Jones v. Department of Corrections

• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: ALEXANDER; WORSWICK, C.J., and GREEN; WORSWICK
• Citation: Jones v. Department of Corrections, 730 P.2d 112, 46 Wn.App. 275 (Wash. App. 1986)
• Decision Date: 19 December 1986
• Docket Number: No. 8209-8-II
• Parties: Lacy J. JONES, Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Petitioner.

Page 275

46 Wn.App. 275

730 P.2d 112

Lacy J. JONES, Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Petitioner.

No. 8209-8-II.

Court of Appeals of Washington Division 2.

Dec. 19, 1986.

Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Michael P. Lynch, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for petitioner.

Douglas P. Wyckoff, Swanson, Parr, Cordes, Younglove, Peeples & Wyckoff, P.S., Olympia, for respondent.

ALEXANDER, Judge.

The Department of Corrections (Department), pursuant to RAP 2.3, sought discretionary review of an order of the Thurston County Superior Court, which reversed the Personnel Appeals Board's (Board) affirmance of Lacy Jones' dismissal from public employment. We granted review. ¹ The Department argues here that the trial court erred in (1) concluding that it had jurisdiction to entertain Jones' appeal from the Board's decision, and (2) concluding that the decision of the Board was arbitrary and capricious. We hold that the trial court erred in ruling that it had subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, we reverse without reaching the Department's other contention.

Jones was dismissed from his employment at the Department for the stated causes of neglect of duty, gross misconduct, and willful violation of employing agency rules. Specifically, it was alleged that he breached security at the Washington Corrections Center in Shelton on January 16, 1982 for the purpose of trafficking a significant amount of marijuana and that he "had been involved in trafficking significant amounts of marijuana into" the Corrections Center on that date and other occasions. Jones timely appealed his dismissal to the Board.

The Board upheld Jones' dismissal, concluding that he had indeed breached Department security, and that this breach amounted to gross misconduct and willful violation of the Department's published rules. ²

Jones thereafter filed a notice of appeal in the Thurston County Superior Court. Jones served that notice on the Attorney General who signed an acceptance of service "on behalf of the Department of Corrections, State of Washington." No one in the employing agency was served with the notice of appeal within the requisite time. Ultimately, the Department moved to dismiss Jones' appeal claiming that the Superior Court was without subject matter jurisdiction because Jones had not served his notice of appeal on the Department. The trial court denied the motion, and the matter proceeded to a hearing on the merits of the appeal. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court held that the Board's decision affirming Jones' dismissal should be reversed because it "was arbitrary and capricious." ³

In our judgment, the resolution of the jurisdictional issue is dispositive of the appeal. ⁴ It is axiomatic that for the Superior Court to have appellate jurisdiction over an appeal from an administrative decision, the appealing party must comply with the statute conferring jurisdiction on the Superior Court. Lidke v. Brandt, 21 Wash.2d 137, 150 P.2d 399 (1944). The statute conferring appellate jurisdiction on the Superior Court in employee appeals is RCW 41.64.130. That statute reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

(1) Within thirty days after the recording of the order and the mailing thereof, the employee may appeal the decision and order of the board on appeals made pursuant to RCW 41.06.170(2), as now or hereafter amended, to the superior court of Thurston county on one or more of the grounds that the order was:

* * * (2) Such grounds shall be stated in a written notice of appeal filed with the court, with copies thereof served on a member of the board or the executive secretary and on the employing agency, all within the time stated.

(Italics ours.)

In Reeves v. Department of Gen. Admin., 35 Wash.App. 533, 667 P.2d 1133 (1983), we held that in order for an appellant to comply with the statute, service must be had on the agency itself and that service on the Attorney General is not sufficient. The court said:

Service upon the Attorney General is neither service upon the statutorily designated administrative head of an administrative agency nor upon the statutorily designated agency itself.

Reeves, 35 Wash.App. at 538, 667 P.2d 1133.

Jones argues that Reeves applies prospectively only, and that it has no application to this case because Reeves was decided after Jones filed and served his notice of appeal to the Superior Court. He cites In re Marriage of Brown, 98 Wash.2d 46, 653 P.2d 602 (1982), in support of his argument that the holding in Reeves does not have retroactive application. In Brown, the court discussed the factors that must be considered by the court in determining the issue of retroactivity. The court said:

First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied ... or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed ... Second, it has been stressed that "we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history to the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." ... Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for "[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the 'injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity."

Brown, 98 Wash.2d at 50-51, 653 P.2d 602.

Applying the Brown factors to this case, it is clear that Reeves should be applied retroactively. First, Reeves did...