Jones v. Cox

• Decision Date: 06 April 1992
• Docket Number: No. 90SC479,90SC479
• Parties: Dilworth JONES, Petitioner, v. Sara COX, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 218

828 P.2d 218

Dilworth JONES, Petitioner, v. Sara COX, Respondent.

No. 90SC479.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

April 6, 1992.

Rehearing Denied April 27, 1992.

Alan Epstein, William James Barber, Hall & Evans, Denver, for petitioner.

David A. Bauer, David A. Bauer, P.C., Lakewood, for respondent.

Steven G. Francis, Fischer, Howard & Francis, Fort Collins, for amicus curiae Colorado Trial Lawyers Ass'n.

James D. Johnson, Blunk, Johnson & Johnson, Denver, for amicus curiae Colorado Defense Lawyers Ass'n.

Justice MULLARKEY delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to consider whether the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court's dismissal of a personal injury action on the grounds that the action failed to comply with the two-year statute of limitations set forth in section 13-80-102(1)(a), 6 C.R.S. (1986 Supp.), and also to consider the issue of whether the applicable statute of limitations began running at the date the physical injury was incurred as opposed to when the threshold requirement of section 10-4-714(1)(e), 4 C.R.S. (1973 & 1986 Supp.), was met. The court of appeals held that because section 13-80- 101(1)(j), 6 C.R.S. (1986 Supp.), specifically addresses the particular class of cases represented by this case, unlike the more general section 13-80-102(1)(a), the three-year statute of limitations of section 13-80-101(1)(j) is appropriate here. Cox v. Jones, 802 P.2d 1125 (Colo.App.1990). We affirm and also hold that the statute of limitations begins to run from the date the physical injury and its cause were known or should have been known by the exercise of reasonable diligence.

I.

Sara Cox, the respondent, and Dilworth Jones, the petitioner, were involved in a motor vehicle accident on October 7, 1986. Both parties were insured. Cox incurred medical expenses as a result of the injuries she received. It was not until November 28, 1986 that Cox's medical expenses exceeded $2,500.00, which was the threshold requirement for bringing an action against a third-party tortfeasor under section 10-4-714(1)(e) of the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act (Act) (also referred to as the No-Fault Act). On October 11, 1988, Cox filed a personal injury action against Jones.

After Cox filed her complaint, Jones filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) and for attorney fees on the grounds that the action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations of section 13-80-102(1)(a). Cox responded to the motion by stating that her cause of action accrued only after she met the threshold requirement for bringing the action, and therefore, she had properly filed within the two-year period requirement. The trial court ruled that the cause of action accrued on the date of the accident. Therefore, the court dismissed the complaint as failing to comply with the two-year statute of limitations.

II.

Jones argues that the court of appeals stretched the clear meaning of section 13-80-101(1)(j) by holding that an ordinary negligence action involving an automobile accident is an action brought under the No-Fault Act. Section 13-80-101(1)(j) states:

(1) The following civil actions, regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought, or against whom suit is brought, shall be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter:

* * * * * *

(j) All actions under the "Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act", part 7 of article 4 of title 10, C.R.S.

§ 13-80-101(1)(j), 6 C.R.S. (1986 Supp.). Jones argues that the term "under" is plain and unambiguous in the context of section 13-80-101 and means that only first party claims by insureds against insurers are claims arising under the Act and are governed by its statute of limitations. He argues, therefore, that because the nature of the action here is a tort, the statute of limitations which is generally applicable to torts should apply. Section 13-80-102(1)(a) provides:

(1) The following civil actions, regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought, or against whom suit is brought, shall be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter:

(a) Tort actions, including but not limited to actions for negligence, trespass, malicious abuse of process, malicious prosecution, outrageous conduct, interference with relationships, and tortious breach of contract.

§ 13-80-102(1)(a), 6 C.R.S. (1986 Supp.).

Citing Persichini v. Brad Ragan, Inc., 735 P.2d 168 (Colo.1987), the court of appeals concluded that where there are two applicable statutes of limitation, the more specific one should control. Therefore, it applied the statute of limitations found in section 13-80-101(1)(j), which specifically applies to actions under the Act, rather than the statute of limitations found in section 13-80-102(1)(a), which generally applies to torts. The court of appeals concluded that interpreting section 13-80-101(1)(j) as Jones suggests comports with neither the plain language of the statute nor its legislative intent. We agree. ¹

Our primary task in construing a statute is to determine and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Woodsmall v. Regional Transportation District, 800 P.2d 63, 67 (Colo.1990); Kern v. Gebhardt, 746 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Colo.1987). To determine legislative intent, we must look primarily to the language of the statute itself and then give effect to the statutory terms in accordance with their commonly accepted meaning. Woodsmall, 800 P.2d at 67; Kern, 746 P.2d at 1344. When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to interpretive rules and statutory construction. Woodsmall, 800 P.2d at 67; Griffin v. S.W. Devanney and Co., Inc., 775 P.2d 555, 559 (Colo.1989). However, if the intended scope of the statutory language is unclear a court may consider " 'the consequences of a particular construction.' " Woodsmall, 800 P.2d at 67 (quoting § 2-4-203(1)(e), 1B C.R.S. (1980)).

The particular language of section 13-80-101 with which we are concerned is the word "under" in the term "all actions under the 'Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act', part 7 of article 4 of title 10, C.R.S." Jones argues that this section was meant to address only first-party claims between insurers and their insureds. On the other hand, Cox argues that the Act was intended to regulate persons owning and operating motor vehicles in this state and all claims for damages resulting from such ownership and operation.

The word "under" is defined as "within the grouping or designation of." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2487 (1986). Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether the General Assembly intended personal injury negligence actions brought by an insured, against the operator of the other vehicle involved in an accident, to be within the designation of the Act. Because the intended scope of the word "under" is not clear and unambiguous, we will look closer at the purpose of the Act and the consequences of the particular construction urged by Jones.

The purpose behind the "No-Fault" provisions, section 10-4-701, et seq., is made clear in section 10-4-702:

The general assembly declares that its purpose in enacting this part 7 is to avoid inadequate compensation to victims of automobile accidents; to require registrants of motor vehicles in this state to procure insurance covering legal liability arising out of ownership or use of such vehicles and also providing benefits to persons occupying such vehicles and to persons injured in accidents involving such vehicles.

§ 10-4-702, 4A C.R.S. (1987). Under the Act, all registrants of motor vehicles are required to be insured. § 10-4-705, 4A C.R.S. (1987). Motorists involved in automobile accidents recover from the insurers on a no-fault basis and "the minimum coverages required" are set out in section 10-4-706, 4A C.R.S. (1987 & 1991 Supp.). The General Assembly intended to place a duty upon the insurer to pay all the medical expenses which an insured ² incurs by reason of an accident, irrespective of who might have been the tortfeasor. In re United States Court of Appeals v. Criterion Ins. Co., 198 Colo. 132, 135, 596 P.2d 1203, 1205 (1979). In this way, victims of automobile accidents are compensated and the amount of litigation arising out of automobile accidents is reduced.

"[T]he Act limits tort actions and recoveries." Cingoranelli v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 658 P.2d 863, 867 (Colo.1983). It abolishes the general rights of both the insured and the insurer to recover against the owner, user, or operator of the other motor vehicle involved in the accident for damages for benefits required to be paid under the Act. § 10-4-713(1), 4A C.R.S. (1987). Actions brought by an insured against a third-party tortfeasor "for damages for bodily injury caused by a motor vehicle accident" are allowed by section 10-4-714, 4A C.R.S. (1987), only in certain cases. As relevant here, such actions are allowed where the accident causes reasonable need for medical services in excess of $2,500.00. Therefore, we conclude that such actions are brought "under" the Act and the legislature intended the three-year statute of limitations to apply.

Our reading of the statute is buttressed by the legislative policy of the Act. One of the purposes of section 10-4-714 is to differentiate between minor and major injuries. Bushnell v. Sapp, 194 Colo. 273, 571 P.2d 1100 (1977). However, we have concluded that to deny an automobile accident victim full tort recovery is contrary to the General Assembly's intent in enacting this section. See Marquez v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 29, 33 (Colo.1980). Tort actions like the one in issue evidently were considered by the legislature to further the legislative objectives of the Act, and thus are allowed under this section. To apply the general two-year statute of limitations, as urged by Jones, would have the effect of prohibiting an...