Jones v. Copenhaver
| Decision Date | 20 December 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:13-cv-00472-BAM-HC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | RASHI TAGUE JONES, Petitioner, v. COPENHAVER, Warden, Respondent. |
TO TRANSFER THE PETITION (DOC. 17)
ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS THE PETITION (DOC. 17)
AND DISMISSING THE PETITION (DOCS.
1, 7) OR, ALTERNATIVELY, DENYING
THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS (DOCS. 1, 7)
ORDER DIRECTING THE ENTRY OF
Petitioner is a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(c)(1), the parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings in the case, including the entry of final judgment, by manifesting their consent in writings signed by the parties or their representatives and filed by Petitioner on April 19, 2013, and on behalf of Respondent on June 24, 2013.
Pending before the Court is the Respondent's motion to dismiss the petition, which was filed on October 4, 2013, and served by mailon Petitioner. Although the time for filing opposition to the motion has passed, no opposition has been filed.
Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies to the petition. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997).
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2241 provides that writs of habeas corpus may be granted by a district court within its jurisdiction only to a prisoner whose custody is within enumerated categories, including but not limited to custody under the authority of the United States or custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(1) and (3).
A district court must award a writ of habeas corpus or issue an order to show cause why it should not be granted unless it appears from the application that the applicant is not entitled thereto. 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (Habeas Rules) is applicable to proceedings brought pursuant to § 2241. Habeas Rule 1(b). Habeas Rule 4 permits the filing of "an answer, motion, or other response," and thus it authorizes the filing of a motion in lieu of an answer in response to a petition. Rule 4, Advisory Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption and 2004 Amendments. This gives the Court the flexibility and discretion initially to forego an answer in the interest of screening out frivolous applications and eliminating the burden that would be placed on a respondent by ordering an unnecessary answer. Advisory Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption. Rule 4 confers upon theCourt broad discretion to take "other action the judge may order," including authorizing a respondent to make a motion to dismiss based upon information furnished by respondent, which may show that a petitioner's claims suffer a procedural or jurisdictional infirmity, such as res judicata, failure to exhaust state remedies, or absence of custody. Id.
The Supreme Court has characterized as erroneous the view that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is appropriate in a habeas corpus proceeding. See, Browder v. Director, Ill. Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 269 n. 14 (1978); but see Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 325-26 (1996). However, in light of the broad language of Rule 4, it has been held in this circuit that motions to dismiss are appropriate in cases that proceed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and present issues of failure to state a colorable claim under federal law, O'Bremski v. Maas, 915 F.2d 418, 420-21 (9th Cir. 1990); procedural default in state court, White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989); and failure to exhaust state court remedies, Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 n.12 (E.D.Cal. 1982). Analogously, a motion to dismiss a petition for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is appropriate in the present proceeding because this Court has a duty to determine its own jurisdiction in advance of determining the merits of the petition. Wilson v. Belleque, 554 F.3d 816, 821 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. den., 130 S.Ct. 75 (2009).
Petitioner signed and declared under penalty of perjury that he mailed his petition from the United States Prison at Atwater (USPA) on March 25, 2013. (Doc. 1, 5.) The petition was deemed filed onthat date pursuant to the "mailbox rule," which was initially developed in case law and is reflected in Habeas Rule 3(d) and Rule 3(d) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts. Pursuant to the mailbox rule, a prisoner's pro se habeas petition is "deemed filed when he hands it over to prison authorities for mailing to the relevant court." Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 3(d) requires an inmate to use the custodial institution's system designed for legal mail and provides for a showing of timely filing by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or by a notarized statement setting forth the date of deposit and verifying prepayment of first-class postage. The mailbox rule applies to federal and state petitions alike. Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2010) (). The mailbox rule, liberally applied, in effect assumes that absent evidence to the contrary, a legal document is filed on the date it was delivered to prison authorities, and a petition was delivered on the day it was signed. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. at 275-76; Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 770 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010); Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2010); Lewis v. Mitchell, 173 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1058 n.1 (C.D.Cal. 2001). The date a petition is signed may be inferred to be the earliest possible date an inmate could submit his petition to prison authorities for filing under the mailbox rule. Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds, Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005).
Respondent represents that after the petition was mailed but before the petition was "filed, " Petitioner was transferred to United States Prison at Allenwood on March 27, 2013. (Doc. 17, 2.) The Court notes that Petitioner filed in this Court a notification of change of address that was signed on April 15, 2013. (Doc. 6.) Respondent declines to challenge the Court's jurisdiction over Respondent Copenhaver, Warden of USPA, in view of the foregoing facts. (Doc. 17, at 3:10-11, and at 2-3.)
This Court has jurisdiction over Petitioner's custodian. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) provides that writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the district courts "within their respective jurisdictions." A writ of habeas corpus operates not upon the prisoner, but upon the prisoner's custodian. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 494-495 (1973). A petitioner filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 must file the petition in the judicial district of the petitioner's custodian. Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1990). The warden of the penitentiary where a prisoner is confined constitutes the custodian who must be named in the petition, and the petition must be filed in the district of confinement. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 446-47 (2004). It is sufficient if the custodian is in the territorial jurisdiction of the court at the time the petition is filed; transfer of the petitioner thereafter does not defeat personal jurisdiction that has once been properly established. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 193 (1948), overruled on other grounds in Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. at 499-500; Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1990).
Here, the petition was deemed filed as of the time it was mailed; thus, the record reflects that Petitioner's custodian was in the territorial jurisdiction of this Court at the time the petition was filed.
Respondent acknowledges that venue is proper in this district. (Doc. 17, 3:14-15.) However, Respondent seeks a transfer, asserting that exercising jurisdiction in this case would be anomalous. However, as the foregoing authorities demonstrate, no anomaly is present; rather, Petitioner was transferred after jurisdiction attached. Respondent also argues that transfer would be more practical and allow for a more efficient adjudication of the petition. However, Respondent cites no facts in support of this argument. The district of Petitioner's present custodial institution is not the district in which Petitioner was sentenced, and it appears that full documentation of Petitioner's restitution history is before the Court.
Respondent contends that this Court's decision in this case will be subject to review in Petitioner's present district, and further, that any determinations this Court would make on the merits of the petition concern Petitioner's sentence and are thus beyond the authority of this Court to undertake in a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. As the following analysis will show, to the extent that this Court might be considered to have jurisdiction to reach the merits of the petition, this Court addresses only the authority of the BOP to collect restitution and does not purport to affect the sentence imposed on Petitioner.
Accordingly, the request for transfer will be denied.
After filing his petition on March 25, 2013, Petitioner filed a supplement to the petition on April 26, 2013. In the petition, Petitioner challenges the authority of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to set a payment schedule for, and to...
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