Jones v. City of Jackson et al.

• Citation: 203 F.3d 875
• Decision Date: 14 February 2000
• Docket Number: No. 98-60013,98-60013
• Parties: (5th Cir. 2000) JOSEPH JONES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF JACKSON ET AL., Defendants, MALCOLM McMILLIN and LES TANNEHILL, Defendants-Appellants
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Page 875

203 F.3d 875 (5th Cir. 2000)

JOSEPH JONES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF JACKSON ET AL., Defendants, MALCOLM McMILLIN and LES TANNEHILL, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 98-60013

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTH CIRCUIT

February 14, 2000

Rehearing Denied March 20, 2000.^*

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi

Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge:

Malcolm McMillin and Les Tannehill appeal the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment, in which they claimed qualified, absolute and sovereign immunity from Joseph Jones's causes of action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Mississippi state law. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

For purposes of this appeal we assume the truth of the following facts.

In October 1991, Jones entered guilty pleas to three separate burglary counts. In the first count, Cause No. 4255, Jones was sentenced to two years of incarceration and five years of probation. The other counts, Cause Nos. 4256 and 4257, were left as open pleas, the sentences to be determined at a later time. On February 24, 1993, after Jones had completed his two years in prison and been released to serve the probated portion of his initial sentence, Judge Breland Hilburn, Circuit Judge of Hinds County, Mississippi, issued a bench warrant for Jones's arrest for failure to appear for sentencing in Cause Nos. 4256 and 4257. The basis for the issuance of the bench warrant is variously characterized as a "clerical error" and "probation violation" by the parties on appeal.

On Sunday, June 5, 1994, a City of Jackson police officer stopped Jones for a routine traffic violation. The officer arrested Jones for an outstanding warrant on a simple assault charge and for operating a motor vehicle without a license and took him to the Jackson City Jail. The next day, June 6, 1994, Hinds County¹ Sheriff's Deputy Les Tannehill sent a facsimile copy of a bench warrant to the Jackson City Jail requesting that a detainer be placed in Jones's file based on the bench warrant issued earlier by Judge Hilburn. Malcolm McMillin, Sheriff of Hinds County, had no personal involvement with Jones other than his official responsibilities to devise and enforce policy for Hinds County. On Tuesday, June 7, 1994, Jones attended a hearing before the City of Jackson Municipal Court wherein the charges of simple assault and driving without a license brought by the City of Jackson were dismissed when the City of Jackson determined that it had arrested the wrong person. However, Jones remained incarcerated in the Jackson City Jail on the basis of the detainer lodged by Tannehill. The City of Jackson continued to incarcerate Jones until June 20, 1994, when he was transferred from the Jackson City Jail to the Madison County Jail.

At the time, the City of Jackson and Hinds County Jail systems were under federal court order to relieve overcrowding. Jackson and Hinds County entered into an Interlocal Agreement with Madison County, Mississippi to house Jackson's extra prisoners for a fee. The agreement allocated a set number of prisoner beds to Jackson and Jackson agreed to "sublet" their unused beds in Madison County Jail to house Hinds County's extra prisoners. The cost of Jones's incarceration was billed daily to Hinds County, who reimbursed the City of Jackson for their payments to Madison County.

Jones remained in the Madison County Jail as a result of the Hinds County detainer, without hearing or court appearance, until March 6, 1995. After nine months, Jones was brought into state district court in Hinds County, Mississippi and Judge Hilburn entered an order dismissing all affidavits for probation violation, terminating Jones's probation, dismissing and vacating all detainers and charges placed on Jones by Hinds County or the Jackson Police Department and ordered the Hinds County Sheriff's Office to "immediately RELEASE the Defendant from custody."

On June 7, 1996, Jones filed a complaint in Mississippi state court against the City of Jackson, Hinds County and numerous individual defendants, alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights and various state laws by detaining him in 1994-95. Jones dismissed Hinds County without prejudice and the remaining defendants removed the case to federal court. Tannehill and McMillin filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis of absolute, qualified and sovereign immunity. The district court denied summary judgment in a one-page order.

II. DISCUSSION

A. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Jones argues that we do not have jurisdiction over this appeal. Typically, denials of qualified immunity, although not final orders, are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine set forth in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). This doctrine allows an immediate appeal from orders denying summary judgments based on qualified immunity as a matter of law. See Mitchell v. Forsythe, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). "If disputed factual issues material to summary judgment are present, the district court's denial of summary judgment on the basis of immunity is not appealable." Lampkin v. City of Nacogdoches, 7 F.3d 430, 431 (5th Cir. 1993)(quotation and citations omitted). Jones maintains that there is no way to determine whether facts or law formed the basis for the district court's denial of summary judgment and that this court is therefore without jurisdiction to review it on interlocutory appeal.

When the district court fails to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, the appellate court will "undertake a cumbersome review of the record to determine what facts the district court, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, likely assumed." Behren v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996). Having performed the requisite record review, we conclude that this appeal presents questions of law, not fact,² and is therefore immediately appealable. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).

This court reviews the denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo using the same criteria applied by the district court in the first instance. Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 1991).

B. IN CUSTODY

No one disputes that Jones was imprisoned for nine months. However, Appellants contend that Hinds County did not have "custody" of Jones. Who was responsible for Jones's illegal detention and whether or not that detention gave rise to constitutional protections are mixed questions of fact and law that go to the gravamen of Jones's suit.

Under Mississippi law, if a Hinds County prisoner is housed in a different county due to over-crowding, Hinds County remains responsible for his custody. See Lee v. State of Mississippi, 437 So.2d 1208, 1209 (Miss. 1983) (interpreting 47-3-1 MISS. CODE ANN. (1972). Further, a Mississippi prisoner awaiting trial on a criminal charge in one county is entitled to credit for time served in another county so long as a detainer is lodged in the prisoner's file by the first county. See id. In addition, we find it significant that the Mississippi Circuit Court order directed Hinds County to release Jones, which order successfully gained his freedom.

This court has similarly held that a prisoner incarcerated in one jurisdiction subject to a detainer from a different jurisdiction is "in custody" of the second jurisdiction for purposes of federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. 2241(c)(3)(1994). See Dickerson v. State of Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1987). Dickerson relied on Braden v. 30th Judicial Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973), in which the Supreme Court concluded that a state placing a detainer on the petitioner who was incarcerated in another jurisdiction had "custody" of him for habeas corpus purposes. See id., 410 U.S. at 489 n.4.

Based on the unanimous jurisprudence of Mississippi, the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court, we conclude that Jones has alleged facts sufficient to establish that Hinds County had custody of Jones. McMillin and Tannehill, named in their individual and official capacities, allegedly caused Hinds County's exercise of illegal custody over Jones by affirmative acts (e.g., sending the detainer to Jackson City Jail) and omissions (e.g., failing to take Jones before the Circuit Court of Hinds County as the Bench Warrant commanded).

C. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

The first inquiry in examining a defense of qualified immunity asserted in a motion for summary judgment is whether the plaintiff has alleged "the violation of a clearly established constitutional right." Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991). The second step is to "decide whether the defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable" in light of the legal rules clearly established at the time of the incident. Spann v. Rainey, 987 F.2d 1110, 1114 (5th Cir. 1993).

Clearly established constitutional rights

Jones alleged that his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he was held pursuant to a detainer issued by the Hinds County Sheriff's Office and placed in his file by defendant Tannehill and was not brought before a judge or magistrate for over nine months.

a. Fourth Amendment

Jones's Fourth Amendment allegations fail because he admitted that a facially valid bench warrant existed in Hinds County on the date the detainer was sent to Jackson City Jail. The original seizure was therefore pursuant to a valid court order. "Fourth Amendment claims are appropriate [only] when the complaint contests the method or basis of the arrest and seizure of the person." Brooks v. George County, Miss., 84 F.3d 157, 166 (5th Cir. 1996). The protections offered by the Fourth Amendment do not apply if the plaintiff challenges only...