Jones v. Com.
Decision Date | 16 January 2004 |
Docket Number | Record No. 030310. |
Citation | 591 S.E.2d 72,267 Va. 218 |
Parties | Robert I. JONES, Sr. v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia, et al. |
Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Roger T. Creager (John C. Shea; Marks & Harrison, Richmond, on briefs), for appellant.
Catherine Crooks Hill, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General; Judith Williams Jagdmann, Deputy Attorney General; Edward M. Macon, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellees.
Amid Curiae: The Virginia Trial Lawyers Association (Malcolm Parks; Maloney, Parks Clarke & Nathanson, on brief), in support of appellant.
Present: HASSELL, C.J., LACY, KEENAN, KINSER, LEMONS, and AGEE, JJ., and CARRICO, S.J.
OPINION BY Justice DONALD W. LEMONS.
In this appeal, we consider whether the University of Virginia ("the University") is a governmental entity for the purposes of determining its status as a statutory employer under the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"), Code §§ 65.2-100 to -1310.
Robert I. Jones, Sr. ("Jones") was employed by Waco, Inc. ("Waco"), an independent contractor employed by the University to perform asbestos abatement in a building on the grounds. Part of this work included the removal of electrical conduits. Jones received an electrical shock while attempting to remove an electrical conduit.
Jones filed a motion for judgment against the University and its employees alleging that they had negligently informed him that the electrical power to that conduit had been turned off when the conduit actually contained live wires. The defendants each filed pleas in bar based on the Act. The Commonwealth of Virginia, on behalf of the University, and the individual defendants asserted that the University was the statutory employer of Jones because it is a governmental entity with a statutory mandate to maintain its buildings and Jones was engaged in the maintenance of a University building.
The trial court sustained the defendants' pleas in bar, dismissing Jones's action, and denied Jones's motion to reconsider on November 20, 2002. Jones appeals the adverse judgment of the trial court.
Jones asserts that the trial court erred by holding that the University is a governmental entity and that its trade or business included asbestos removal from buildings under its care and control. Further, Jones argues that the trial court erred in applying the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act despite the language of the Virginia Tort Claims Act stating that "the Commonwealth shall be liable ... where the Commonwealth . . ., if a private person, would be liable . . . ." Code § 8.01-195.3.
The Virginia Workers' Compensation Act provides that:
When any person (referred to in this section as "owner") undertakes to perform or execute any work which is a part of his trade, business or occupation and contracts with any other person (referred to in this section as "subcontractor") for the execution or performance by or under such subcontractor of the whole or any part of the work undertaken by such owner, the owner shall be liable to pay to any worker employed in the work any compensation under this title which he would have been liable to pay if the worker had been immediately employed by him.
Code § 65.2-302(A). This "statutory employer" provision is designed to ensure that owners do not escape liability for workers' compensation benefits by having their work performed by others. Henderson v. Central Tel. Co., 233 Va. 377, 381, 355 S.E.2d 596, 598-99 (1987); Smith v. Horn, 232 Va. 302, 305-06, 351 S.E.2d 14, 16 (1986).
In this case, the University was the owner of the building on which Jones was working when he was injured. Once an owner is found to be a statutory employer, it is subject to all the mandates, duties, and rights as to its statutory employee mandated by the Act, including the "exclusivity rule." The exclusivity rule provides that when an employee is eligible for remedy under the Act, he or she may not seek any other remedy against the employer or his fellow employees. See Code § 65.2-307(A).
As discussed below, the analysis of the liability as an owner for governmental entities and private entities differs. In other words, state agencies, municipalities, and counties are treated differently from private corporations and individuals. Jones argues that we have never extended governmental entity status to a college or university under the Act. However, both statutory language and case law indicate that the University is entitled to governmental entity status.
The reasoning that led to our holding in Phillips applies here with equal force. The characteristics of the University informing our decision in that case are the same here. Although we did not use the specific term "governmental entity" in Phillips, certainly an entity that is established by statute, is governed and controlled solely by the General Assembly, owns property through money appropriated by the General Assembly, and whose very essence is public use and service is a governmental entity, is to be treated in the same manner as municipalities for the purposes of the Act.
In a situation in which an employee of an independent contractor sues a private entity that owns a project, we have applied the "normal work test" to determine whether the injured party was engaged in the trade, business, or occupation of the owner at the time of his or her injury. See Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc. v. McReynolds, 216 Va. 897, 902-03, 224 S.E.2d 323, 326-27 (1976); Johnson v. Jefferson Nat'l Bank, 244 Va. 482, 485, 422 S.E.2d 778, 780 (1992). However, the normal work test does not apply to the determination of the trade, business, or occupation of a governmental entity.
In Nichols v. VVKR, Inc., 241 Va. 516, 403 S.E.2d 698 (1991), we held:
A governmental entity or a public utility does not share the ability to choose its activities. Therefore, if the project's owner is a governmental agency or a public utility, any activity which the owner is authorized or required to do by law or otherwise, is considered the trade, business, or occupation of the owner.
Id. at 521, 403 S.E.2d at 701. See Henderson, 233 Va. at 383-85, 355 S.E.2d at 599-601; Ford v. City of Richmond, 239 Va. 664, 667, 669, 391 S.E.2d 270, 271-73 (1990). The unique nature of a governmental entity requires examination of statutory authorization and mandated duties to determine the entity's trade, business, or occupation. What the legislature has authorized or required an entity to do is the trade, business, or occupation of the entity, whatever the frequency with which the task is performed or the number of employees directly employed to perform the task.1 Jones relies on Board of Supervisors v. Boaz, 176 Va. 126, 10 S.E.2d 498 (1940), to support his argument that the...
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