Jones v. Connell, 87-5150

Citation833 F.2d 503
Decision Date29 September 1987
Docket NumberNo. 87-5150,87-5150
PartiesMichael A. JONES v. Supervisor, Sergeant CONNELL, Supervisor, Lt. Pincheck, Sco. Colello, Sco. Kiesling, William H. Fauver, Commissioner, John J. Rafferty, Supt., J. Butler, Asst. Supt., L. Sherrer, Classification Comm. Member, Mr. Knief, Classification Committee Member, Lt. August, Classification Committee Member, Mr. Dickerson, Classification Committee Member, Appellants. . Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit Rule 12(6)
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

W. Cary Edwards, Atty. Gen. of N.J., James J. Ciancia, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Modestino Carbone, Deputy Atty. Gen., Trenton, N.J., for appellants.

Michael A. Jones, pro se.

Before SEITZ, GREENBERG and ROSENN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff, Michael A. Jones, a prisoner at Rahway State Prison in New Jersey, brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 on December 7, 1984 against certain correction officers charging that they were attempting to provoke him into committing an act that would result in plaintiff being charged with a disciplinary violation. Subsequently, there were several changes in plaintiff's prison classification status until on March 6, 1985 he was classified to gang minimum, inside only. In response to this new classification on March 19, 1985 plaintiff filed an amended complaint against the Commissioner of Corrections, the Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent at Rahway and members of the classification committee charging that they caused plaintiff to be reclassified from full minimum to gang minimum, inside only, in retaliation for his original complaint.

Thereafter, plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction against being harassed and, in addition, asked for reinstatement to the full minimum status. On July 22, 1985, the district judge in a memorandum opinion and order directed that a hearing be held by a magistrate to determine whether plaintiff had in fact been subject to retaliation and, if so, what relief should be ordered. After holding the hearing, the magistrate on November 21, 1985 filed a report and recommendation in which he found that there had been no retaliation against plaintiff. Rather, there had been an error in the calculation of his parole eligibility date so that when it was correctly calculated under a "new" set of classification criteria, adopted in response to a prisoner's escape, he was ineligible for the full minimum status. The magistrate, however, was "troubled" by the fact that the new guidelines had not been reduced to writing. Thus, he recommended that the judge require the Department of Corrections to reduce them to writing and when that was done re-evaluate plaintiff's custody status pursuant to the written standard.

The matter was then considered by the judge who issued a memorandum opinion and order on August 21, 1986 adopting the magistrate's report and recommendation. The judge said there was "simply no evidence in the record to create an issue of fact as to the correctness of the Magistrate's" finding that there had been no retaliation. He then pointed out that when the new guidelines were promulgated, plaintiff would have an opportunity for his status to be evaluated again.

Even before the court acted, defendants had revised their standards. The Department of Corrections on July 31, 1986 revised Standard 853 to provide for three custody levels, maximum custody, gang minimum or in-and-out and full minimum. On August 8, 1986, Rahway revised its policies to provide a classification of gang minimum inside only. Plaintiff was classified as gang minimum inside only on October 17, 1986.

On October 16, 1986, plaintiff wrote a letter to the judge complaining that he had not been reclassified. The judge treated the letter as a motion and decided the matter by an opinion dated February 3, 1987. He determined that plaintiff had been improperly classified gang minimum inside only, as that status was reserved for prisoners who could never be eligible for full minimum and plaintiff was not in that category. He rejected defendants' contention that the standards permitted plaintiff to be given that status. He found, however, that Rahway's policies were ambiguous and might justify plaintiff's being assigned to gang minimum in-and-out rather than...

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3 cases
  • Rannels v. Hargrove
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • February 20, 1990
    ...greatly upon the sovereignty protected by the Eleventh Amendment.2 Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 106, 104 S.Ct. at 911; Jones v. Connell, 833 F.2d 503, 505 (3d Cir.1987). To the extent that Rannels seeks damages for Hargrove's purported violation of Pennsylvania law, this court still lacks juri......
  • N.J. Primary Care Ass'n Inc. v. State
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • July 9, 2013
    ...however, is “barred by the Eleventh Amendment from ordering ... state officials to conform their conduct to state law.” Jones v. Connell, 833 F.2d 503, 505 (3d Cir.1987); see also Concourse Rehabilitation & Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. DeBuono, 179 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir.1999) (“As we repeatedly have......
  • New Jersey Educ. Ass'n v. New Jersey
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
    • December 12, 2011
    ...court [i]s barred by the Eleventh Amendment from ordering the state officials to conform their conduct to state law." Jones v. Connell, 833 F.2d 503, 505 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)); see also Kliesh v. Bucks County Domestic Rels......

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