Jones v. Cunningham

• Citation: 313 F.2d 347
• Decision Date: 16 January 1963
• Docket Number: No. 8716.,8716.
• Parties: Claude O. JONES, Jr., Appellant, v. W. K. CUNNINGHAM, Jr., Superintendent of the Virginia State Penitentiary, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

313 F.2d 347 (1963)

Claude O. JONES, Jr., Appellant, v. W. K. CUNNINGHAM, Jr., Superintendent of the Virginia State Penitentiary, Appellee.

No. 8716.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued September 27, 1962.

Decided January 16, 1963.

John W. Edmonds, III, Richmond, Va. (Court-assigned counsel), for appellant.

Reno S. Harp, III, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Virginia (Robert Y. Button, Atty. Gen. of Virginia, on brief), for appellee.

Before SOBELOFF, Chief Judge, and HAYNSWORTH and J. SPENCER BELL, Circuit Judges.

SOBELOFF, Chief Judge.

Presently confined in the Virginia Penitentiary on sentences aggregating 39 years imposed in 1951, Claude O. Jones, Jr., seeks relief by way of habeas corpus on the ground that the performance of his court-appointed lawyer was so inadequate as to amount to a denial of the effective assistance of counsel. Pursuant to our holding in an earlier appeal, Jones v. Cunningham, 297 F.2d 851 (4th Cir., 1962), that this prisoner's petition raised a substantial constitutional question, a hearing was conducted by the District Court, but the District Judge again dismissed the petition. However, the court granted a certificate of probable cause for the present appeal, "being of the opinion that a substantial question with regard to the duty which court-appointed counsel owes to his client" was raised. Our consideration is limited to this single issue.

There is no denial, and indeed there can be none, that Jones was entitled to legal representation at his trial. As we indicated in the first appeal, 297 F.2d at 854, the charges against him involved complicated legal issues with which no unskilled layman could be expected to cope, and in combination carried a maximum penalty of seventy years' imprisonment.¹

As the District Court's findings reveal, the need for counsel was given formal recognition on the afternoon of August 17, 1951, when the Circuit Court for Lunenburg County, Virginia, designated an experienced and highly regarded member of the local bar to represent Jones and his co-defendant William Ray Moore. But this appointment was made on the eve of the trial. Jones had been in custody since his arrest on August 8. A full confession was in the hands of the police, who had interrogated him at various intervals during a three-day period. Unassisted and unadvised by counsel, Jones had waived preliminary hearing and indicated to the Commonwealth attorney, the only attorney with whom he had talked, his willingness to relinquish his right to indictment and to plead guilty to all six informations filed against him. Cf. Hamilton v. State of Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961).

Admittedly counsel did not contact the prisoners until the morning of August 18, just before their arraignment and trial. For Jones, who had not been in touch with friend or family while in the county jail, this meeting was his first and only opportunity to obtain professional advice. The court-appointed lawyer allegedly began the interview with the remark, "Well, you have made a confession; there is nothing I can do for you." The attorney now avers his inability to admit or deny making this or other remarks attributed to him,² but Jones was emphatic on the point at the hearing: "Mr. stopped us just as the jailor was taking us to court and he the lawyer said that the court had notified him to be in court that morning, that he was going to be appointed to represent us in court, and also said `I don't know why they want to appoint me for. Nothing I can do. You already confessed and pled guilty.' He looked like he was mad."³ This, according to Jones' uncontradicted testimony, was the extent of the pre-trial conversation with the lawyer.

The District Court in its findings makes no reference to the above incident, and there is no finding, and no shred of testimony on which it could have based a finding, that the lawyer made additional inquiry or did anything more for his client then pleading him guilty that same morning. Asked whether he discussed with Jones the question of waiver of indictment and trial by jury, the lawyer replied that he had "no recollection of whether or not any such discussion took place." Nor did the record warrant the conclusion that Jones was advised of his right to seek a continuance.⁴ Certainly no application for a continuance was made. What does appear is that Jones admitted his guilt to his lawyer and no more was said about the case. For example, the attorney himself acknowledged in the stipulation that he "did not discuss with the prisoner the circumstances under which the confession had been made," and he asserted that Jones made no complaint as to the circumstances surrounding his confession. The District Court so found.

The record also discloses that the trial proceeded without a word being uttered by defense counsel, apart from his insistence that Jones sign the waivers of indictment and trial by jury, as well as formal entry of pleas of guilty to all six informations.

For his part in three storebreakings, Jones was charged and convicted of (a) larceny from, and (b) breaking and entering an automobile dealer's office; (c) larceny from, and (d) breaking and entering a supermarket; and (e) possession of burglar's tools and (f) breaking and entering a movie theater office. The applicable code provision states that "if the same act be a violation of two or more statutes * * * conviction under one of such statutes * * * shall be a bar to a prosecution or proceeding under the other or others."⁵ As construed by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, the statute permits the prosecution to charge both breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny and the larceny itself as one continuous act.⁶ But while the Commonwealth may file dual accusations, it may not obtain more than one conviction.⁷ Here there were not only dual convictions, but cumulative penalties.

In this instance, the informations were not prepared or filed until the morning of the trial. Had counsel been accorded an opportunity to study them in advance, serious doubt might have entered his mind whether Jones, even if chargeable with all six offenses, could lawfully be convicted of more than one crime for each of the three separate transactions. But this was a matter of defense to be raised in a formal plea in writing, setting forth all the facts and circumstances,⁸ and a failure to take such action before trial constituted waiver.⁹

It is true that the lawyer says he did argue the point after trial at a presentence hearing in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain leniency.¹⁰ But this argument came two weeks after Jones had been saddled with dual convictions for each continuous act and went only to the severity of punishment, not the legality of the convictions. Counsel's belated attempt to salvage something from the derelict case forcefully suggests that his initial contact with his client was so fleeting that he could not appreciate until after the trial the serious legal problems lurking in the case.

Likewise, no objection was raised at the trial to the introduction of the extra-judicial confession, which Jones claims was extracted after he had been "interrogated constantly by the authorities in a coercive manner and denied medical attention." Voluntariness vel non of the confession is not here the primary question, but it might have been at his trial had the issue been raised. The pertinent inquiry now is the adequacy of legal counsel provided Jones at his trial. If there was a reasonable basis for challenging the confession and it was not challenged because of the late appointment of the lawyer, the failure to make proper investigation, whether for lack of opportunity or otherwise, bears directly on the character of the representation afforded.

Had the attorney taken enough time he could with reasonable diligence have learned from the police as well as from Jones that the latter "appeared to be in a weakened condition at the time of his arrest"¹¹ and remained in such state at least during the first day of questioning.¹² In addition, it was a matter of record that three days intervened between his arrest and confession, a suspicious factor which demanded further probing by the lawyer.¹³ Since the police apparently neglected their statutory duty to bring Jones promptly before a judicial officer for a preliminary hearing,¹⁴ it was at least arguable that it was "not permissible to trifle with him, and detain and interrogate him, for the ulterior purpose of extracting a confession as to his own guilt, or getting information from him as to the guilt of others."¹⁵ If the attorney needed more time he could have gained time by advising the client not to waive indictment.

It is true that Jones did not complain spontaneously to his lawyer during their hurried meeting of his treatment by the police. But this was his first serious encounter with the police and his silence stemmed in all likelihood from the erroneous supposition that his extrajudicial statements, however obtained, concluded the issue of guilt and left him no alternative but to throw himself on the court's mercy. In any event, since the burden of proving voluntariness was on the Commonwealth,¹⁶ the least that was demanded of counsel was some investigation of the pertinent facts and arguable points of law before counselling surrender.

The factual links in this chain of events, verified by the findings, unmistakably confirm the initial hypothesis, concerning which we said in Jones' first appeal, 297 F.2d at 855, that the ill-timed appointment of counsel was merely "an empty gesture and not a true satisfaction of the defendant's constitutional rights." It was no more than a gesture to equip Jones for his day in court with a lawyer of excellent reputation who sought no more than the fleeting opportunity to consult with the accused and made no effort to map out possible defenses. It was not a true satisfaction of the defendant's...