Jones v. City of N.Y.

• Decision Date: 20 December 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–CV–1739.,12–CV–1739.
• Citation: 988 F.Supp.2d 305
• Parties: Jermal JONES, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, the Kings County District Attorney's Office, Tina Fay and Connie Solange, as employees of the Kings County District Attorney's Office, and Individually, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

988 F.Supp.2d 305

Jermal JONES, Plaintiff,
v.
The CITY OF NEW YORK, the Kings County District Attorney's Office, Tina Fay and Connie Solange, as employees of the Kings County District Attorney's Office, and Individually, Defendants.

No. 12–CV–1739.

United States District Court,
E.D. New York.

Dec. 20, 2013.

[988 F.Supp.2d 308]

Alan M. Nelson Esq., Lake Success, NY, for Plaintiff.

Patrick Neil Beath, NYC Law Department, New York, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JACK B. WEINSTEIN, Senior District Judge:

I.	Introduction	309
II.	Facts	309
III.	Standard of Review	310
IV.	Fourth Amendment Claims Under § 1983	310

A.
Probable Cause
311

1.	Law	311
2.	Application of Law to Facts	311

B.
Absolute Immunity
312

1.	Law	312
2.	Application of Law to Facts	312

C.
Municipal Liability
312

1.
Monell Claim
312

a.	Law	312
b.	Application of Law to Facts	313

2.
City of New York Is Not Responsible for District Attorney Training Policies or Practice
314

V. State Claims
317

A.
New York State Malicious Prosecution
317

1.	Law	317
2.	Application of Law to Facts	318

B.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
318

1.	Law	318
2.	Application of Law to Facts	318

C.
Actual and Constructive Fraud
318

1.	Law	318
2.	Application of Law to Facts	319

D.
Negligent Misrepresentation
319

1.	Law	319
2.	Application of Law to Facts	319

E.
Negligent Hiring, Training & Supervision
319

1.	Law	319
2.	Application of Law to Facts	319

VI. Conclusion
319

[988 F.Supp.2d 309]

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Jermal Jones brings federal civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988; and pendant state-law claims against the City of New York (“City”); the Kings County District Attorney's Office (“District Attorney”); and two Assistant District Attorneys (“ADAs”), Tina Fay and Connie Solange, individually and in their professional capacities.

He alleges that ADA Fay failed to timely provide exculpatory DNA identification material pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), thus prolonging his incarceration in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196 (2d Cir.2007). The two ADAs allegedly “compounded that constitutional violation by systematically misrepresenting that the laboratory report demonstrated that the DNA sample acquired from the plaintiff matched the DNA contained in the semen sample recovered upon the minor complainant's clothing, when in fact it failed to do so.” Pl.'s Am. Compl., ECF No. 47, ¶ 41. The City and the District Attorney are also said to be liable under Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), because the conduct complained of resulted from “customs, policies, usages, practices, procedures, and rules” of the City and District Attorney. Id. at ¶ 117.

Plaintiff contends that he was maliciously prosecuted after there was no longer probable cause for the continuation of a criminal proceeding against him. Pl's Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 51–56. He asserts that under New York law the ADAs' conduct constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress, actual and constructive fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. Id. at ¶¶ 57–78. The City and the District Attorney are also said to be liable under state law on a theory of respondeat superior and for negligent hiring, training, and supervision of the ADAs. Id. at ¶¶ 118–119.

The case is meritless.

II. Facts

On November 11, 2007, plaintiff was arrested for harassment of his former girlfriend and sexual assault on her minor daughter. His arrest was based on the victims' statements. On November 16, 2007, he was charged by a Kings County Grand Jury in a nine count indictment (“2007 Indictment”) alleging, among other crimes: sexual abuse in the first degree and endangering the welfare of a minor.

According to a laboratory report, semen recovered from the victims' residence indicated that the probabilities of the source of the semen being from the following groups were:

1 in 18 Black

Less than 1 in 331 Caucasian

1 in 229 Hispanic

Less than 1 in 196 Asian

Pl.'s Am. Compl. at Ex. A, ¶¶ 5–6. Plaintiff is Black. The report noted that “[f]urther analysis could be done upon submission of a blood or saliva sample from the victim.” Id. No evidence has been presented of a subsequent submission or report.

In short, the semen found at the crime scene could not be connected to the defendant, but was somewhat more likely to have come from a Black man than from a man of another “race.” It would have been useless at a trial. It is unclear when the report was turned over to plaintiff.

On June 4, 2008, plaintiff was separately indicted (“2008 Indictment”) for unrelated crimes allegedly committed in 2002. Pl.'s Am. Compl. at ¶ 13. He was arraigned

[988 F.Supp.2d 310]

upon those charges on June 10, 2008. Id. The basis for the 2008 Indictment was an “actual matching” of the DNA sample acquired upon his 2007 arrest with evidence collected at the 2002 crime scene. Id. at ¶ 14, 47.

On June 1, 2009, plaintiff's former girlfriend wrote to plaintiff's defense attorney, recanting both complaining witnesses' accusations. Pl.'s Am. Compl. at ¶ 10, Ex. B. Nevertheless, ADA Fay and ADA Solange continued to prosecute plaintiff on the 2007 Indictment.

On October 5, 2010, plaintiff was convicted upon the unrelated 2008 Indictment. He was sentenced to forty years in prison. See Beath Decl. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 15, Ex. I.

Misdemeanor charges of harassment in the 2007 Indictment were dismissed on December 2, 2010. Remaining charges were dismissed on June 16, 2011. Pl.'s Am. Compl. at ¶ 49, Exs. C & D.

III. Standard of Review

Dismissal of a claim is proper when the pleading party has failed “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “[A] court must accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor.” Clark Street Wine & Spirits v. Emporos Sys. Corp., 754 F.Supp.2d 474, 479 (E.D.N.Y.2010). To withstand the motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).

Whether a complaint states a plausible claim to relief “is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” In re Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities Litig., 730 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir.2013). In determining the adequacy of the complaint, any written instrument attached to the complaint as an exhibit or incorporated in the complaint by reference, as well as integral documents upon which the complaint relies will be considered. Subaru Distrib. Corp. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 425 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir.2005). “The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The court's task “is merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.” Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir.1980).

IV. Fourth Amendment Claims Under § 1983

In Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196 (2d Cir.2007), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized that wrongful pretrial incarceration caused by suppression of exculpatory evidence violates the Fourth Amendment. Under Russo, a plaintiff is required to show: “(1) that he has a right to be free from continued detention stemming from law enforcement officials' mishandling or suppression of exculpatory evidence, (2) that the actions of the officers violated that right, and (3) that the officers' conduct ‘shocks the conscience.’ ” Id. at 203. The Court relied on three factors to find such a violation: (1) the length of time of wrongful incarceration, (2) the ease with which exculpating evidence could have been checked, and (3) the “alleged intentionality” of the officers' behavior. Id. at 209.

[988 F.Supp.2d 311]

A. Probable Cause

1. Law

In assessing Fourth Amendment claims for detention and prosecution brought under Section 1983 courts look to the law governing probable cause of the state in which the arrest occurred. See Lundt v. City of New York, 12 CIV. 1737 DLC, 2013 WL 5298458 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2013). In New York, probable cause is an absolute defense to both malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. Maron v. County of Albany, 166 Fed.Appx. 540, 541 (2d Cir.2006); see also Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir.2006); Raymond v. Bunch, 136 F.Supp.2d 71, 80 (N.D.N.Y.2001). “This is true whether that action is brought under state law or under § 1983.” Maron, 166 Fed.Appx. at 541. Probable cause is defined as “such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonable prudent person in like circumstances to believe plaintiff guilty.” Newton v. City of New York, 566 F.Supp.2d 256, 273 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (quoting Colon v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 78, 82, 468 N.Y.S.2d 453, 455 N.E.2d 1248 (N.Y.1983)).

2. Application of Law to Facts

Accepting all plaintiff's factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, defendants had probable cause to arrest and continue to detain plaintiff. Plaintiff did not have a “right to be free from continued detention stemming from law enforcement officials' mishandling or suppression of exculpatory evidence.” Russo, 479 F.3d at 203. His confinement was privileged.

His arrest, on November 11, 2007, was based on statements of two victims—his former girlfriend and her minor daughter—positively identifying him and alleging harassment and sexual abuse. He was promptly indicted by a Kings County Grand Jury on November 16, 2007. The DNA report in question, which plaintiff has incorporated in his amended complaint, was issued several months later, on April 21,...