Jones v. County of DuPage

• Decision Date: 07 December 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87 C 9841.,87 C 9841.
• Citation: 700 F. Supp. 965
• Parties: Cathy JONES, Individually and as Wife and Administrator of the Estate of Earl R. Jones, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF DuPAGE, A Local Public Entity; Richard P. Doria, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Sheriff of DuPage County; Joseph Caulfield, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Deputy in Charge of Corrections for DuPage County Jail; Louis Cook, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Deputy Jailer of DuPage County; et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

700 F. Supp. 965

Cathy JONES, Individually and as Wife and Administrator of the Estate of Earl R. Jones, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF DuPAGE, A Local Public Entity; Richard P. Doria, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Sheriff of DuPage County; Joseph Caulfield, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Deputy in Charge of Corrections for DuPage County Jail; Louis Cook, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Deputy Jailer of DuPage County; et al., Defendants.

No. 87 C 9841.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.

December 7, 1988.

George N. Avgeris, Timothy Fisher, Hinsdale, Ill., for plaintiff.

James R. Schirott, Charles E. Hervas, James G. Sotos, Michael W. Condon, Schirott & Associates, Itasca, Ill., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BRIAN BARNETT DUFF, District Judge.

Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and her son, Earl Jones, has sued the County of DuPage ("DuPage"), the City of Elmhurst ("Elmhurst") and numerous county and city officials for allegedly causing Earl to commit suicide shortly after he was arrested and incarcerated on October 18, 1985. She brought the suit in state court, alleging federal and state law claims against all defendants. Defendants subsequently removed to this court, and have now moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff's complaint, though long in words, is extremely short in substance. After parsing out the repeated lists and descriptions of the parties, and the redundant accusations as to what the defendants did not do, the factual allegations are as follows.

Earl Jones was arrested by Elmhurst police officers ("the police officers") on October 18, 1985 for misdemeanor charges. At the time of the arrest, the police officers recovered from Earl a quantity of cannabis sativa, a vial of Ativan tablets, a vial containing Valium tablets and an open bottle of whiskey. Earl was intoxicated.

The police officers then transported Earl to the DuPage County jail, where they released him into the custody of the DuPage County jail officials ("the jail officials"). These officials then placed Earl in an isolation cell. Some time later, in the early morning hours of October 19, 1985, Earl hanged himself from the bars of the cell by a bedsheet. By the time he was discovered and medical personnel were summoned, Earl was dead.

In Counts I and II, plaintiff claims that the police officers and the jail officials, respectively, negligently caused Earl's death through, inter alia, their failure to adequately discover that Earl was intoxicated and emotionally upset, failure to provide him with medical services as required by his condition, failure to supervise him while he was locked in solitary confinement, and failure to "provide him with bedding materials such as `tear away' blankets and sheets which would have prevented him from inflicting harm on himself or committing suicide." Compl. ¶ 12.

In Count III, plaintiff first claims that the conduct of the city and county officials was a result of their improper training as well as the inadequate funding of the jail facility. She then alleges that the improper training and inadequate funding, combined with the negligence of the police officers and jail officials, violated Earl's federal constitutional rights.

DISCUSSION

The Federal Claims

Plaintiff alleges that the DuPage and Elmhurst officials violated three constitutional provisions through their arrest, detention and treatment of Earl: the Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Clause; the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause; and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. To determine which, if any, of these claims have merit requires a careful examination of current law governing the detention of individuals by the state. For while it is axiomatic that the Constitution places limits on how state officials may treat individuals in the state's custody, the source of these limits as well as their scope can differ markedly from case to case.

The Fourth Amendment governs the conduct of a government official taking an individual into custody — i.e., seizing him — and imposes rather stringent limits on what the official may do. When it can reasonably be accomplished, the officer must secure an arrest warrant. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2590, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979). When he cannot, he must have probable cause before making the arrest. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). In either case, he may only use such force as is reasonably necessary to effectuate it. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 1699, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706 (7th Cir.1987). And, if he makes the arrest without a warrant, he must bring the arrestee before a magistrate for a determination of probable cause within a short period of time. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed. 2d 54 (1975).

Once an arrestee is properly in custody, he becomes a pretrial detainee, and the Constitution provides him fewer protections. His First and Fourth Amendment rights are of a diminished scope, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 555, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3215, 82 L.Ed. 2d 393 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring), and his substantive due process rights are limited to protection against egregious government conduct. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.1973) (Friendly, J.). To be sure, the procedural prong of the Due Process Clause does prohibit the state from "punishing" him, Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 583-85, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 3231-32, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (intent to punish can be inferred if purported internal security measures are not reasonably related to legitimate government objective), since doing so would clearly amount to a deprivation of liberty without due process — i.e., a criminal trial. But that limitation is a narrow one. "If a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate government objective, it does not, without more, amount to `punishment.'" Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 539, 99 S.Ct. at 1874.

If the pretrial detainee is convicted, the even more limited protections of the Eighth Amendment come into play. Whitley v. Ambers, 475 U.S. 312, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986) ("The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause applies ... `only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.") (Quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n. 40, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1412 n. 40, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977)). Now the state may punish him, by depriving him of life, liberty or property, and may subject him to harsh treatment and conditions of confinement; "only the `unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' ... constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 670, 97 S.Ct. at 1412 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)); see also Whitley v. Ambers, 475 U.S. 312, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986) (Eighth Amendment prohibits wanton infliction of pain by prison officials maintaining security); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105, 97 S.Ct. at 291 (Eighth Amendment prohibits "deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury").

This outline provides a useful starting point for addressing plaintiff's constitutional claims. Thus, it makes clear immediately that plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims cannot survive, since plaintiff had not been convicted of a crime at the time he committed suicide. It also indicates that whether Earl was an arrestee, or instead a pretrial detainee will have significant implications for his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.

Defendants' primary argument for dismissal of Count III overlooks this distinction. Because negligent deprivations are not deprivations within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986); Archie v. Racine, 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir.1988) (en banc), and because plaintiff alleges only that defendants failed to exercise due care in their treatment of Earl, defendants maintain that plaintiff has failed to state a claim.

Plaintiff's first response to this argument ignores it. She insists that defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived Earl of his life and, therefore, violated the Due Process Clause. The problem with her argument, of course, is that the deprivation of life by a government official is not ipso facto a due process violation.

The government may lawfully kill a person after he has been convicted of a capital crime provided it does so in accordance with a valid death penalty statute. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). Government officials may kill a person intentionally without such a conviction where exigent circumstances require it. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 1701, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). And, as Davidson and Daniels, and the cases springing from them, have made clear, government officials may kill a person accidentally or negligently at any time without running afoul of the Due Process Clause. See Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S.Ct. at 671 ("The protections of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison officials."); Archie v. Racine, 847 F.2d at 1218-20; Molton v. City of Cleveland, 839 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1988); McClary v. O'Hare, 786 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.1986); see also State Bank of St. Charles v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1140, 1147-48 (7th Cir.1983) (suicide of pretrial detainee resulting from "simple negligence" on part of prison officials does not...