Jones v. Connors
| Decision Date | 20 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 11 C 8276,11 C 8276 |
| Parties | RAMON JONES, Plaintiff, v. Chicago Police Officers KEVIN M. CONNORS, STAR #15151, ARMANDO CAZARES, STAR # 8680, Unknown Chicago Police Sergeant, THE CITY OF CHICAGO, as indemnitor, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Ramon Jones brings this cause of action against Chicago police officers Kevin M. Connors, Armando Cazares, and the City of Chicago, as indemnitor, for excessive force and failure to intervene in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I), and against Connors, Cazares, an unknown Chicago police sergeant, and the City, as indemnitor, (collectively, "Defendants") for civil conspiracy and malicious prosecution (Count II). Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss Count II of Jones's second amended complaint. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants' motion is granted and Count II is dismissed.
In deciding the instant motion, the Court assumes the veracity of the well-pled allegations in Jones's complaint and construes all reasonable inferences in his favor. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank, 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007)(citing Savory v. Lyons, 469 F,3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006)). On December 16, 2009, Connors and Cazares identified Jones at a gas station at 71st Street and Halsted Avenue in Chicago, Illinois. Connors and Cazares then disembarked from their squad car and attempted to question Jones. (Id.) Jones started to leave the gas station and Connors began to chase him. (Id.) During the chase, Connors tripped on a curb at the gas station and fell, injuring himself. (Id.)
Jones continued to walk and run away from the gas station until he reached the 7000 block of South Peoria Street. (Id. ¶ 3,) There he heard Cazares identify himself as a police officer, draw and cock his gun and threaten to shoot Jones if he did not stop. (Id.) Jones then stopped and laid face down on the ground with his hands behind his head as ordered by Cazares, who then stomped, kicked, and pummeled Jones while and after he handcuffed Jones behind his back. (Id.) While Jones was face down on the ground, Connors arrived at the 7000 block of South Peoria Street in the squad car and disembarked, whereupon he showed Jones the blood and scrapes on his hand and then proceeded to stomp, kick, and pummel Jones on his face and body while Jones was handcuffed on the ground. (Id. ¶ 4.)
The foregoing was witnessed in whole or in part by neighborhood witnesses, including Ibi Cole, LuLu Cole, and Lloyd Whitaker. (Id. ¶ 5.) Ibi Cole called 911 and spoke to a police dispatcher. (Id. ¶ 6). She asked that a supervisor be sent to her house to discuss what she had seen. (Id.) An unknown Chicago police sergeant was dispatched to speak to Cole. (Id.) Either Connors or Cazares, through the police dispatcher, contacted the sergeant assigned to interview Cole and asked to meet him at Ogden Park before the sergeant went to Cole's house. (Id. ¶ 7.) Connors, Cazares, and the unknown police sergeant then met at Ogden Park and there developeda conspiracy to thwart charges that Connors and Cazares allegedly used excessive and unreasonable force on Jones by falsely reporting that Jones pushed or struck Connors so that he fell to the ground and injured himself. (Id. ¶ 8.) Jones would thereby be charged with aggravated assault on a police officer, a felony. (Id.) The Defendants, each and all of them, knew that Jones did not strike Connors and did not cause him to fall and be injured. (Id. ¶ 9.) At the time Connors and Cazares beat Jones, and at material times thereafter, they exhibited plain manifestations of personal and racial malice, using racial epithets and otherwise acting with personal vengeance. (Id. ¶ 11.)
Jones was indicted on two counts of aggravated battery to a police officer and one count of resisting and obstructing arrest. Jones was held in the Cook County Jail from December 17, 2009 to October 4, 2010, when he was found not guilty on two counts of aggravated assault and guilty of the lesser included offense of resisting and obstructing a police officer.
On November 18, 2011, Ramon Jones commenced this action by filing a complaint in this Court. (R. 1, Compl.) Jones's original complaint in this matter was filed against unknown Chicago police officers. (Id.) Jones filed his first amended complaint naming Defendants Connors and Cazares on December 12, 2011. In his first amended complaint, Jones alleged that Connors and Cazares deprived him of his constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by using excessive force against him and by failing to intervene (Count I). (Id. ¶ 4). On August 1, 2012, this Court granted Jones leave to file a second amendedcomplaint. (R. 42, Min. Entry.) On that same day, Jones filed his second amended complaint. In his second amended complaint, Jones added claims for malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy (Count II) and joined another Defendant, the unnamed Chicago police sergeant.
On August 15, 2012, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Count II on the grounds that the malicious prosecution claim is time-barred; that Jones cannot state a claim for malicious prosecution; and that Jones cannot maintain his claim for civil conspiracy. (R. 47, Defs.' Mot. at 2.) Furthermore, Defendants argue that because Count II is the only count alleged against the unnamed Chicago police sergeant, he should be dismissed from the case. (Id.)
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all of the well-plead facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint and construes all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94; Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 618 (citing Savory, 469 F.3d at 670). To properly state a valid claim, the complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "Detailed factual allegations" are not required, but the plaintiff must allege facts that, when "accepted as true...state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twomhly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To determine whether a complaint meets this standard, the "reviewing court [must] draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. If the factual allegations are well-plead, the Court assumes their veracity and then proceeds to determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. See id. at679. A claim has facial plausibility when its factual content allows the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. See id. at 678.
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court is generally confined to allegations in the complaint and cannot consider extrinsic evidence without converting the motion into one for summary judgment, although "the bar on considering matters outside the pleadings is not absolute." Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 417 F.3d 727, 731 n.3 (7th Cir. 2005). The limitation on what the Court may consider is attenuated by Rule 10(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, insofar as "documents attached to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice" may also be considered by the Court in deciding a motion to dismiss without converting it into a motion for summary judgment. Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.l (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 10(c)). Documents that defendants attach to a motion to dismiss will be considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to the plaintiff's claims. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Cnty. of Cook, No. 10 C 320, 2011 WL 1004561, at *3 (N.D, Ill. March 17, 2011) (citing Cont'l Cas. Co., 417 F.3d at 731 n.3). Furthermore, the Court may take judicial notice of matters of public record without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7th Cir. 1997); Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1994). This includes taking judicial notice of state court decisions. See 520 S. Michigan Ave. Assocs., Ltd. v. Shannon, 549 F.3d 1119, 1138 n.14 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing In re Salem, 465 F.3d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 2006)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) therefore imposes "two easy-to-clear hurdles" onevery complaint in order to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 536 F.3d 1074, 1804 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)); accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. First, a complaint must describe the plaintiff's claims and the grounds supporting them in "sufficient detail to give the defendants fair notice" of the claims alleged against them, which requires more than mere "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Concentra, 496 F.3d at 776. Notice to the defendants alone, however, is not sufficient. To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must also include factual allegations which "plausibly suggest a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level." See id. If a complaint does not satisfy...
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