Jones v. Dall. Cnty.
Decision Date | 03 October 2022 |
Docket Number | 3:20-CV-3025-X (BH) |
Parties | KYLE DAMOND JONES, Plaintiff, v. DALLAS COUNTY Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge[1]
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the plaintiff's complaint should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim.
On October 1, 2020, Kyle Damond Jones (Plaintiff) filed this lawsuit against Dallas County (County), alleging that a Justice of the Peace (JP) had dismissed his lawsuit against a Justice of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas (Justice) without adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in violation of federal law. (See doc. 3 at 1.)[2] He claims that he received a copy of Justice's plea to the jurisdiction in the mail on September 29, 2020, he drafted a reply brief that he intended to file on October 1 2020, but he learned when he arrived to file it that JP had already granted it and dismissed his case with prejudice on September 30, 2022. (Id.)[3] Plaintiff contends that he should have received more time to respond to the plea to jurisdiction, and that the entry of judgment without allowing him a chance to respond violates the “implied checks and balances in place in this country...” (Id.) He also claims that JP was biased in favor of Justice because they are both judges. (Id.; doc. 8 at 6.)
In response to a Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire (MJQ), Plaintiff clarified that he is suing only County for “not respecting the blue line of the Constitution as put in place by the Supremacy Clause” because his case was dismissed before he had a chance to respond to Justice's “questions.” (See doc. 8 at 3, 6-7.) He claims that neither principles of immunity nor a position or job title can “be used to protect wrong actions,” as there is no prioritized citizenship, and the failure to adhere to this principle is illegal under 18 U.S.C. § 242. (Id.; see also doc. 3 at 1.) He seeks $75,000.00 in damages. (See id. at 7-8.)
Plaintiff has been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. (See doc. 6.) Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, his complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Section 1915(e)(2)(B) provides for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or of any part of it, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327. A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Because Plaintiff's suit appears to arise from his dissatisfaction with the outcome in state court proceedings, consideration of whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies is warranted.[4] The doctrine divests federal district courts of jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indust. Corp, 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). “[F]ederal district courts, as courts of original jurisdiction, lack appellate jurisdiction to review, modify, or nullify final orders of state courts.” See Weekly v. Morrow, 204 F.3d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Liedtke v. State Bar, 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994)). Only the United States Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review final judgments or decrees entered by the highest court of a state. 28 U.S.C. § 1257. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine has four elements: (1) a state-court loser; (2) alleging harm caused by a state-court judgment; (3) that was rendered before the federal suit began; and (4) the federal suit requests review and reversal of the state-court judgment. Houston v. Venneta Queen, 606 Fed.Appx. 725, 730 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars consideration of direct attacks on a state court judgment, as well as all claims that are inextricably intertwined with the state court proceedings. See AEP Energy Services Gas Holding Co. v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. CIV.H-03- 4973, 2004 WL 2278770, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2004) () (citing Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 375-76 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Shepard, 23 F.3d 923, 924 (5th Cir. 1994)); see also Roland v. Texas, CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:21-CV-415-SDJ-CAN, 2022 WL 1192781, at *7, n.10 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2022), rec. accepted 2022 WL 622320 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2022); Illinios Cent. R.R. Co. v. Guy, 682 F.3d 381, 390-91 (5th Cir. 2012) ( )(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Weaver v. Tex. Capital Bank, N.A., 660 F.3d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) ( )(citations omitted). It does not, however bar a federal lawsuit simply because it challenges a state court's legal conclusions. Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 383-84 (5th Cir. 2013). “[A] federal suit is not barred if the alleged injuries were caused by a defendant's actions rather than by the state court judgment, even if the defendant's actions led to the state court judgment.” Jennings v. Abbott, 538 F.Supp.3d 682, 693 (N.D. Tex. 2021) (citing Truong, 717 F.3d at 382-84.)
Here, while there is inevitably some overlap, Plaintiff seems to primarily to complain of the actions of JP, and not the judgment itself. He only seeks monetary damages against County based on JP's allegedly improper conduct, and not to overturn or modify the state court judgment. See, e.g., Morris v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 443 Fed.Appx. 22, 24 (5th Cir. 2011) ); Brown v. Anderson, Civil Action No. 3:16-CV-0620-D-BK, 2016 WL 6903730, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2016), rec. accepted 2016 WL 6893723 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2016) (citing Truong, 717 F.3d at 383) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred claims seeking the reversal of a state court judgment but that claims for monetary damges against the defendants were “not automatically barred”) that the ; (see also doc. 8 at 8) (confirming that Plaintiff only seeks monetary damages). Accordingly, subject matter jurisdiction exists over this action.
Plaintiff's claims against County for alleged violations of his constitutional rights arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.[5] That statute “provides for a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). To state a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must allege facts that show (1) he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005).
Municipalities including counties, may be held liable under § 1983. Hampton Co. Nat'l Sur., LLC v. Tunica Cty., 543 F.3d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 2008). A municipality may be liable under § 1983 if the execution of one of its customs or policies deprives a plaintiff of his or her constitutional rights. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); Jones v. City of Hurst, Tex., No. 4:05-CV-798-A, 2006 WL 522127, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2006) (citing Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997)). It is well-settled that a municipality cannot be liable under a theory of respondeat superior, however. Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing cases). “Under the decisions of the Supreme Court and [the Fifth Circuit], municipal liability under section 1983 requires proof of three elements: a policy maker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force' is the policy or custom.” Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694); see also Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541-42 (5th Cir. 2010); Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 2005). Official municipal...
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