Jones v. Denmark

• Decision Date: 05 July 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:14-cv-258-LG-JCG
• Parties: LA TIDTUS JONES PLAINTIFF v. SUPERINTENDENT JOHNNIE DENMARK, ET AL. DEFENDANTS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

LA TIDTUS JONES PLAINTIFF
v.
SUPERINTENDENT JOHNNIE DENMARK, ET AL. DEFENDANTS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:14-cv-258-LG-JCG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI SOUTHERN DIVISION

July 5, 2016

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

BEFORE THE COURT is a Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure to Exhaust Available Administrative Remedies (ECF No. 55) filed by Defendants Johnnie Denmark, Lt. Mark Davis, Timothy Morris, Brenda Sims, Hubert Davis, Rongelia Powe, Melton Martin, Stacy Taylor, Ronald King,¹ Chaplain Unknown Powell, Mike Hatten, Christopher Luker, Gloria Perry,² and Chaplain David Finch. Defendants Wexford Health Services Inc., Dr. Ronald Woodall, and Dr. Unknown Woodland joined the Motion (see ECF No. 57), which seeks to dismiss many - but not all - of Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff responded on November 25, 2015 (ECF No. 59), and Defendants replied on December 10, 2015 (ECF No. 60; ECF No. 61). Plaintiff then filed a sur-reply/motion entitled "Plaintiff Response in Opposition to Docket 57 58 60 61 for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies" (ECF No. 62) on December 28, 2015, seeking, among other things, appointment of counsel. Having considered the submissions of the parties and relevant legal authority, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF

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No. 55) should be GRANTED because Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies with regards to most of his claims before filing suit. Additionally, after conducting a sua sponte review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A of Plaintiff's remaining claims, the Court determines that they should be dismissed as well. Finally, Plaintiff's request that he be appointed counsel should be DENIED.

I. Background

La Tidus Jones is currently incarcerated with the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the South Mississippi Correctional Institution (SMCI) in Leakesville, Mississippi. He filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on July 3, 2014, alleging numerous violations of his rights secured by the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (ECF No. 1). Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, he makes the following claims³:

1. That Defendants Lt. Mark Davis and Stacy Taylor watched six fellow inmates physically assault him and did not intervene. (ECF No. 15, at 2).

2. That Plaintiff put Defendants Johnnie Denmark, Timothy Morris, Hubert Davis, and Melton Martin on notice of the threats he had received from the same six inmates before the assault and Defendants failed to protect him. Id. at 3.

3. That Defendants Lt. Mark Davis and Stacy Taylor refused to provide him with medical treatment immediately following the assault and,

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with Hubert Davis, refused to provide him with medical treatment the next day as well. Id.

4. That Defendants Lt. Mark Davis, Stacy Taylor, and Hubert Davis intended for Plaintiff to be assaulted by those six inmates as retaliation for filing lawsuits. Specifically, that Lt. Mark Davis stated, "I don't think [Plaintiff] is getting the picture and crazy inmates that file federal law suits against wardens will get just as what you got;" and that Hubert Davis stated, "I don't see any injuries do y'all see any injuries?;" and that all three Defendants laughed at Plaintiff. Id. at 3, 9. Plaintiff alleges that Lt. Mark Davis made other threats as well. See id. at 11.

5. That Defendant Timothy Morris saw his injuries after the assault and did not offer the availability of medical assistance. Id. at 3.

6. That Rongelia Powe denied him relocation from the unit where he was assaulted. Id. at 9. Further, that he was denied relocation because he was a black inmate who had filed grievances against MDOC staff members, while white inmates who reported being in fear for their life were moved to new locations. Id. at 4.

7. That he did not receive medical attention for three or four weeks after the assault despite submitting at least twelve inmate sick call requests. Id. Specifically, that Defendant Brenda Sims refused to have him medically examined. Id. at 10.

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8. That Defendant Dr. Woodall refused to provide adequate medical care to him when Plaintiff finally received medical attention and stated to him, "You didn't die, I don't see anything wrong but a few lump and bumps." Id. at 4. Also, that Dr. Woodall refused to refer Plaintiff to a bone specialist after he was assaulted. Id. at 10.

9. That Defendants Wexford Health Services, Inc.'s staff and Dr. Woodall have failed to remedy Plaintiff's known injuries with which he has suffered since arriving at SMCI. Id. at 10.

10. That Defendants Lieutenant L. Singleton and K-9 Officer Christopher Luker interfered with Plaintiff's prayer and fasting during Ramadan and that Defendants Chaplain Finch and Warden Timothy Morris failed to remedy these First Amendment violations. Id. at 11.

11. That Defendant Singleton allowed another inmate to read and remove some of Plaintiff's legal files from the inmate legal storage room, which included evidence necessary for proving Plaintiff's claims in another law suit. (ECF No. 17, at 2).

12. That each of the above-listed acts and omissions were made pursuant to the orders of Defendants Johnnie Denmark and Ronald King and that Defendants all acted in concert to retaliate against Plaintiff for filing prior lawsuits. (ECF No. 15 at 7, 13).

13. That he has also generally been deprived of adequate living conditions, asserting that the SMCI employees "keep[] off the lights 24

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HRS each day," that he is subjected to "excessive noise," that the restroom facilities are unsanitary, that he has not been provided with adequate clothing, and that he has been denied haircuts. Id. at 15, 17.

Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 55) on October 21, 2015, arguing that claims 1-10 have not been exhausted by the Plaintiff because they were either (1) never grieved through the Administrative Remedy Program (ARP) or (2) backlogged at the time this suit was filed, and therefore had not been addressed by the ARP. (See ECF No. 56, at 1-3). Plaintiff responds that (1) he has evidence to prove that he has exhausted his claims, and (2) summary judgment is inappropriate because the Court "cannot determine which claims are herein is exhausted in light of the ambiguous nature of the (ARP) remedy evidence." (ECF No. 59, at 1-2). Although it is not entirely clear which of Plaintiff's claims Defendants concede to be exhausted,⁴ the Court finds that all claims not obviously unexhausted are either foreclosed as a matter of law or entirely unsupported by evidence, and should therefore also be dismissed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

a. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary Judgment is mandated against the party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's

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case and on which that party has the burden of proof at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A motion for summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe "all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 571 (5th Cir. 2012).

b. The Prison Litigation Reform Act

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner pursuing a civil action seeking redress from government employees, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, H.R. 3019 (codified as amended in scattered titles and sections of the U.S.C.), applies and requires that this case be screened.

The PLRA provides that "the Court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Accordingly, the statute "accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992).

B. The PLRA's Exhaustion Requirement

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A centerpiece of the PLRA's effort to "reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits" is an "invigorated" exhaustion provision. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). The PLRA provides:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C.§ 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.

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