Jones v. CPR Division, Upjohn Co.

CourtArizona Court of Appeals
Writing for the CourtNELSON; HAIRE, P. J., and FROEB
CitationJones v. CPR Division, Upjohn Co., 584 P.2d 611, 120 Ariz. 147 (Ariz. App. 1978)
Decision Date27 July 1978
Docket NumberCA-CIV,No. 1,1
Parties, Blue Sky L. Rep. P 71,445 Billy F. JONES and Virginia Jones (his former wife), Jere Martin and Mary Lou Martin (his former wife), and Richard C. Jones and Keva Jones (his former wife), Appellants, v. CPR DIVISION, the UPJOHN COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, and Filbert Terrazas and Eloise Terrazas, his wife, Appellees. 3486.
OPINION

NELSON, Judge.

Prior to February 21, 1972, appellees, Filbert and Eloise Terrazas (Terrazas), were the majority shareholders (74%) and managing officers of Terri-Flex Products, Inc. (Terri-Flex). Terri-Flex was engaged essentially in the sale and installation of roofing and insulation systems, and roofing components, primarily foam. Their principal material supplier was the other appellee in this case, CPR Division of the Upjohn Company (CPR), with whom they had traded for several years on an open account, and to whom the sum of $100,000 was owed for materials.

On February 21, 1972, a promissory note was executed by Terri-Flex and Terrazas to CPR for $100,000. That note provided for installments to reduce the open account balance and further mandated that if Terrazas ceased to operate, or in any way disposed of the business without the consent of CPR, CPR could accelerate the note.

By August of 1972, as a result of additional materials purchases, Terri-Flex owed CPR $60,000 on its open account and $76,000 on the $100,000 note. In mid-August, representatives of CPR came to Phoenix to discuss the status of their relationship with Terri-Flex. Terrazas informed them that his failure to meet his obligations was due to business difficulties Terri-Flex was experiencing and his own ill health required him to reduce his role in the business.

Shortly after this meeting, Terrazas negotiated for the sale of his Terri-Flex stock to appellants Billy Jones, Richard Jones and Jere Martin (JJ&M), reached a tentative agreement, and executed a letter which provided that Terrazas agreed to convey his stock in Terri-Flex to JJ&M upon their payment of $55,000.

Subsequently, at Terrazas' request, representatives of CPR returned to Phoenix to negotiate with the potential purchasers regarding Terri-Flex' obligations to CPR. CPR became involved because the promissory note from Terri-Flex and Terrazas gave CPR the right to accelerate the balance of their promissory note if Terrazas sold the Terri-Flex business. After two days of negotiations, the parties entered into an agreement on August 31, 1972 which provided that CPR would waive its right to accelerate its note if certain conditions were met. Initially the purchasers agreed to make an immediate payment to CPR of $26,633.84. The agreement further provided that a new promissory note to CPR in the amount of $111,000 would be executed by the purchasers with Terrazas also personally liable to the extent of the first $76,000. In addition, the agreement provided that certain stock held by JJ&M be pledged as security on the note. The stock purchase price of $55,000 was also paid by JJ&M to Terrazas. After the consummation of this agreement, CPR continued to supply materials to Terri-Flex.

In the weeks following the assumption of the business by JJ&M, several events occurred which ultimately led to this litigation. In the sale between JJ&M and Terrazas, those parties agreed that no sale would occur if the accounts payable as of August 30th exceeded by more than 10% The accounts payable as of June 30th. The purchasers determined in the ensuing months that these accounts in fact exceeded 10% Of the June 30th accounts. The other crucial event was JJ& M's discovery of revocation proceedings pending against Terri-Flex' contractor's license. In October 1972, the purchasers called in Mr. Terrazas and informed him of these difficulties, seeking to abandon the purchase.

In March of 1973, JJ&M defaulted on the promissory note and in April they wrote a letter to CPR and Terrazas indicating their formal intention to rescind the contract, based upon alleged misrepresentations made to them by Terrazas.

CPR filed suit in June of 1973 against Terrazas and the purchasers to enforce their promissory note, and JJ&M counterclaimed as to CPR and cross-claimed as to Terrazas, seeking rescission and claiming common law and securities fraud. The trial court dismissed the jury and directed a verdict denying JJ&M rescission and finding against them and Terri-Flex on the balance of the promissory note for $75,000 plus attorneys' fees. The court also entered judgment against Terri-Flex and ARM (the corporation which continued operating the Terri-Flex business with a newly acquired contractor's license) on the open account for $31,500 and against Terrazas and for CPR for $40,000, the remaining balance of his $76,000 liability, plus attorneys' fees on the note. The court also directed a verdict in favor of Terrazas and against JJ&M on the cross-claim. JJ&M and Terrazas then perfected their appeals to this Court. 1

At the outset, we note that Terrazas challenges this Court's jurisdiction over the case, due to some alleged defects in the filing of the notice of appeal. This Court, by motion, has previously ruled on the exact issue there raised, and this appeal is now before us in compliance with that ruling. We have reviewed the record in this regard and see no need to discuss the issue further.

While each party presents somewhat different questions to this Court for our consideration on appeal, we can capsulize them into one basic issue which we will discuss: was it error for the trial court to grant a directed verdict denying JJ&M rescission against both Terrazas and CPR?

DIRECTED VERDICT

In the arguments before this Court, it was suggested that the jury on this case sat in a strictly advisory capacity and therefore their dismissal by the judge and his direction of a verdict were to be treated as the verdict of the trier of fact. Rule 39(k), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S., provides:

"Advisory jury and trial by consent. In all actions not triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or, the court, with the consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury whose verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right."

Although this suit dealt, at least in part, with an equitable action seeking rescission, a jury was requested and one was convened. The court made no specific ruling on the capacity in which they would sit, however the law in Arizona makes their function clear. The cases overwhelmingly hold that "even in equity cases, where a jury has been demanded, the court may not withdraw the case from the jury's consideration if there are controverted issues of fact." Slonsky v. Hunter, 17 Ariz.App. 231, 496 P.2d 874 (1972). Therefore, if the court had been required to direct a verdict in a matter at law, it would be proper to do so in an equity action. Han v. Horwitz, 2 Ariz.App. 245, 407 P.2d 786 (1965). If, however, there were controverted issues of fact, as we find there were in part of the controversy before us, then such a direction would not be proper.

RESCISSION JJ&M v. TERRAZAS

Appellants JJ&M sought affirmative relief in this action against both Terrazas and CPR for rescission of their contract. The basis for the cross- claim against Terrazas was his alleged fraudulent misrepresentations and withholding of facts material to the sale. The elements which must be shown in Arizona to support an allegation of fraudulent misrepresentation have been set forth on numerous occasions and are as follows:

"(1) A representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) his intent that it should be acted upon by the person and in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) his reliance on its truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; (9) his consequent and proximate injury. Carrel v. Lux, 101 Ariz. 430, 434, 420 P.2d 564, 568 (1966);" Jennings v. Lee, 105 Ariz. 167, 461 P.2d 161 (1969).

As characterized by counsel at oral argument, this transaction was consummated in haste, probably undue haste precluding the necessary careful analysis of all facets of this business. However, the evidence indicated that complete disclosure of the company's financial position was probably not given. One answer in the transcript, while perhaps not legally significant standing alone, exemplifies the nature of this transaction:

"MR. TERRAZAS: Mr. Cunningham, (counsel for JJ&M) if I would have told your clients all of the things you have brought up in the last three years in the litigation we have had here, we would have never made a deal. I would still be owning Terri-Flex."

JJ&M rely primarily for this action, however, on what they believe to be two crucial misrepresentations or omissions.

The contract of sale between Terrazas and JJ&M provided:

"That the Accounts Payable as reflected in the June 30, 1972, Balance Sheet do not increase more than 10% as reflected in the August 30, 1972 Balance Sheet. If they do, then this agreement can be terminated at the option of the undersigned."

In the trial court, JJ&M subpoenaed numerous creditors of Terri-Flex who testified that Terri-Flex owed them varying sums of money. Some of these creditors' bills appeared on neither the June nor the August balance sheets, and others appeared in amounts unrelated to what was actually owed. While it is difficult for ...

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  • Farnsworth v. Evans
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    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • May 26, 2011
    ...that only one inference could be derived therefrom in which case it would become a question of law." Jones v. CPR Div., Upjohn Co., 120 Ariz. 147, 151, 584 P.2d 611, 615 (App. 1978) (quoting Mahurin v. Schmeck, 95 Ariz. 333, 340, 390 P.2d 576, 580 (1964)). Even if the delay was unreasonable......
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  • § 5.1.10.1
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    ...128 Ariz. 209, 214, 624 P.2d 887, 892 (Ct. App. 1981) (holding tender at commencement of suit was timely); Jones v. CPR Div., Upjohn Co., 120 Ariz. 147, 151-53, 584 P.2d 611, 615-17 (Ct. App. 1978) (concluding that adequacy of tender was jury question); Bullard v. Garvin, 1 Ariz. App. 249, ......
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