Jones v. City of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 15 May 1951
• Citation: 104 Cal.App.2d 212,231 P.2d 167
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: JONES v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al. Civ. 17963.

Page 167

231 P.2d 167

104 Cal.App.2d 212

JONES v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al.

Civ. 17963.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

May 15, 1951.

Rehearing Denied June 1, 1951.

Hearing Denied July 12, 1951.

Jones & Wiener, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Ray L. Chesebro, City Atty., Bourke Jones, Asst. City Atty., Joseph N. Owen, Deputy City Atty., all of Los Angeles, for respondent City of Los Angeles.

SHINN, Presiding Justice.

Annabelle Jones, plaintiff and appellant, was standing on the sidewalk at the southwest corner of Spring and Eighth Streets, in Los Angeles. She was close to an electrolier consisting of a cast iron base about three feet high and a lamp post with cross arms supporting five large light globes. The total height of the standard to the top of the center globe was 13 1/2 or 14 feet. A truck and van-type trailer operated by Ray Carter Trucking Company approached from the west. The right front corner of the van struck the top of the standard and broke off the pole where it joined the base. Mrs. Jones was struck by the falling sections of the pole and severely injured; she sued the City and the individual partners who composed the trucking company. In a jury trial the verdict and judgment were against the City, but in favor of the trucking company. Plaintiff moved for a new trial as to the trucking company and the City also moved for a new trial. The court granted both motions. The trucking company did not appeal; plaintiff appealed from the order granting the motion of the City.

In granting the motions the court specified insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict as to each defendant. It is not claimed by the City that the order is supportable for error in the trial. The sole question to be considered is whether it was an abuse of discretion to grant the motion of the City upon the ground of insufficiency of the evidence.

It is contended by plaintiff that the electrolier was placed so close to the curb as to create an obviously dangerous and defective condition of public property of which the city had knowledge, that such condition was a proximate cause of the accident, and that liability of the City results under section 53051 of the Government Code, commonly referred to as the Public Liability Act, a codification of Act 5619, Deering's General Laws, page 2630, which was in force at the time of the accident.

The physical facts which contributed to the happening of the accident are the following: The base of the standard was imbedded 12 inches from the face of the adjacent curb; the width of the crossarms which were at right angles to each other was 39 1/2 inches; the thickness of the metal at the break was 9/16ths of an inch; the width of the body of the trailer was 7 feet 9 inches; the width between the outsides of the wheels was 8 feet; the top of the trailer was 12 feet 5 1/2 inches above ground level; there was an inlet through the curb and a culvert under the sidewalk, immediately west of the lamp post, for the diversion of surface waters from the gutter; opposite the inlet the center of Eighth Street, at a point 20 feet from the curb, was approximately 10 inches above the level of the gutter; easterly from that point, the gutter rose gradually to within one inch of the sidewalk level at the corner; the lamp post was 4.8 feet west of the westerly edge of the sidewalk of Spring Street. Naturally, the slope of Eighth Street caused the body of the trailer to incline toward the south. Plaintiff claims that it was shown by uncontradicted testimony that the light standard inclined toward the north. There was testimony that after the accident the three-foot base inclined toward the north and was almost an inch from the perpendicular. From this it is argued that at the top the inclination of the standard toward the street would be approximately four inches. A truck driver testified that he had observed on other occasions that the pole leaned toward the north. There was also evidence from which it could have been inferred that the inclination of the base might have been somewhat affected by the blow it received. Plaintiff argues earnestly against the reasonableness of such an inference. It is an arguable question of fact, but is not a determinative factor in the case, for reasons which will be developed.

Plaintiff contends that the described condition was incontestably dangerous and defective, and further, that it was conclusively shown to have been a proximate cause of the accident. These conclusions are claimed to follow from the fact that the truck, while it was entirely upon the roadway, came in contact with the top of the light standard. It is claimed there was concurrent negligence upon the part of the truck driver and the city, as otherwise the accident would not have happened. We can readily agree that there is liability for plaintiff's injuries, but to say that as a matter of law the fault lay with one defendant or the other, or with both, would be quite another matter. Of necessity plaintiff argues that there was no basis in the evidence for a finding that a known dangerous and defective condition did not exist or that it was not a proximate cause of the accident. Therefore, it is said that it was an abuse of...