Jones v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

• Decision Date: 28 May 1943
• Docket Number: Docket No. 110984.
• Citation: 1 T.C. 1207
• Parties: HERBERT JONES, PETITIONER, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT.
• Court: U.S. Tax Court

1 T.C. 1207

HERBERT JONES, PETITIONER,

v.COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT.

Docket No. 110984.

Tax Court of the United States.

Promulgated May 28, 1943.

Petitioner, a resident of Nevada, was separated from his wife and, as a preliminary to his suit for divorce, his attorneys negotiated a complete settlement of her claims for support and maintenance with attorneys representing his wife. Under this agreement he was to convey to her two pieces of real estate and make a substantial cash payment. Thereupon petitioner filed in Nevada a divorce complaint alleging mental cruelty on the part of the defendant and advising the court that provision for support and maintenance of the defendant had been settled by the parties and no award in that respect would be requested. To this complaint petitioner's wife, on the same day, filed her answer through counsel, admitting the settlement and the fact she was asking no award for maintenance and support. Thereupon the court on the same day entered a final decree of absolute divorce. Following this, petitioner conveyed the property and money to his former wife as agreed. Held, that such conveyance by petitioner was made without donative intent in an arm's length business transaction settling her right to maintenance and support from petitioner and is not subject to gift tax. J. F. Dammann, Esq., for the petitioner.

Harold H. Hart, Esq., for the respondent.

OPINION.

LEECH, Judge:

Respondent determined a deficiency in gift tax of $39,329.30 for the calendar year 1938. The issue is whether a payment of $222,643, made in property and money by petitioner in that year to his former wife in performance of his obligation to her under a contract settling property rights, entered into as an incident of their divorce proceedings, constituted a taxable gift.

We find the facts as stipulated by the parties.

The petitioner is a resident of Cook County, Illinois, and filed a gift tax return for the period here involved with the collector for the first district of Illinois.

In the year 1938 the petitioner was a resident of the State of Nevada. His wife, Louisa Dorothea Kann Jones, had separated from him and was a resident of England. On February 2, 1938, petitioner filed in the First District Court of Ormsby County, Nevada, a suit for divorce from his wife, alleging mental cruelty. On the same date his wife, through her attorneys, entered her appearance in such suit and filed her answer to the complaint.

Prior to the filing of this suit for divorce, the parties thereto, through their respective attorneys, had negotiated a property settlement, to be effective upon the granting of the divorce. In that suit, the complaint filed by petitioner stated ‘that there are no children the issue of the marriage, and all property rights of plaintiff and defendant have been settled and adjusted, and no order of the Court is requested in reference thereto.‘ The answer filed by petitioner wife admitted this allegation. On the same date after a hearing the court entered its findings of fact and decree sustaining the allegations of the complaint and awarding an absolute divorce and restoring each party to the status of a single, unmarried person.

Thereafter, on May 23, 1938, petitioner and his former wife, to carry out their aforesaid prior agreement, executed an agreement bearing witness to the fact that petitioner had on that date paid over to her the sum of $190,000 and conveyed to her two residence properties in England in effecting a full, complete, and final settlement of all claims of each in the property of the other. The two pieces of property in question had a combined value of $32,643.

During the years from 1928 to 1937, inclusive, the net income returned by petitioner for Federal income tax was as follows:

+-----------------+
                ¦1928¦$142,240.98 ¦
                +----+------------¦
                ¦1929¦192,691.84  ¦
                +----+------------¦
                ¦1930¦163,072.25  ¦
                +----+------------¦
                ¦1931¦78,526.32   ¦
                +----+------------¦
                ¦1932¦60,351.08   ¦
                +----+------------¦
                ¦1933¦76,134.01   ¦
                +----+------------¦
                ¦1934¦77,498.42   ¦
                +----+------------¦
                ¦1935¦105,253.74  ¦
                +----+------------¦
                ¦1936¦131,783.43  ¦
                +----+------------¦
                ¦1937¦163,993.98  ¦
                +-----------------+
                

Respondent contends that the transfer of money and property by petitioner to his former wife under the foregoing circumstances was a taxable gift. He has consistently maintained the position heretofore that payments under antenuptial agreements constituting the consideration for surrender by the intended wife of the inchoate right of dower to which she would be otherwise entitled after marriage are subject to the gift tax. See Bennet B. Bristol, 42 B.T.A. 263; reversed, Commissioner v. Bristol, 121 Fed.(2d) 129. But, so far as we are advised, this is the first instance where respondent has taken the position that payments made by a husband to his wife, incidental to divorce proceedings and in settlement of her rights to maintenance and support, are taxable as gifts.

Section 804 of ‘Title VI— Estate Tax Amendments‘ in the Revenue Act of 1932 amended section 303(d) of the estate tax provisions of the Revenue Act of 1926, by providing that, ‘For the purposes of this title * * * ,‘ release of dower, curtesy, or similar rights ‘shall not be considered to any extent a consideration 'in money or money's worth.’‘ The gift tax law was enacted as Title III of the same Revenue Act of 1932 and contained no comparable provision. Despite this pointed omission, respondent's theory in the Bristol case was that in construing section 503 of the gift tax law¹ we should read into it the quoted amendment to the estate tax provisions.

The effect of that theory, of course, would require a holding in every case that a payment for surrender of dower or other marital rights would be subject to gift tax. We rejected that theory in the Bristol case. In the proceeding, involving a payment under an antenuptial contract, it was held that the surrender of such rights under a contract of that character could be full and adequate consideration under the gift tax law, and that the sufficiency of that consideration was a question of fact for determination in each case upon the evidence as to the value of the estate, the rights in which were released. Our view was that not only the failure of Congress to make section 804, supra, applicable to the gift tax provisions, but its specific limitation of that section to the purposes of the estate tax provisions, precluded its being treated as an amendment to the gift tax law. On review, our decision there was reversed. Commissioner v. Bristol, supra. We have not, however, departed from the view expressed in our opinion in that case. Moreover, the comparatively recent decision by the Second Circuit in Commissioner v. Beck's Estate, 129 Fed.(2d) 243, is especially significant. In that case it was urged that the estate and gift tax provisions of the statute, being complementary, should be integrated for purposes of construction. Similarly rejecting this theory the court held that these provisions, though complementary, were separate and distinct in themselves and that the silence of Congress in its failure to require the integration of their provisions was ‘strident.‘

The respondent relies here strongly upon the opinion of the Circuit Court in the Bristol case. He also cites other decisions involving antenuptial settlements and cases decided under the estate tax provisions of the statute. Passing the question of the correctness of our decision in the Bristol case, we do not think that the cited decisions control the present question. The Bristol case involved an antenuptial contract under which payment was made for a release of dower rights. The contested payment here occurred in satisfaction of the wife's right to support by her husband and as an incident of their divorce. There may be some ground for argument that prior to or during marriage, when no divorce is contemplated, the inchoate right of dower which may never be realized is too uncertain and indefinite to be then measured in terms of money. Moreover in those cases the circumstances are frequently such that there may well be a definite donative intent in the transfer. The contract there may be to effect a mere family arrangement. The parties are manifestly not dealing - at arm's length and the purpose to exact a quid pro quo may be lacking. It is a far cry, however, from such a transaction to that presented in this record, where the transfer was in settlement of a present and existing liability. Here the estranged husband and...