Jones v. CitiMortgage, Inc.
| Decision Date | 07 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. CV F 12-2067 LJO SMS |
| Parties | KEVIN JONES, et al., Plaintiff, v. CITIMORTGAGE, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER ON CITIMORTGAGE'S F.R.Civ.P.
12 MOTION TO DISMISS
(Doc. 7.)
Defendant CitiMortgage, Inc. ("CMI") seeks to dismiss as lacking sufficient facts plaintiffs Kevin Jones and Cheryl Jones' (collectively the "Joneses'") claims arising from attempts to modify their loan for their Merced property ("property"). The Joneses respond that they have "pled more than sufficient facts to allege the nature and extent of the wrongful conduct" committed by CMI. This Court considered CMI's F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the record and VACATES the February 13, 2013 hearing, pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). For the reasons discussed below, this Court DISMISSES without prejudice this action.
On July 31, 2006, the Joneses executed in CMI's favor a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on the property.
In April 2009, CMI informed the Joneses that they qualified for a loan modification to reduce their monthly payments to $1,395 if the Joneses remained 90 days late on their payments. After falling 90 days behind, the Joneses submitted $1,395 monthly payments during June to November 2009 "as instructed" by CMI.
In November 2009, CMI provided the Joneses a Home Affordable Modification Trial Period Plan ("HAMP trial"), which included a schedule for December 2009 and January and February 2010 payments. The HAMP trial obligated the Joneses to pay on scheduled dates amounts, "which includes payment for Escrow items, including real estate taxes, insurance premiums and other fees, if any, of U.S. $1,395.00." The Joneses signed and returned the Hamp trial and submitted the HAMP trial payments up to November 2010 "as directed by" CMI.
In November 2010, CMI representative Kevin Jones informed the Joneses that CMI approved their permanent loan modification with a monthly payment around $1,600. CMI's November 5, 2010 letter ("November 5 letter") to the Joneses enclosed a Home Affordable Modification Agreement ("modification agreement"). The November 5 letter addressed an escrow account and stated:
During December 2010, the Joneses attempted to submit their first $2,150.91 payment. CMI representatives advised that $2,150.91 was an unacceptable partial payment and that the Joneses were required to pay $2,651.19.2 On January 10, 2011, CMI representative Ashanca agreed to accept the Joneses' $2,150.91 payment and advised that the Joneses should mail their monthly payments.
On January 28, 2011, the Joneses telephoned CMI to attempt to submit their January 2011 payment, and CMI representative Junell accepted it and informed the Joneses to mail their monthly payments. The Joneses mailed to CMI their February 2011 to April 2012 monthly payments of $2,150.91.
On January 17, 2012, the Joneses received a CMI demand letter that they were in default for $12,778.09. The Joneses immediately contacted CMI, and CMI representative Airean informed them the default was due to failure to make escrow payments. The Joneses informed Airean that the November 5 letter explained that their modified loan contained an escrow account, that their initial escrow payment was $500.58, and that the escrow payment was included in their monthly loan payment as noted in Section 3.C. of the modification agreement, which set out an initial $2,150.91 monthly payment. Airean represented to the Joneses that Section 3.C. of the modification agreement reflected CMI's erroneous omission of the escrow payment and that the Joneses should have been making $2,600 monthly payments. Numerous CMI representatives and managers continued to represent to the Joneses that CMI had failed to include the escrow amount in their monthly payments and that the Joneses were required to make $2,600 monthly payments.
In May 2012, CMI returned the Joneses' payment with a letter from CMI's foreclosure department that CMI would not accept the Joneses' payments because their loan was in foreclosure. CMI also returned the Joneses' June, July and August 2012 payments.
On July 13, 2012, defendant Cal-Western Reconveyance recorded a notice of default for the property. On July 17, 2012, the Joneses requested CMI for McGraw Project assistance and wereinformed by CMI associate Brondy Leung ("Ms. Leung") that the Joneses did not qualify for such assistance due to CMI's mistake on their loan modification.
CMI's August 27, 2012 letter informed the Joneses that they were ineligible for HAMP modification. On September 4, 2012, CMI representative Brian telephoned the Joneses that they had been approved for a trial modification under CMI's Supplemental Modification Program with $2,291.79 monthly payments.
The Joneses rejected the modification offer and contested default. In September 2012, CMI accepted the Joneses' $2,150.91 payment.
CMI seeks to dismiss the complaint's fraud and related claims as lacking facts to satisfy elements of the claims.
Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683 (1974); Gilligan v. Jamco Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where there is either a "lack of a cognizable legal theory" or "the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990); Graehling v. Village of Lombard, Ill., 58 F.3d 295, 297 (7th Cir. 1995). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion "tests the legal sufficiency of a claim." Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).
In addressing dismissal, a court must: (1) construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true; and (3) determine whether plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would merit relief. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-338 (9th Cir. 1996). Nonetheless, a court is not required "to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." In re Gilead Sciences Securities Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). A court "need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations," U.S. ex rel. Chunie v.Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643, n. 2 (9th Cir.1986), and must not "assume that the [plaintiff] can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S.Ct. 897 (1983). A court need not permit an attempt to amend if "it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by an amendment." Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2005).
A plaintiff is obliged "to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' [which] requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554,127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, a court "will dismiss any claim that, even when construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, fails to plead sufficiently all required elements of a cause of action." Student Loan Marketing Ass'n v. Hanes, 181 F.R.D. 629, 634 (S.D. Cal. 1998). In practice, a complaint "must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562, 127 S.Ct. at 1969 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)).
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937,1949 (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court explained:
. . . a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." . . . A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. . . . The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. (Citations omitted.)
After discussing Iqbal, the Ninth Circuit summarized: "In sum, for a complaint to survive [dismissal], the non-conclusory 'factual content,' and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. at 1949).
The U.S. Supreme Court applies a "two-prong approach" to address dismissal:
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