Jones v. Davis

• Decision Date: 19 December 2017
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. H-16-3761
• Parties: BILLY RAY JONES, (TDCJ-CID #1925745) Petitioner, v. LORIE DAVIS, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

BILLY RAY JONES, (TDCJ-CID #1925745) Petitioner, v. LORIE DAVIS, Respondent.

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-16-3761

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

ENTERED: December 20, 2017

December 19, 2017

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION

Petitioner, Billy Ray Jones, seeks habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a conviction in the 174th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas. Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, (Docket Entry No. 12), and copies of the state court record. Jones has filed his response. (Docket Entry No. 14). After consideration of the motion and response, the record, and applicable authorities, the court grants respondent's motion. The reasons for this ruling are stated below.

I. Background

A jury found Jones guilty of the felony offense of possessing with intent to deliver the controlled substance phencyclidine ("PCP"), weighing more than 200 grams and less than 400 grams, and using or exhibiting a deadly weapon. (Cause Number 139777301010). Jones pleaded true to the enhancement paragraph relating to a prior conviction in Cause Number 94987. On April 24, 2014, the court sentenced Jones to eighteen years imprisonment. The First Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed Jones's conviction as modified on July 30, 2015. The appellate court modified the judgment to strike the special finding or order of "APPEAL WAIVED. NO PERMISSION TO APPEAL GRANTED." The appellate court further modified the judgment to strike the "TRUE" finding to the headings of "Plea to 2nd Enhancement/Habitual Paragraph" and "Findings on 2nd Enhancement/Habitual Paragraph." Jones did not file a petition for discretionary review in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.

Jones filed his first application for state habeas corpus relief on September 9, 2015, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed it on December 23, 2015, because his direct appeal was pending. (Docket Entry No. 13-12, p. 1). Jones filed a second application for state habeas corpus relief on April 17, 2016, which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied without written order, on findings of the trial court, without a hearing on September 21, 2016. (Docket Entry No. 13-14, p. 1).

On December 21, 2016, this court received Jones's federal petition. Jones contends that his conviction is void for the following reasons:

(1) the search of Jones's vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment because the police officer failed to produce a search warrant prior to searching Jones's vehicle;

(2) trial counsel, Tommy L. LaFon, rendered ineffective assistance by failing to hire an expert witness;

(3) Jones's right to equal protection was violated, where "Petitioner was discriminated against because of his economic status," namely that "Petitioner could not hire a good attorney because of his poverty;"(4) Jones's due process rights were violated "due to invalid indictment and failure to prove allegations;" and

(5) the trial court abused its discretion by:

a. failing to apply the law to the facts; and

b. allowing the State expert witness to give expert opinion without a proper predicate.

(Docket Entry No. 1, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, pp. 6-7).

II. The Applicable Legal Standards

This court reviews Jones's petition for writ of habeas corpus under the federal habeas statutes, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Woods v. Cockrell, 307 F.3d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 2002); Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 1997), citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).

Sections 2254(d)(1) and (2) of the AEDPA set out the standards of review for questions of fact, questions of law, and mixed questions of fact and law that result in an adjudication on the merits. An adjudication on the merits "is a term of art that refers to whether a court's disposition of the case is substantive, as opposed to procedural." Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 281 (5th Cir. 2000). A state-court determination of questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact is reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and receives deference unless it "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000). A state-court decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent if: (1) the state court's conclusion is "opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law" or (2) the "state court confronts facts that arematerially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent" and arrives at an opposite result. Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court unreasonably applies Supreme Court precedent if it unreasonably applies the correct legal rule to the facts of a particular case, or it "unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Id. at 1495. Questions of fact found by the state court are "presumed to be correct . . . and [receive] deference . . . unless it 'was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'" Hill, 210 F.3d at 485 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)).

A state court's factual findings are entitled to deference on federal habeas corpus review and are presumed correct under section 2254(e)(1) unless the petitioner rebuts those findings with "clear and convincing evidence." Garcia v. Quarterman, 454 F.3d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Hughes v. Dretke, 412 F.3d 582, 589 (5th Cir. 2005) and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). This deference extends not only to express findings of fact, but to the implicit findings of the state court as well. Garcia, 454 F.3d at 444-45 (citing Summers v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 861, 876 (5th Cir. 2005); Young v. Dretke, 356 F.3d 616, 629 (5th Cir. 2004)).

While, "[a]s a general principle, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, relating to summary judgment, applies with equal force in the context of habeas corpus cases," Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 764 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 831 (2000), the rule applies only to the extent that it does not conflict with the habeas rules. Section 2254(e)(1) - which mandates that findings of fact made by a state court are "presumed to be correct" - overrides the ordinary rule that, in a summary judgment proceeding, all disputed facts must be construed in the light most favorableto the nonmoving party. Unless the petitioner can "rebut[ ] the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence" as to the state court's findings of fact, those findings must be accepted as correct. Smith v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 661, 668 (5th Cir. 2002).

Jones is proceeding pro se. A pro se habeas petition is construed liberally and not held to the same stringent and rigorous standards as pleadings filed by lawyers. See Martin v. Maxey, 98 F.3d 844, 847 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996); Guidroz v. Lynaugh, 852 F.2d 832, 834 (5th Cir. 1988); Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981). This court broadly interprets Jones's state and federal habeas petitions. Bledsue v. Johnson, 188 F.3d 250, 255 (5th Cir. 1999).

III. Statement of Facts

The appellate court summarized the evidence at trial as follows:

Houston Police Department ("HPD") Officer C.T. Harrington testified that around 9:00 p.m. on August 12, 2003, he and his partner, Officer Zink, were patrolling an area of southeast Houston known for high narcotics activity. As they drove by an apartment complex known for PCP activity, Harrington noticed a Chevrolet Avalanche truck, with its running lights on, backed into a parking space. Based on his training and experience, Harrington was concerned that a crime was possibly in progress. He explained that the manner in which the truck was parked indicated that "someone's in the [truck] with a quick way to leave the apartment complex ... or they're waiting on someone to return back to the [truck]." Harrington parked his patrol car so that he could observe the truck and initiate a traffic stop after it left the complex, if he witnessed a traffic violation. Once the truck left the complex, he observed that it failed to make a complete stop at a stop sign. Harrington followed the truck for a short time before he activated his emergency lights and siren. Rather than stop his truck immediately, appellant, who was the driver, traveled approximately two-tenths of a mile, passing several places safe to stop, before he pulled over into a parking lot. Harrington then used a spotlight, which enabled him to see that the truck had three occupants—two in the front and one in the back. He noted that all of the occupants were making "very fast movements as if they were trying to gather something or stuff something down." Harrington specifically saw appellant making "furtive movements with his hands," while his head was engaged in "a ducking motion to immediately put something under the seat." Based on his training and experience, Harrington believed that "someone [was] hiding somethingthat they had on their person or in the [truck], or someone [was] possibly reaching for a weapon that [was] stashed under the seat."

After Officers Harrington and Zink exited their patrol car, they asked the occupants of the truck to put their hands outside of the windows. Despite the request, the occupants continued to make continuous movements inside the truck, with no response to the officers. Suddenly, the front passenger, later identified as Daffany Chapman, jumped out of the truck and acted erratically while cussing and screaming—behavior that Harrington described as "a diversionary tactic." While Zink attempted to control Chapman, Harrington observed continuous "headbobbing" motions inside the truck.

After Officer Zink placed Chapman into the patrol car, Officer Harrington

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