Jones v. Culver
| Decision Date | 06 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 110,334.,110,334. |
| Citation | 50 Kan.App.2d 386,329 P.3d 511 |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Sharalene JONES, Administrator of the Estate of Byron J. Funk, Deceased, Appellant, v. Glenda CULVER, Appellee. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court
1. To demonstrate a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must show a contract existed between the parties; there was sufficient consideration to support the contract; one party performed or was willing to perform the requirements of the contract; a party breached the contract; and there were damages to the plaintiff caused by the breach of the contract.
2. In Kansas, the elements of an unjust enrichment claim are a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; an appreciation or knowledge of the benefit by the defendant; and the acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment of its value.
3. A worker who allows his or her earnings to contribute to a 401(k) plan created by an employer is a settlor of a trust. Accordingly, to comply with K.S.A. 60–1610(b), a divorce decree must reflect any changes in a beneficiary.
Donald N. Peterson II and Sean M. McGivern, of Withers, Gough, Pike, Pfaff & Peterson, LLC, of Wichita, for appellant.
Michael L. Baumberger, of Klenda Austerman LLC, of Wichita, for appellee.
Before MALONE, P.J., HILL and ARNOLD–BURGER, JJ.
When Byron Funk died intestate 14 years after his divorce from Glenda Funk (now known as Culver), his former employer paid the proceeds from his retirement account to Glenda because she was still the named beneficiary of the account. Contending Glenda had no proper claim to this retirement account because of their divorce, Byron's estate sued Glenda seeking return of the proceeds on theories of breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The district court granted summary judgment to Glenda, and the estate appeals. Because the estate has neither shown us an enforceable contract nor established all the required elements to prove unjust enrichment, we affirm the district court.
The factual background is simple.
Byron and Glenda were divorced in Sedgwick County in June 1998. The divorce decree indicated the court awarded Byron his 401(k) “as his sole and separate property, free and clear of any right, title, claim or interest” of Glenda. Glenda was awarded her vehicle, her IRAs, and other items. The divorce decree gave the parties the standard directions to finish the paper work:
Byron died intestate on February 6, 2012. The proceeds of his 401(k) were distributed to Glenda, as she was still the named beneficiary on the account. The administrator of Byron's estate—his sister, Sharalene K. Jones—sued Glenda in the district court, alleging her retention of the proceeds constituted (1) unjust enrichment; (2) a breach of contract with Byron ( i.e., under the divorce decree); and (3) a breach of her fiduciary duty to Byron's Estate.
The court disposed of the breach of contract claim by ruling the Estate had failed to meet the burden of showing either the divorce decree or a pretrial order made in the case constituted a contract. The court denied judgment on the unjust enrichment claim because there was no benefit conferred upon Glenda by the Estate as required by the theory of unjust enrichment. The court also concluded that it was no more inequitable for Glenda to collect the proceeds of the 401(k) than it was for Jones or the Estate to do so.
The court added that under K.S.A. 60–1610(b) (now K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 23–2802 [d] ), a change in beneficiary must be addressed in a divorce decree or by the actions of the owner. The court determined this provision applies to trusts and that Byron's 401(k) qualified as a trust. However, the court noted, Byron and Glenda's divorce decree did not mention a change in beneficiary. The court said it could not grant equitable relief where the parties failed to comply with K.S.A. 60–1610.
We review some fundamental points of law.
The district court's grant of summary judgment was based on its interpretation of the divorce decree and pretrial order. Issues involving the interpretation and legal effect of written contracts involve questions of law subject to unlimited review by this court. Shamberg, Johnson & Bergman, Chtd. v. Oliver, 289 Kan. 891, 900, 220 P.3d 333 (2009). The court's decision also rested on its interpretation of caselaw and Kansas statutes. We exercise unlimited review over these issues. See Redd v. Kansas Truck Center, 291 Kan. 176, 187–88, 239 P.3d 66 (2010).
To demonstrate a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must show:
• a contract existed between the parties;
• there was sufficient consideration to support the contract;
• one party performed or was willing to perform the requirements of the contract;
• a party breached the contract; and
• there were damages to the plaintiff caused by the breach of the contract.
See Commercial Credit Corporation v. Harris, 212 Kan. 310, Syl. ¶ 2, 510 P.2d 1322 (1973); City of Andover v. Southwestern Bell Telephone, 37 Kan.App.2d 358, 362, 153 P.3d 561 (2007). Jones' claim involved the first of these elements—whether a contract existed between the parties. And if there was a contract, we do not think it was breached.
The record reveals that the pretrial order, which was made during the divorce proceedings, listed the parties' proposed divisions of their marital assets. In a section titled “RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED DIVISION OF VALUES,” Glenda listed “Byron's 401k” under “Husband.” Other assets, such as “Glenda's IRA,” were listed under “Wife.” In a section titled “PETITIONER'S PROPOSED DIVISION OF VALUES,” Byron listed his 401(k) under “Husband.” Thus, there was no conflict between the parties at that time—Byron's 401(k) should go to Byron.
On appeal, Jones argues the pretrial order constitutes a contract between Byron and Glenda in which they agreed Byron would keep his 401(k) account. Jones claims that because Glenda “agreed” in the pretrial order “to make no claim” to Byron's 401(k), she is “now in breach” of that agreement. We are not so persuaded. This language does not create a contract.
Here, the pretrial order merely reflects Byron's and Glenda's “proposals” or “suggestions” as to what should happen with their assets. As the district court pointed out, Byron and Glenda did not sign the order, and there is no contractual language in the order indicating the parties' proposals were binding or final or that the parties were purporting to agree on any particular asset. Instead, Byron and Glenda were simply offering suggestions as to how the various assets should be divided. The district court would later, in the divorce decree, make a final determination about the disposition of their marital property. Nothing about the pretrial order indicates it was a contract between Byron and Glenda.
Even if we would view the pretrial order as a contract, we see no breach of the contract. The order only proposed that Byron keep his 401(k) account. And there is no dispute that Byron did, in fact, keep his 401(k) account post-divorce.
What Byron arranged to have done with the proceeds of the asset upon his death is an entirely different matter. Byron was free to do whatever he wanted with the asset post-divorce. And if Byron desired, post-divorce, for Glenda to have the proceeds of the asset upon his death, Byron was free to make that arrangement. By leaving Glenda as the...
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