Jones v. Corbyn

• Decision Date: 29 December 1950
• Docket Number: No. 4110.,4110.
• Citation: 186 F.2d 450
• Parties: JONES, Collector of Internal Revenue v. CORBYN et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

186 F.2d 450 (1950)

JONES, Collector of Internal Revenue v. CORBYN et al.

No. 4110.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

December 29, 1950.

Helen Goodner, Washington, D. C. (Theron Lamar Caudle, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ellis N. Slack, Robert N. Anderson, Leland T. Atherton, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., and Robert E. Shelton, U. S. Atty., Oklahoma City, Okl., on the brief), for appellant.

H. L. Douglass, Oklahoma City, Okl. (John H. Halley, Jr., Oklahoma City, Okl., on the brief), for appellees.

Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and BRATTON and PICKETT, Circuit Judges.

PICKETT, Circuit Judge.

Marmaduke Corbyn, Marmaduke Corbyn, Jr., and G. Scaling Corbyn, as taxpayers, brought this action against the Collector of Internal Revenue for the District of Oklahoma to recover income taxes paid as a result of his deficiency assessments. Judgment was for the taxpayers and the Collector has appealed. The question presented is whether $45,000 of a lump sum payment of $46,500 received by the taxpayers for the release of a life time general insurance agency contract should be treated for tax purposes as a long term capital gain or as ordinary income.

Marmaduke Corbyn was an experienced and successful life insurance agent. In 1934 he entered into a contract with Occidental Life Insurance Company of California whereby he became the exclusive agent of that company in Oklahoma for the solicitation of life insurance policies. The contract contained unusually attractive provisions. By a supplement and an amendment to the original contract, Marmaduke Corbyn, Jr., and G. Scaling Corbyn were recognized as partners with their father, Marmaduke Corbyn, and the partnership was to continue until the death of the last surviving member. Subagencies were established throughout the state and through the efforts of the partners and subagents the annual amount of insurance written rose to over $3,000,000. In 1944 difficulties arose which resulted in a civil action being brought against the company by the agents. The first cause of action in that suit was for a declaratory judgment to determine the validity of the contract and to declare the rights of the parties under it. Three other causes of action were for damages. While the case was being tried on the first cause of action, the parties entered into a written contract which terminated the agency contract and provided that the partnership should resign as agents and no longer solicit insurance on behalf of the company, and turn over to the company its office space and all books, records and files pertaining to the company business.¹ It was agreed that the agents had no claim against the company for damages on account of partial or total breach of the contract, but they did retain the right to receive renewal commissions on existing policies. The company paid the agents $46,500 of which $1,500 represented attorney fees to be paid the attorneys representing the agents in the litigation. In making their income tax returns, the taxpayers reported their proportionate share of the $45,000 as a long term capital gain. Upon audit and review of the returns, the Collector treated it as ordinary income and imposed the resulting deficiencies which were paid under protest.

The Collector contends that the contract was not a capital asset within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 117 (a) (1), 26 U.S.C.A. § 117 (a) (1), which states that all "property" is "capital assets", with certain exclusions which are not material here. He argues that the taxpayers had nothing more than an employment contract to perform services requiring special skill and granting to them the privilege of soliciting insurance for the company; that it is not property which is susceptible of ownership for a length of time as is a share of stock or a bond; and upon termination of the contract all the company received and paid for in advance was a promise by the agency not to exercise this privilege. We do not agree with this contention. The contract or franchise had at all times substantial value. It was capable of producing income for its owner. It was enforceable at law and could be bought and sold. Acting under its provisions, the agents developed a large and lucrative business. The evidence was without conflict that the value of the contract and the business formed the basis for the final purchase price. The evidence was also without conflict that the minimum value of this particular contract and business was not less than $45,000. The business was built up through the efforts of the taxpayers continuing over a number of years and appreciated in value during these years. It was a thriving business netting approximately $30,000 per year to the agency. Except for the renewal commissions, the effect of the termination contract was to transfer the business to the company intact.

The statutory definition of capital assets includes all property not excluded. Mertens Law of Federal Income Taxation, Vol. 3, Sec. 22.04. If the thing given up by the taxpayers is property within the meaning of the statute, then, of course, it is a capital asset. The term "capital assets" should not be considered in a technical or restricted sense but should be given its ordinary meaning. Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364, 369, 45 S.Ct. 274, 69 L.Ed. 660; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Shapiro, 6 Cir., 125 F.2d 532, 535, 144 A.L.R. 349; Investment & Securities Co. v. Robbins, D. C., 49 F. Supp. 620, affirmed Investment & Securities Co. v. U. S., 9 Cir., 140 F.2d 894. Property may be tangible or intangible such as a franchise or good will. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Arenz, 290 U.S. 66, 68, 54 S. Ct. 16, 78 L.Ed. 176; Cleveland Allerton Hotel Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 6 Cir., 166 F.2d 805, 807; Hoyd v. Citizens Bank of Albany Co., 6 Cir., 89 F.2d 105, 107; Grace Bros. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 9 Cir., 173 F. 2d 170, 175. In Citizens State Bank of Barstow, Texas, v. Vidal, 10 Cir., 114 F.2d 380, 382, the court defined property as "a word of very broad meaning and when used without qualification, may reasonably be construed to include obligations, rights and other intangibles, as well as physical things. `Property' within the tax laws should not be given a narrow or technical meaning." We think that what the taxpayers owned in this case was a capital asset.

The Collector also asserts a contention that the cancellation of the agency contract did not constitute a sale or exchange within the meaning of Sec. 117 of the Internal Revenue Code. He relies principally upon analogy of Hort v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 313 U.S. 28, 61 S.Ct. 757, 85 L.Ed. 1168 and similar cases. The Hort case presents an entirely different situation. There the taxpayer was the owner of a building, a portion of which was leased to a trust company for a period of fifteen years at an annual rental of $25,000. The trust company desired to be relieved of the rental obligations in the lease and the same was cancelled upon the payment to the taxpayer of $140,000. The court held that this was the payment of rentals for the unexpired period of the lease and taxable under Sec. 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 47 Stat. 169, 178, 26 U.S.C.A. § 22 (a). The settlement there was no more than an agreement as to how much rental the lessee would pay as provided for in the lease. It is not comparable to the sale and transfer of a going business under an exclusive contract.

Broadly speaking, a sale is a transfer of property for a valuable consideration. Burger-Phillips Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 5 Cir., 126 F.2d 934, 936; Pender v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 4 Cir., 110 F.2d 477, 478, certiorari denied 310 U.S. 650, 60 S.Ct. 1103, 84 L.Ed. 1416; Hawaiian Gas Products v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 9 Cir., 126 F.2d 4, 5, certiorari denied 317 U.S. 653, 63 S.Ct. 48, 87 L.Ed. 525. By terminating the contract and transferring the business to the company, there was a sale and transfer of a capital asset within the meaning of the statute.

It is true that the contract released any and all claims for damages which the taxpayers might have against the company and dismissed the litigation with prejudice. Generally, amounts received as damages in litigation are ordinary income. Helvering v. Safe Deposit Co., 316 U.S. 56, 62 S.Ct. 925, 86 L.Ed. 1266; Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 59 S. Ct. 155, 83 L.Ed. 119; Raytheon Production Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1 Cir., 144 F.2d 110, certiorari denied 323 U.S. 779, 65 S.Ct. 192, 89 L.Ed. 622; Swastika Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 6 Cir., 123 F. 2d 382, certiorari denied 317 U.S. 639, 63 S.Ct. 30, 87 L.Ed. 515; Parker v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1355. Income received must be considered in the light of the source from which it was realized. Swastika Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra; Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 6 Cir., 59 F.2d 912. The amount of the settlement in this case was not based upon damages. It was based upon the value of the exclusive business franchise. The fact that the suit ended in a compromise settlement does not change the nature of the recovery. The nature of the basic claim from which the amount is received is the determining factor. Raytheon Production Corp....