Jones v. Crittenden

• Decision Date: 31 January 1814
• Citation: Jones v. Crittenden, 4 N.C. 55, 1 Car. L. Rep. 385 (N.C. 1814)
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: JONES v. CRITTENDEN.

4 N.C. 55

1 Car. L. Rep. 385

JONES

v.CRITTENDEN.

SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

JANUARY TERM, 1814

The act passed in 1812 "to suspend executions for a limited time" commonly called the suspension act, is unconstitutional, it being prohibited by that part of section 10, Article I, Constitution of the United States, which says that no State shall pass any "law impairing the obligations of contracts."

TAYLOR, C. J. The law of which the defendant claims the benefit was passed in 1812, and provides that any court rendering judgment against a debtor for debt or damages between 31 December in that year and 1 February, 1814, shall stay the same until the first term or session of the court after the latter period, upon the defendant's giving two freeholders as securities. The act also contains sundry details not necessary to be recited.

In deciding the momentous question whether the will of the Legislature, as expressed in this act, be incompatible with the will of the people

as expressed in their fundamental law, the Constitution of the United States, we disclaim all right or power to give judgment against the validity of a legislative act unless its collision with the Constitution appear to our understandings manifest and irreconcilable. On the contrary, if patient and dispassionate consideration of the subject produce anything short of entire conviction, we hold ourselves bound to support a law.

The constitutional will of the Legislature, inclination not less than duty prompts us to execute; for identified as its members are with the other citizens of the community, and faithfully representing their feelings and interests, we can never allow ourselves to think that the acts proceeding from them can be designed for any other purpose than the promotion of the general welfare, or can result from other than the purest and most patriotic motives.

We have deliberately viewed the question in every light in which the arguments of the learned counsel on both sides have presented it, and aided by such additional information as our own research or reflection could furnish, the result of our opinion is that thelaw in question is unconstitutional, and cannot be executed by the judicial department without violating the paramount duty of their oaths to maintain the Constitution of the United States.

This conclusion we derive (1) from the plain and natural import of the words of the Constitution of the United States; (2) from a consideration of the previously existing mischiefs which it was the design of that valuable instrument to suppress and remedy.

Amongst the important objects which the people of the United States designed to accomplish by adopting the Constitution, that of establishing justice, holds a conspicuous rank. This appears from the solemn declaration of the people themselves in the preamble to that instrument. The enlightened statesman by whom it was originally framed had reaped abundant instruction from history and experience. Long accustomed to contemplate the operation of those master principles and comprehensive truths which form at once the defenses and the ornament of human society, and which alone can justly form the basis of the social compact, they designed to give them practical effect for the benefit of the American people—to consecrate and make them perpetual. They well knew that while the principle of justice is deeply rooted in the nature and interest of man and essential to the prosperity of states, it forms the strongest and brightest link in the chain by which the author of the Universe has united together the happiness and the duty of His creatures.

To give a proper direction to these general principles, the clause in the Constitution which presents the question before us, was inserted. Some of its provisions are transcribed from the articles of confederation;

others are added because experience had demonstrated that without them the Union of the states would be imperfect. The words are, "No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money, emit bills of credit, make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts," etc.

The obligation of a contract may be impaired by various modes and in different degrees; and the restrictive clause in the Constitution does, according to our apprehension of its meaning, annul every act of a state legislature which shall thereafter produce that effect, plainly and directly, in any degree. When, therefore, the validity of the law is maintained by the defendant's counsel because it does not allow a debtor, who promises to pay in one thing, to pay in another; because it does not absolutely restrain the debtor from paying according to his engagement: or, because it does not allow a third person to interfere between the contracting parties—the answer is that the examples cited furnish stronger instances of a violation of the Constitution than the case before us; they may with stricter propriety be called cases of annulling a contract; but they certainly do not prove that the obligation of contracts is not impaired by the act under consideration.

Whatever law releases one party from any article of a stipulation voluntarily and legally entered into by him with another, without the direct assent of the latter, impairs its obligation; because the rights of the creditor are thereby destroyed, and these are ever correspondent to and coextensive with the duty of the debtor. The first principles of justice teach us that he to whom a promise is made under legal sanctions should signify his consent before any part of it can be rightfully canceled by a legislative act.

The binding force of a contract may likewise be impaired by compelling either party to do more than he has promised. If an act postponing the payment of debts be constitutional, what reasonable objection could be made to an act which should enforce the payment before the debt becomes due? If, notwithstanding the constitutional barrier, it is competent for the Legislature to hold out to all debtors that although they fail to pay their debts when they become due, and their creditors are in consequence compelled to sue them, they shall nevertheless be indulged with a certain time beyond the judgment, superadded to the ordinary delays of the law, may not the Legislature, with equal authority, announce to all creditors the right of suing for their debts and enforcing payment before the day? Yet the rights of both parties established by the contract are, in the eye of justice, equally

sacred; and whether those of the creditor are sacrificed to the convenience of the creditor, or the subject be reversed, we are compelled to think that the Constitution is overlooked.

No unimportant part of the obligation of every contract arises from the inducement the debtor is under to preserve his faith. With many persons (and it may be hoped, the greater number), a sense of justice and respect for character form motives of sufficient strength; but how rarely does it happen that a man lending his money, or selling his property on credit, estimates such motives so highly as to deem them a safe and exclusive ground of reliance? In most cases he would reserve both money and property in his own possession, were he not assured that the law animates the industry and quickens the punctuality of his debtor, and that by its aid he can obtain payment in six or nine months. Hence the well considered ceremonies of bonds, mortgages, and deeds of trust, more useful as the instruments of coercive justice than as preserving the evidence of contract. The act under view destroys this assurance, and while it produces a state of things the existence of which at the time of contract would have restrained the creditor from parting with his property, it encourages the debtor to relax his efforts to be punctual. It weakens his inducements to fulfill his engagement, and thereby impairs its obligation.

The right to suspend the recovery of a debt for one period implies the right of suspending it for another; and as the state of things which called for the first delay may continue for a series of years, the consequence may be a total stagnation of the business of society by destroying confidence and credit amongst the citizens.

An argument urged and much relied on by the defendant'scounsel is that the law in question bears only on the remedy, and is therefore within the sphere of legislative authority. But if in so doing it violates the Constitution, it is not less invalid than if it directly touched and annulled the right. Every one will agree that a law which should deny to all creditors the power of instituting the action of debt, covenant, assumpsit, or a bill in chancery, would invade the Constitution; that a law which should limit the recovery of all debts to so short a period after its passage that it would be impossible, according to the course of the courts, to obtain a judgment, would also be null and void. Though such laws, ostensibly, bear only on the remedy, yet they do in reality annihilate the right. The law before us, it is conceded, does not go to the extent of either instance, yet it certainly diminishes the importance and value of the right. It is difficult to conceive how a law could otherwise impair an existing right than by withholding the remedy, which is in effect to suspend the right.

The undoubted right of the Legislature to alter and reform the judicial system may, it is said, produce delay in the execution of a contract equal to that which results from the present law; and it is urged that all such acts must, upon the same principle, be declared unconstitutional.

We cannot acquiesce in the final conclusion drawn from these premises, which, without hesitation, we acknowledge to be correct.

All such laws the Legislature have an unquestionable right to enact, a right...