Jones v. City of Detroit

• Decision Date: 21 December 2021
• Docket Number: No. 21-1055,21-1055
• Citation: 20 F.4th 1117
• Parties: S. Baxter JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN; Reuben Fluker; Robin Cleaver ; Edward Hudson ; Elvin Barren, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

20 F.4th 1117

S. Baxter JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.CITY OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN; Reuben Fluker; Robin Cleaver ; Edward Hudson ; Elvin Barren, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 21-1055

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: November 2, 2021

Decided and Filed: December 21, 2021

ARGUED: Kathryn Bruner James, GOODMAN HURWITZ & JAMES, P.C., Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Cheryl L. Ronk, CITY OF DETROIT, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Kathryn Bruner James, GOODMAN HURWITZ & JAMES, P.C., Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Cheryl L. Ronk, CITY OF DETROIT, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellees.

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; MOORE and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.

SUTTON, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court in which GRIFFIN, J., joined. MOORE, J. (pp. –––– – ––––), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

SUTTON, Chief Judge.

After police arrested Baxter Jones during a protest in Detroit, he sued the City on several grounds, including a claim that the police officers failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for him when they took him to the police station. Officers transported Jones, who uses a wheelchair, in a cargo van. That was unsafe and injured him, he alleged in the complaint. The district court dismissed his claim that the City was vicariously liable for the officers' failure to accommodate him. Because vicarious liability is not available for claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, we affirm.

I.

In 2014, officers with the Detroit Police Department arrested Baxter Jones and eight other individuals as they demonstrated outside a city water contractor's facility. The protestors blocked the building's entrance, and the officers arrested them for disorderly conduct. A police bus came to take the protestors to a police station, but Jones could not board it because he uses a wheelchair, which the bus was not equipped to handle. The officers called for a cargo van to transport him.

According to Jones, the vehicle was not up to the task. Because the van did not have a wheelchair lift, the officers had to lift him into the van. The interior of the van, he claims, also created problems, as the height of the ceiling made it difficult for him to sit up straight. And the van lacked restraints. To keep the wheelchair from rolling around while the van was in transit, an officer sat in the back with Jones and braced his feet against the chair's wheels to prevent it from moving. Jones claims that the entry into the van and the jostling and bouncing of the ensuing trip exacerbated existing injuries and damaged his spine.

The State of Michigan declined to prosecute Jones for disorderly conduct, but that did not end the dispute. Jones filed a lawsuit against the City of Detroit. In addition to the City, he named a number of police officers in their individual capacities. He brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ; the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. ; and state law, Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1101 et seq. He also filed a claim under § 1983, arguing that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court denied their request for qualified immunity on the excessive-force claim, which prompted an interlocutory appeal. Our court reversed and granted qualified immunity to the officers with respect to the excessive-force claims against them. Jones v. City of Detroit , 815 F. App'x 995, 1000 (6th Cir. 2020).

The district court separately granted summary judgment in the City's favor on Jones's failure-to-accommodate claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. The court held that neither statute permits a claim of vicarious liability, the theory under which Jones sued the City. Jones asked the district court to certify that question for interlocutory appeal. It did, and we granted permission to appeal.

II.

Under Title II of the ADA, "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A Title II plaintiff may bring a claim for intentional discrimination or for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation. Roell v. Hamilton County , 870 F.3d 471, 488 (6th Cir. 2017).

When it comes to remedies for a violation, Title II borrows from the Rehabilitation Act. It says that the "remedies, procedures, and rights" under section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act apply to Title II claims. 42 U.S.C. § 12133. Section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act, as it happens, is a borrower too. It says that the "remedies, procedures, and rights set forth" in Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act "shall be available" for violations of the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a). The upshot? The remedies available for violations of Title II of the ADA and § 505 of the Rehabilitation Act are "coextensive" with those for Title VI, Barnes v. Gorman , 536 U.S. 181, 185, 122 S.Ct. 2097, 153 L.Ed.2d 230 (2002), and to borrow from the district court operate like one "matryoshka doll" within another, Jones v. City of Detroit , Case No. 17-11744, 2019 WL 2355377, at *5 (E.D. Mich. June 4, 2019).

That prelude sets the table for establishing that Title VI tells us whether vicarious liability is available under these provisions of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Whether an injured party may seek relief premised on vicarious liability turns on the nature of the "remedies, procedures, and rights" available or, in the words of the Supreme Court, on a construction of "the scope of available remedies" under the statute. Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind. Sch. Dist. , 524 U.S. 274, 284–85, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998) ; see Barnes , 536 U.S. at 187, 122 S.Ct. 2097.

Hiler v. Brown confirms the point. 177 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999). It evaluated whether an employee may sue a supervisor in his individual capacity in a retaliation claim under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 543. The relevant portion of the Rehabilitation Act at issue in that case incorporated Title VII's remedies in the same way that Title II incorporates Title VI's remedies. Id. at 545. There, we looked to Title VII to determine whether a claimant could sue a supervisor personally under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. Here, we do the same. Whether Title II imposes vicarious liability rises and falls with whether Title VI does.

In answering the Title VI question, we have considerable guidance. Title II of the ADA is not the only federal civil rights statute that incorporates the remedies established by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 uses the same remedial scheme, compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-1, 2000d-2, with 20 U.S.C. §§ 1682, 1683 ; see also Cannon v. Univ. of Chi. , 441 U.S. 677, 695–96, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), and the Supreme Court to our fortune has already investigated the availability of vicarious liability under Title IX.

In Gebser , the Court faced a claim by a student who became embroiled in a sexual relationship with a teacher and who sued her school district for sexual harassment under Title IX. 524 U.S. at 277–78, 118 S.Ct. 1989. The student did not have any evidence that other school officials knew about the teacher's misconduct, however. Id. at 291, 118 S.Ct. 1989. Absent actual notice and deliberate indifference on the part of district officials with the authority to intervene, the Court held that the student did not have a claim for monetary damages. Id. at 292–93, 118 S.Ct. 1989.

Three features of Title IX undergirded the Court's decision. The first was its date of enactment. At Title IX's birth in 1972, most civil rights laws did not permit money damages actions. That was true even for "principal civil rights statutes" like Title VII, which created an express cause of action. Id. at 285–86, 118 S.Ct. 1989. Title IX by contrast has only an implied cause of action. See Cannon , 441 U.S. at 717, 99 S.Ct. 1946. Under these statutory circumstances, the Court thought it hard to believe that Congress would implicitly authorize damages awards under Title IX at a time when it had not done so under Title VII, which contained an express cause of action. Gebser , 524 U.S. at 285–86, 118 S.Ct. 1989.

The second feature was Title IX's "contractual nature" as Spending Clause legislation. Id. at 287, 118 S.Ct. 1989. When Congress invokes its Spending Clause powers and imposes conditions on the States for the receipt of federal funds, it reasoned, a recipient must have notice that noncompliance could open the door for liability in damages. Id. No such notice appeared in the words of the statute. A school district would justifiably be surprised to learn that, by accepting federal funds, it could be subjected to a monetary judgment mentioned nowhere in the statute due to conduct school officials knew nothing about—and even at a dollar amount exceeding the initial grant. Id. at 289–90, 118 S.Ct. 1989. It was "sensible to assume" from this statutory silence, the Court explained, that Congress "did not envision" money-damages liability. Id. at 287–88, 118 S.Ct. 1989.

The third feature was the enforcement scheme that Title IX lays out. While the statute does not expressly create a private cause of action, it does expressly create administrative enforcement remedies. Id. at 288, 118 S.Ct. 1989. The key recourse is that federal agencies may file actions against noncompliant recipients of funds. Before doing so, an agency must notify the "appropriate person" employed by the recipient and attempt to achieve compliance voluntarily. Id. ; see 20 U.S.C. § 1682. That reality offered one more clue to the Court. "It would be unsound," the Court explained, "for a statute's express system of enforcement to require notice to the recipient and an opportunity to come into voluntary ...