Jones v. City of Albuquerque Police Dep't

• Decision Date: 14 July 2020
• Docket Number: NO. S-1-SC-37094,S-1-SC-37094
• Citation: 470 P.3d 252
• Parties: Andrew JONES, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE POLICE DEPARTMENT and Department of Public Safety of the State of New Mexico, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

470 P.3d 252

Andrew JONES, Plaintiff-Petitioner,

v.CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE POLICE DEPARTMENT and Department of Public Safety of the State of New Mexico, Defendants-Respondents.

NO. S-1-SC-37094

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Filing Date: July 14, 2020

Kennedy Kennedy & Ives, LLC, Adam C. Flores, Laura Louise Schauer Ives, Joseph Patrick Kennedy, Shannon L. Kennedy, Albuquerque, NM, for Petitioner

Doughty Alcaraz, P.A., Robert M. Doughty III, Jeffrey Merrill Mitchell, Albuquerque, NM, for Respondents

Daniel Yohalem Katherine, Elizabeth Murray, Santa Fe, NM, Leon F. Howard, III, Albuquerque, NM, Peifer, Hanson & Mullins, PA, Lauren Keefe, Albuquerque, NM, for Amici Curiae New Mexico Foundation for Open Government and American Civil Liberties Union of New Mexico

VIGIL, Justice.

{1} This case requires us to examine NMSA 1978, Section 14-2-1(A)(4) (2011, amended 2019),¹ a provision of the Inspection of Public Records Act (IPRA) that creates an exception from inspection for certain law enforcement records. Relying on the plain language of Section 14-2-1(A)(4), we conclude that Section 14-2-1(A)(4) does not create a blanket exception from inspection for law enforcement records relating to an ongoing criminal investigation.

{2} Plaintiff Andrew Jones (Jones) appeals the order of the district court that granted summary judgment to the Department of Public Safety (DPS), thereby dismissing Jones's IPRA enforcement action. Jones argues that the district court misconstrued Section 14-2-1(A)(4) and incorrectly allowed DPS to withhold requested public records solely because the records related to an ongoing criminal investigation. Jones further argues that the Court of Appeals was incorrect to hold that he acquiesced to the district court's interpretation of Section 14-2-1(A)(4), was incorrect to hold that his lawsuit was moot, and wrongly dismissed his appeal.

{3} We conclude that Jones is correct. We reverse the Court of Appeals. We reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment to DPS, concluding that the district court's interpretation of Section 14-2-1(A)(4) was overbroad and contrary to the plain language of the statute. That misinterpretation also led the district court to incorrectly deny summary judgment to Jones at an earlier point in the case. Accordingly, we reverse that judgment as well.

I. BACKGROUND

{4} James Boyd was shot and killed by Albuquerque Police Department officers on March 16, 2014. On April 8, 2014, Mr. Boyd's brother Andrew Jones sent a written request to DPS pursuant to IPRA for various records relating to the shooting. DPS responded fourteen days later, agreeing to produce a primary incident report, the personnel records of one of the officers involved, and one subpoena. DPS denied production of all other pertinent records in its possession.

{5} DPS denied production of the requested records for two reasons. First, and primarily, DPS grounded its refusal to produce the requested records in Section 14-2-1(A)(4), which exempts from the general IPRA disclosure requirement "law enforcement records that reveal confidential sources, methods, information or individuals accused but not charged with a crime." DPS explained that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was investigating the shooting, and asserted that "release of the requested information pose[d] a demonstrable and serious threat to [that] ongoing criminal investigation." Second, DPS relied on NMSA 1978, Section 29-3-3 (1979). DPS stated that Section 29-3-3 imposed a duty to cooperate with the FBI and that the FBI "specifically requested that DPS not publicly release evidence related to [its] investigation in order to maintain the integrity of its investigation." DPS stated that the requested records would be released "when the release of such records no longer jeopardize[d] the law enforcement investigation."

{6} Jones filed suit in district court pursuant to IPRA, claiming that DPS "made no attempt or effort to make non-exempt information, documents or material evidence available for Plaintiff's review, nor indicate how the records requested fall within the cited exemption." Jones sought production of the requested records, attorney fees, and costs, among other relief.

{7} Jones subsequently moved for summary judgment, contending that IPRA required disclosure of the requested records under the undisputed material facts. Jones argued that neither of the reasons offered by DPS—that there was an ongoing criminal investigation and that the FBI asked DPS to withhold the records—was legally sufficient to justify its refusal to produce the requested records.

{8} First, Jones argued that, even if the district court accepted DPS's contention that production of the records would pose "a demonstrable and serious threat to an ongoing criminal investigation," the IPRA exception cited by DPS— § 14-2-1(A)(4) —was not satisfied. Nor, argued Jones, could DPS rely on the FBI's request that DPS withhold information related to the investigation, despite DPS's statutory duty "to cooperate" with federal law enforcement agencies. The duty to cooperate, stated Jones, does not imply that the requirements of IPRA must give way. Jones further pointed out that the FBI only requested that DPS withhold records if the delayed production was in accord with the IPRA exception from disclosure for certain law enforcement records, § 14-2-1(A)(4).

{9} In response to Jones's motion, DPS offered a broad interpretation of Section 14-2-1(A)(4) and marshalled evidence directed to meet that standard. DPS argued that, in enacting Section 14-2-1(A)(4), "the Legislature ... intended for records pertaining to ... ongoing investigations [to] remain sealed until the investigation is complete." DPS additionally stated that the requested records referenced an officer who was "the likely target of the FBI investigation[,]" which would implicate the aspect of Section 14-2-1(A)(4) that exempts records that reveal individuals accused but not charged with a crime.

{10} DPS attached two documents to support its contention that it was entitled to withhold the requested records: an affidavit from the DPS cabinet secretary and a letter from the FBI. Both documents indicated that there was, indeed, an ongoing criminal investigation. DPS argued that whether there was an ongoing criminal investigation was a disputed issue of material fact. The documents also indicate that the FBI requested that DPS delay disclosure of related materials in order to maintain the integrity of the investigation, if possible under IPRA.

{11} After a hearing, the district court denied Jones's summary judgment motion. The district court found that whether there was an ongoing criminal investigation was both material and disputed.² It further found that the requested records were exempt from disclosure pursuant to Section 14-2-1(A)(4). In addition to denying summary judgment to Jones, the district court went further. It ordered that if the investigation remained ongoing by January 15, 2015: (1) DPS would be required to "produce a privilege log to [Jones]" providing a description of the withheld documents and the basis for denying production; (2) Jones would have an opportunity to challenge the privilege log; and (3) DPS would be required to "produce the requested records to the district court" to facilitate review of any challenges by Jones.

{12} DPS moved for summary judgment on April 15, 2015. DPS stated that it produced the records requested by Jones on January 14, 2015, subsequent to the completion of the FBI investigation. It further stated that the district court had already ruled that the (by then produced) records had been properly withheld pursuant to Section 14-2-1(A)(4). Thus, according to DPS, "enforcement [was] no longer available to [Jones]" and summary judgment was appropriate. In response, Jones did not deny that the records were provided in accordance with the procedure devised by the district court, but renewed his argument that DPS's initial refusal to produce the requested records was unlawful and that DPS construed Section 14-2-1(A)(4) too broadly.

{13} The district court granted DPS's summary judgment motion, concluding that there were no remaining issues of material fact and DPS was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It was undisputed that DPS produced the requested records in accordance with the prior ruling of the district court, so inspection of the records was no longer at issue. The district court concluded that Jones could not be entitled to an award of attorney fees because the requested records were exempt from disclosure pursuant to Section 14-2-1(A)(4). To determine that the records were exempt from disclosure, the district court explicitly relied on its earlier order denying summary judgment to Jones, which so found.

{14} Jones appealed the district court's summary judgment order to the Court of Appeals. Over a dissent, the Court of Appeals affirmed by memorandum opinion. Jones v. Albuquerque Police Dep't , No. A-1-CA-35120, mem. op., 2018 WL 3000216 (May 10, 2018) (nonprecedential). The Court of Appeals declined to reach Jones's argument that the district court was incorrect to find that the requested records were exempt from production under Section 14-2-1(A)(4). Jones , No. A-1-CA-35120, mem. op. ¶¶ 9, 13-14. The Court of Appeals offered two different reasons to affirm the district court. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. First, it held that because Jones did not object to the district court's order denying Jones's summary judgment motion, Jones acquiesced and failed to preserve any argument against the order. Id. ¶¶ 9, 14. This included Jones's argument that the requested records were wrongly withheld. Id. Second, the Court of Appeals held that the case was moot. Id. ¶ 15. The Court of Appeals seemed to reason that Jones no longer had an action for injunctive relief because Jones received the requested records, and could no longer succeed in an action for attorney fees because (1) the records were produced in...