Jones v. City Of Kansas City, Missouri

Citation15 S.W.3d 736
Parties(Mo.banc 2000) . Supreme Court of Missouri Larry Jones, Appellant, v. City of Kansas City, Missouri, Respondent. Case Number: SC82174 Handdown Date: 0
Decision Date25 April 2000
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Missouri

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Jackson County, Hon. Ronald R. Holliger

Counsel for Appellant: Michael R. Taylor and Douglas R. Horn

Counsel for Respondent: Charlotte L. Ferns and Walter J. O'Toole

Opinion Summary:

In July 1997, a car failed to yield at the yield sign on Brookside Road and 77th Terrace. It hit another car, which hit pedestrian Larry Jones. Jones sued Kansas City for not having a stop sign at the intersection. The court granted the city summary judgment because Jones did not notify the city of his claim as required by section 82.210.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Court en banc holds:

Section 82.210 requires notice within 90 days of a claim for injuries from a "defect in the condition of any bridge, boulevard, street, sidewalk or thoroughfare" in the city. The yield sign was not part of the street within the meaning of this statute. Jones' claim is not subject to, or barred by, the statute.

The Court expresses no view on the merits of Jones' underlying claim.

Opinion Author: Michael A. Wolff, Judge

Opinion Vote: REVERSED AND REMANDED. All concur.

Opinion:

Larry Jones sued Kansas City for injuries from an accident that he claims was caused by the city's failure to have a stop sign at an intersection instead of a yield sign. Jones claims that the allegedly deficient signage was a "defect" in the condition of the city's property. Because Jones failed to give the city notice of his claim under section 82.2101 within 90 days of the accident, the trial court granted summary judgment for the city. After opinion in the court of appeals, we granted transfer.

The issue is whether the notice of claim statute bars Jones's claim. We hold that his claim is not subject to the notice statute, section 82.210, and that the failure of Jones to give notice within 90 days does not bar his claim. The trial court's judgment, accordingly, is reversed, and the cause is remanded.

Facts

Jones was injured in July 1997, when he was struck by a car while walking along 77th Terrace in Kansas City. There was no sidewalk, and Jones walked in the grass along the street, which intersected with Brookside Road. Traffic on Brookside Road was subject to a "yield" sign directing that cars on Brookside Road yield to cars on 77th Terrace. The yield sign was located in the grass next to the street. When Jones was near the intersection, a collision occurred between two cars--a car on Brookside Road failed to yield to a car on 77th Terrace. The car on 77th Terrace struck Jones, after being struck by the other vehicle, while Jones was walking on the grass next to the intersection.

Jones brought suit against Kansas City in May 1998, ten months after the accident. He alleged that sovereign immunity was waived because the city created a dangerous condition on its property by placing only a yield sign at the intersection. Section 537.600.1(2). In its answer, Kansas City raised the affirmative defense that Jones had not complied with section 82.210, which requires that notice be given within 90 days of the occurrence when a claim is to be made "on account of any injuries growing out of any defect in the condition of any bridge, boulevard, street, sidewalk or thoroughfare in said city . . . ." 2 Jones did not give notice of his impending claim within 90 days of the occurrence.

The Notice Requirement

Notice to the city, within 90 days of the occurrence, is a condition precedent to maintaining an action against the city if the action arises from a defect in the condition of "any bridge, boulevard, street, sidewalk or thoroughfare." Dohring v. Kansas City, 71 S.W.2d 170, 171 (Mo. App. 1934).

The question, therefore, is whether the allegedly defective signage is covered by the statute as a "defect in the condition" of a street. Kansas City, in its motion for summary judgment in the trial court and in its arguments to this Court, maintains that the present claim is covered by the statute because the yield sign is a defect in the condition of the street for which it was designated to regulate traffic flow.

The statute provides a list of properties owned by the city: bridge, boulevard, street, sidewalk, thoroughfare. These are properties that, at common law, exposed the city to liability in its proprietary, not sovereign, capacity. Williams v. City of Kansas City, 782 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Mo. banc 1990). The notice statute, thus, is in derogation of the common law and should be narrowly construed against the city and in favor of the injured party. Koontz v. City of St. Louis, 89 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Mo. App. 1936).

Kansas City contends that a yield sign comes within our construction of this statute in Williams where we said: "The list of defective property for which . . . section 82.210 requires a notice of claim includes all of those publicly maintained exterior improvements designed to facilitate travel for which the common law permitted liability because of their proprietary nature." 782 S.W.2d at 65. Williams, however, does not invite us to expand the list of properties to include a yield sign as an "exterior improvement designed to facilitate travel." The latter phrase is intended merely to summarize the category of properties that consists of bridges, boulevards, streets, sidewalks and thoroughfares. Each of this group of terms is a structure that facilitates travel and upon which travel occurs by vehicle (bridge, boulevard, street or thoroughfare) or on foot (sidewalk).

In Williams, the issue was whether steps leading to a parking facility at the Kansas City International Airport were included in the list. This Court held that the steps were part of a sidewalk and were subject to the requirements of section 82.210. 782 S.W.2d at 66. The Court found a second reason for applying the notice statute, that is, that the steps constituted part of a thoroughfare. Id.

Kansas City maintains that Banks v. City of Kansas City, 862 S.W.2d 485 (Mo. App. 1993), is determinative of the outcome of this case. In Banks, the issue was whether a poorly designed street illumination system was subject to the requirements of section 82.210. Citing Williams, the court of appeals held that the lighting system fell "within 'those publicly maintained exterior improvements designed to facilitate travel . . .'" and, therefore, was subject to the statute. 862 S.W.2d at 488. The court in Banks used the Williams language to determine that street lights were subject to the notice statute as a "defect in the condition of any bridge, boulevard, street, sidewalk or thoroughfare . . . ." 862 S.W.2d at 488; section 82.210.3

The Yield Sign Was Not Part of the Street

Quite simply, the yield sign, which Jones alleges to be defective, was not part of any "bridge, boulevard, street, sidewalk or thoroughfare" within the meaning of section 82.210.4 Instead, both Jones and the yield sign were located in grassy areas next to the street. We have consulted a number of dictionaries on the meaning of the...

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3 cases
  • Henson v. City of Springfield
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • May 10, 2017
    ...of the injury, and that the person so injured will claim damages therefor from such city.524 S.W.3d 145In Jones v. City of Kansas City, 15 S.W.3d 736, 737 (Mo. banc 2000), our Supreme Court stated that:Notice to the city, within 90 days of the occurrence, [under section 82.210] is a conditi......
  • Huifang v. City of Kansas City
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • January 23, 2007
    ...of roadways. The Missouri Supreme Court noted in 1988, however, that the 1985 amendment appeared to be a "reinstatement of the holding of Jones as it relates to roads and highways plus opening the door to some degree prior to Jones." Id. at 52. The 1985 amendment thus made clear that the st......
  • State ex rel. Sasnett v. Moorhouse
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • August 5, 2008
    ...of "any defect in the condition of any . . . street, sidewalk, or thoroughfare" as provided for in section 82.210. Id. In Jones v. Kansas City, 15 S.W.3d 736 (Mo. banc 2000), the plaintiff was injured in an accident he claimed was caused by the City's failure to have a stop sign at an inter......

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