Jones v. City of Chicago

• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: Georgia N. Alexakis United States District Judge
• Docket Number: 23 CV 4975
• Decision Date: 12 November 2024
• Citation: Jones v. City of Chicago, 23 CV 4975 (N.D. Ill. Nov 12, 2024)
• Parties: MICHAEL JONES, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, BRYAN COX, PETER THEODORE, DAVID SALGADO, AND ROCCO PRUGER, Defendants.
• topic: Civil Rights,Commercial Litigation,Administrative Law

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MICHAEL JONES, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, BRYAN COX, PETER THEODORE, DAVID SALGADO, AND ROCCO PRUGER, Defendants.

No. 23 CV 4975

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

November 12, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Georgia N. Alexakis United States District Judge

Plaintiff Michael Jones filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action [1] alleging that his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) Officers Bryan Cox, Rocco Pruger, David Salgado, and Peter Theodore (“the officers”). He also brings two claims against the City of Chicago (“the City”) one for malicious prosecution under Illinois law and one under Monell v. City of New York, 436 U.S. 659 (1978). The City moves to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. [23]. The officers join the motion. [25], [26]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies defendants' motion in part and grants it in part.

I. Legal Standards

Defendants' motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. Christensen v. Cnty. Of Boone, Ill., 483 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2007). Dismissal is warranted only if the allegations, taken as true (as the Court does in the section that follows), do not state a plausible claim for relief. Id.

The complaint must also give defendants fair notice of the claim and its grounds: It must name the plaintiff and the defendants, state the nature of plaintiff's grievance, and lend a “few tidbits” that allow the defendant to investigate plaintiff's claims. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P 8(a)(2)).

II. Factual Background

The officers arrested plaintiff on March 31, 2015, ostensibly for possessing drugs. [1] ¶¶ 3, 5, 13. They had neither a warrant for plaintiff's arrest nor probable cause to believe plaintiff possessed drugs. Id. ¶¶ 6, 13.

The officers then fabricated a story to justify plaintiff's arrest and detention. Id. ¶ 7. Per the agreed-upon fabricated story, the officers observed plaintiff selling drugs. Id. ¶ 8. When the officers approached plaintiff, he dropped the drugs and fled, and then admitted to selling drugs. Id.

One or more of the officers then prepared official police reports of this fabricated story. Id. ¶¶ 9-10. One or more of the officers attested to this fabrication in the police reports. Id. ¶ 9. One or more of the officers conveyed the fabricated story to prosecutors. Id. Because plaintiff knew the jury would likely believe the officers' fabricated story, he pled guilty to possessing drugs and was sentenced to three years in prison. Id. ¶¶ 13-15.

After plaintiff served this sentence, he learned that two of the defendant officers had reported arresting and transporting another man at the same time they were allegedly arresting plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 11, 12, 17. Realizing that the two stories were irreconcilable, plaintiff moved to vacate his conviction. Id. ¶¶ 12, 17, 18. On August 26, 2022, a state court vacated plaintiff's conviction, granted the prosecution's request to nolle prosequi the case, and on December 2, 2022, granted plaintiff a certificate of innocence. Id. ¶¶ 18-20. Plaintiff filed this complaint on July 31, 2023. [1].

III. Analysis

A. Group Pleading

Defendants argue that because plaintiff does not identify the specific role played by each officer in his allegations, his complaint engages in improper “group pleading” and runs afoul of the notice requirement in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). [23] at 5 (“Group pleading of this type is not acceptable as plaintiff provides no clues as to whether each defendant actually engaged in the alleged conduct, without making clear that the allegations are against all the defendants.”).

So long as the complaint provides enough detail to put defendants on notice of plaintiff's claims, “group pleading” does not flout Rule 8. See Robles v. City of Chicago, 354 F.Supp.3d 873, 875 (N.D. Ill. 2019). At the pleading stage, a plaintiff in a § 1983 case need not “connect every single alleged instance of misconduct in the complaint to every single specific officer,” but must “generally name the ‘persons responsible for the problem.'” Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[A]t some point the factual detail in a complaint may be so sketchy that the complaint does not provide the type of notice of the claim to which the defendant is entitled under Rule 8.”).

Here, plaintiff names the persons responsible for the problem. He alleges that all four officers arrested him,^[1] [1] ¶ 5; that none of the officers had an arrest warrant, believed that an arrest warrant existed, observed plaintiff committing any offense, or received any information indicating that plaintiff had committed an offense, id. ¶ 6; that, following his arrest, all four officers fabricated a story to justify plaintiff's arrest and effectuate his prosecution, id. ¶ 7; that in this fabricated story, all four officers falsely claimed that they observed plaintiff selling drugs and dropping the drugs while fleeing from the officers, and that plaintiff eventually admitted to the officers that he had been selling drugs, id. ¶ 8; and that all four officers wrote reports regarding plaintiff's arrest, id. ¶ 10.

Plaintiff also alleges that “[o]ne or more of the officer[s]” prepared official police reports conveying the false allegations and attested to those false allegations, and that “[o]ne or more of the officer[s]” communicated these false allegations to prosecutors. Id. ¶ 9.

The question is whether these allegations provide sufficient detail to put the defendants on notice of plaintiff's claims. They do. The officers know that plaintiff has accused each of them of detaining him without probable cause, fabricating evidence against him, and conspiring to do so. This level of detail gives the four officers fair notice of plaintiff's claims. See Robles, 354 F.Supp.3d at 877 (finding a complaint sufficient when it adequately identified the persons responsible for plaintiff's claim and alleged what they did, as discovery would “permit the defendants to flesh out the particulars of the plaintiff's contentions concerning their participation in the scheme”).

Because plaintiff did not engage in impermissible group pleading, the Court next evaluates his claims individually.

B. False Arrest

Plaintiff's complaint cannot proceed entirely: His § 1983 claim for false arrest comes several years too late.

The two-year statute of limitations for a false arrest claim begins when a plaintiff is brought before a judge pursuant to legal process. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007). Because neither party makes clear when exactly that occurred, the Court assumes that plaintiff was brought before a judge shortly after his arrest. Walker v. City of Chicago, 596 F.Supp.3d 1064, 1070 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (assuming the same). That means the statute of limitations for plaintiff's false arrest claim began running on March 31, 2015, the day he was arrested, and expired on March 31, 2017. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 397; Walker, 596 F.Supp.3d at 1071 (in Illinois, false arrest claims must be filed within two years of plaintiff's detention, even if plaintiff's conviction is later terminated in his favor); Stubbs v. City of Chicago, 616 F.Supp.3d 793, 800 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (same). Plaintiff filed his complaint on July 31, 2023-more than six years too late.

Plaintiff concedes that his claim is time-barred. See [31] at 9 (“Plaintiff's counsel is well aware of Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) and does seek to raise a time-barred claim.”) (emphasis added). Even without that concession, plaintiff's complaint makes that point plain as well. See United States v. Lewis, 411 F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005) (dismissal is appropriate when plaintiff's complaint makes clear that his claim is untimely).^[2] Because this flaw cannot be cured by repleading, plaintiff's false arrest claim is dismissed with prejudice. See Haywood v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC, 887 F.3d 329, 335 (7th Cir. 2018).

C. Evidence Fabrication

Plaintiff claims he was unlawfully detained before his conviction, based on fabricated evidence, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. [1] ¶¶ 7, 32, 33. To state a claim of unlawful detention, plaintiff must allege that (1) he was detained, (2) without probable cause, and (3) the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor. Williams v. City of Chicago, 315 F.Supp.3d 1060, 1070 (7th Cir. 2018); see also Patrick v. City of Chicago, 974 F.3d 824, 834-35 (7th Cir. 2020) (“A claim for ... pretrial detention based on fabricated evidence sounds in the Fourth Amendment right to be free from seizure without probable cause.”).^[3] Here, plaintiff sufficiently alleges that (1) the officers caused him to be detained, [1] ¶¶ 5, 7, 13, 15, 16; (2) without probable cause, as the evidence against him was fabricated, id. at ¶¶ 6, 8, 9, 10; and (3) a state court vacated his conviction and granted him a certificate of innocence, id. at ¶¶ 19, 20. Defendants' motion to dismiss the Fourth Amendmentbased version of this claim is therefore denied.

Plaintiff separately claims that the officers violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process when they fabricated the evidence that caused him to plead guilty. [1] ¶¶ 14-16, 41. See Walker, 596 F.Supp.3d at 1072 (explaining that an evidence-fabrication claim brought under the Fourteenth Amendment differs from an evidence-fabrication claim brought under the Fourth Amendment and that the former claim stems from “the use of false evidence to convict someone, which comprises a violation of the right to a fair trial under the Due Process Clause”).^[4]

Defendants argue that...