Linda Matuszak, the Record Office Supervisor at Saginaw Correctional Facility, and Jan E. Trombley, the Warden at Saginaw Correctional Facility (collectively, "Defendants"), appeal the district court's denial of their motion to reconsider its order enjoining them from enforcing subsection (HH)(23) ("Rule 23") of MDOC Policy Directive ("MDOC PD") 05.03.118 ("Prisoner Mail"), which pro se Plaintiff-Appellee Walter Jones claims infringes on his First Amendment and Due Process rights. MDOC PD 05.03.118, which became effective on March 19, 1985, sets forth MDOC's guidelines for prisoners' mail rights. The directive includes a list of prohibited materials prisoners "shall not be allowed to receive ... as they are considered to be a threat to the order and security of an institution or to the rehabilitation of prisoners." MDOC PD 05.03.118(N).

This case relates to Rule 23 of the policy directive, which specifically regulates prisoners' possession of UCC-related materials. Defendants argue that the district court's injunction should be dissolved because: (1) the district court mistakenly found UCC-related materials to be "legal mail" subject to heightened First Amendment protections; (2) the district court erred in finding that Rule 23 is not rationally related to the legitimate penological objective of maintaining order and discipline in MDOC prisons; (3) the district court erred in finding that Rule 23's scholarly-materials exception did not alleviate First Amendment concerns; (4) the district court's issuance of the injunction interfered with the "well-supported judgment of prison officials"; and (5) the district court erroneously applied the standard for the issuance of preliminary injunctions. Jones counters that: (1) this Court cannot consider arguments that Defendants have raised for the first time on appeal; (2) Defendants have regulated their UCC ban through other MDOC directives, obviating the need to dissolve the injunction; and (3) the district court properly determined that the facts met the standard for issuance of a preliminary injunction. Although the district court abused its discretion in applying the incorrect level of scrutiny to analyze Rule 23, for the following reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's preliminary injunction on its merits and REMAND the case to the district court for further consideration not inconsistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
1. Development of Rule 23

Since 2004, there has been a nationwide increase in the number of filings by prison inmates of unsubstantiated liens and Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") financing statements against state or federal officials involved with their incarceration. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, No. CV205-158, 2005 WL 2237640, at *1-2 (S.D.Ga. Aug.25, 2005) (finding that prisoners filed "facially absurd" liens and UCC financing statements designed to harass and intimidate government officials in the performance of their duties); United States v. Orrego, No. 04 CV 0008 SJ, 2004 WL 1447954, at *2-3 (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 2004) (granting government's motion for summary judgment where prisoner purported to copyright his name, after which he filed fraudulent liens against various government officials for using his name without permission or payment); Ray v. Williams, No. CV-04-863-HU, 2005 WL 697041, at *2 (D.Or. Mar.24, 2005) (granting government's motion for summary judgment where prisoner submitted UCC filings against government officials, seeking payment for unauthorized use of his copyrighted name); United States v. Martin, 356 F.Supp.2d 621, 626-27 (W.D.Va.2005) (finding "null and void" prisoner's fraudulent UCC financing statements naming himself as the secured party for a $108,000,000.00 debt purportedly owed to him by various government officials); United States v. Brum, No. CIV. A. 105CV110, 2005 WL 1606584, at *3 (E.D.Tex. July 1, 2005) (granting government's motion for summary judgment where prisoner filed fraudulent liens and UCC financing statements against the judge and prosecutor involved in his criminal conviction); Cooperwood v. McDonald, No. 2:05 CV 111, 2005 WL 1427718, at *2-4 (W.D.Mich. June 13, 2005) (dismissing prisoner's civil rights action under the Prison Litigation Reform Act where prisoner filed a fraudulent lien "for infringement of his copyrighted name"); United States v. Stouder, No. 3:04-1044, 2005 WL 2715666, at *3-5 (M.D.Tenn. Sept.2, 2005) (declaring null and void prisoner's fraudulent UCC financing statements against government officials in the amount of $300,000,000.00).

On March 30, 2004, in response to increased activity by Michigan prisoners engaging in these types of fraudulent schemes, MDOC Director, Defendant Caruso, used her authority to establish policy through a Director's Office Memorandum ("DOM") and enacted DOM 2004-8, "Fraudulent Activities Involving the Uniform Commercial Code." See Jones v. Mich. Dep't of Corrs., No. 05-CV-72817-DT, 2006 WL 2805643, at *1 (E.D.Mich. Sept.28, 2006).1 On January 1, 2005, DOM 2004-8 was superseded by DOM 2005-4, which also restricted prisoners' use of UCC publications in an effort to confront "increased activity by prisoners engaging in various schemes involving the UCC." (Joint Appendix ("JA") 82-83). Also, on March 30, 2005, prison officials approved Housing Unit Rule #45 ("Rule 45"), a policy, which, like DOM 2004-8 and DOM 2005-4, declared that MDOC would consider UCC-related materials to be "contraband" subject to seizure because prisoners could use those materials to facilitate criminal activity.

On June 6, 2005, DOM 2005-4 was superseded by MDOC PD 05.03.118(HH)(22) ("Rule 22"), prohibiting certain types of incoming mail. Rule 22 stated:

PROHIBITED INCOMING MAIL

HH. Prisoners are prohibited from receiving mail that is a threat to the security, good order, or discipline of the facility, may facilitate or encourage criminal activity, or may interfere with the rehabilitation of the prisoner. The following pose such risks within a correctional facility under all circumstances and therefore shall be rejected.

* * *

22. Mail regarding actions that can be taken under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). This does not include legal materials which set forth the statute or provide a scholarly legal analysis of the UCC.

(JA 21.) Rule 22 prohibited prisoners from receiving and possessing certain UCC-related materials but was interpreted by the MDOC officials as making exceptions for UCC-related publications held in the prison law library, such as the Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated or scholarly analyses of the relevant statutes. See Jones, 2006 WL 2805643, at *2. MDOC officials also interpreted Rule 22 as preventing prisoners from using funds from their personal institutional accounts to purchase prohibited UCC materials and required MDOC staff to reject such items that a prisoner received through the mail and to confiscate such items that a prisoner already possessed. Id.

On January 1, 2006, MDOC amended MDOC PD 05.04.118(HH), such that subsection HH(22) now states (in renumbered sub-paragraph 23 ("Rule 23")):

23. Mail regarding actions that can be taken under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) which could be used to harass or threaten another individual, including the filing of a lien against the individual. This does not include legal materials which set forth the statute or provide a scholarly legal analysis of the UCC.

(JA 397) (emphasis added). MDOC also sought legislation that would make inmates' UCC abuses punishable as criminal offenses, and, in 2004, it became a felony in Michigan to knowingly and intentionally file a false or fraudulent financing statement with the Secretary of State under the UCC. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.9501(6) (2004).2

2. Enforcement of Rule 23 against Jones

Jones is currently serving a life sentence in the custody of MDOC. After MDOC enacted DOM 2004-8, Jones notified prison officials that he possessed books, pamphlets, forms, and other literary materials that referenced usage of the UCC regulations but were not associated with criminal or fraudulent activity. On February 10, 2005, Jones attempted to send a letter to the Michigan Secretary of State seeking forms related to Michigan copyright and trademark registration laws. On February 14, 2005, Jones's metered envelope was returned to him without the letter. Jones then filed grievances based on Defendants' enforcement of DOM 2004-8 and their alleged failure to provide him with reasons for confiscating his correspondence. After exhausting the applicable MDOC grievance procedures, Jones filed the instant suit.

B. Procedural history

Jones filed his complaint on July 19, 2005, alleging under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that DOM 2004-8 suppresses communication and is facially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. Because DOM 2004-8 was superseded by Rule 22, the magistrate and district judges construed Jones's claims as arising from Rule 22. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (granting liberal construction to pro se filings); Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985) ("The allegations of a pro se petition, `though vague and conclusory, are entitled to a liberal construction.'").

Jones sought the following relief: (1) a...

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