Jones v. Comer
Citation | 374 S.W.2d 465,237 Ark. 500 |
Decision Date | 13 January 1964 |
Docket Number | No. 5-3116,5-3116 |
Parties | Eugene JONES et al., Appellants, v. Mr. and Mrs. Rufus COMER, Appellees. |
Court | Supreme Court of Arkansas |
Franklin Wilder, Charles R. Garner, Ft. Smith, for appellants.
Warner, Warner, Ragon & Smith, Ft. Smith, for appellees.
Appellants, Eugene Jones, Charles Williams and Betty Williams, and Richard Wilson James, Jr., were the parents of three young boys who drowned in a pond located on land owned by appellees near the city limits of Ft. Smith. The trial court granted defendants' motion for a summary judgment and plaintiffs have appealed. The only issue is the action of the trial court in granting the motion for summary judgment.
Ark.Stat.Ann. § 29-211 (Repl.1962) provides: '(b) * * * A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
* * *'
In the every recent case of Epps v. Remmel, Ark., 373 S.W.2d 141, decided by this court December 16, 1963, we pointed out that if in a hearing on a motion for summary judgment it is shown by uncontroverted affidavits that there is no genuine issue of fact, it becomes the duty of the trial court to dispuse of the case accordingly.
The plaintiffs allege that the defendants owned the property on which the pond is located, and it is further alleged in the complaint:
'As a direct and proximate result of the conditions existing as aforesaid, the three deceased minor children on April 7th, 1962, went upon the described premises at or around 4:00 P.M. on said date and were drowned, thereby causing the damages as hereinafter complained of.'
The defendants filed an answer denying the allegations of the complaint and alleging the affirmative defense of contributory negligence. On authority of Ark.Stat.Anno. § 28-355 (Repl.1962), defendants then propounded interrogatories to plaintiffs, requesting: 'State the names and addresses of all persons known to you or your Attorneys having any knowledge or information of any facts relevant or pertinent to any of the allegations of fact contained in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of your complaint.'
In response, plaintiffs filed a list of their witnesses. The defendants then served notice on plaintiffs that discovery depositions would be taken from the witnesses named by the plaintiffs in the response to the interrogatories. Depositions were taken, counsel for both sides being present. Also affidavits of other witnesses were filed. Later, defendants filed a motion for a summary judgment alleging, in effect, that according to the uncontroverted evidence, as shown by the depositions and affidavits, there was no genuine issue of a material fact; that according to the undisputed evidence there was no liability on the part of the defendants, and that, as a matter of law, defendants were entitled to a judgment in their favor. The court granted the motion and entered a judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs have appealed.
Two of the boys that drowned were nine years of age and one was eight years of age. Two of the boys had bicycles. Late in the afternoon on April 7, 1962, the boys disappeared from their homes. About 8 o'clock p. m. on that same day a cap belonging to one of the boys was found floating in the pond on appellees' property. The property is located about one-half mile from where the boys lived. A further search was made by police and firemen and the bodies of the three young boys were recovered from the pond. The bicycles belonging to the boys were found the following day on the west side of appellees' property.
The property owned by appellees was formerly used as a golf course and the pond was part of the course. It is about 150 feet long by 100 feet wide and about 15 feet deep. One of the bodies was located about eight feet from the west shore of the pond, near the north end. The other two bodies were recovered from a little farther out in the pond. On the northeast shore of the pond there was an old boat partly in and partly out of the water. About 150 or 200 feet north of the pond there was an old bag swing hanging from a limb of a tree.
There is no indication whatever that appellants contend that there is any liability on the part of the defendants except the theory that the...
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