Jones v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State

• Decision Date: 03 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. 63303.,63303.
• Citation: 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 53,330 P.3d 475
• Parties: Darryl L. JONES, Petitioner, v. The EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the State of Nevada, In and for the County of Clark; and the Honorable Doug Smith, District Judge, Respondents, and The State of Nevada, Real Party in Interest.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

330 P.3d 475

130 Nev. Adv. Op. 53

Darryl L. JONES, Petitioner,

v. The EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the State of Nevada, In and for the County of Clark; and the Honorable Doug Smith, District Judge, Respondents,andThe State of Nevada, Real Party in Interest.

No. 63303.

Supreme Court of Nevada.

July 3, 2014.

Darryl L. Jones, Indian Springs, in Proper Person.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Real Party in Interest.

Before HARDESTY, DOUGLAS and CHERRY, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, DOUGLAS, J.:

In considering this petition, we address whether the district court has the authority to restrict a criminal defendant's access to the courts in order to challenge a judgment of conviction and sentence or the computation of time served under a judgment of conviction and, if so, what approach courts should take when restricting that access.

Petitioner Darryl Jones filed a timely post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his judgment of conviction and sentence, his first such petition. Jones represented himself in the postconviction proceeding. Based on motions filed by Jones, including a motion for the appointment of post-conviction counsel, the district court determined that Jones was a vexatious litigant and issued an order restricting Jones' ability to file further documents in the district court. Jones filed this original petition to challenge that order.

This court has held that a district court has authority to label indigent proper person civil litigants as vexatious litigants and to restrict their access to the courts. Jordan v. State ex rel. Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Public Safety, 121 Nev. 44, 59, 110 P.3d 30, 41–42 (2005), abrogated on other grounds by Buzz Stew, L.L.C. v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228 n. 6, 181 P.3d 670, 672 n. 6 (2008). It has not addressed restrictive orders that prohibit a litigant from challenging a judgment of conviction or the litigant's custody status pursuant to a judgment of conviction. We conclude that the district court may restrict a litigant from filing petitions and motions that challenge a judgment of conviction or the litigant's custody status pursuant to a judgment of conviction and that the guidelines set forth in Jordan adequately protect a litigant's rights while providing instruction for the district courts as to when a restrictive order is warranted and the proper scope of a restrictive order. A court imposing access restrictions on a vexatious litigant with respect to filings that involve post-conviction challenges to a judgment of conviction or computation of time served pursuant to a judgment of conviction must: (1) provide notice of and an opportunity to oppose the proposed restrictions; (2) create an adequate record that includes a list of the filings or other reasons that led it to conclude that a restrictive order is needed, including consideration of other less onerous sanctions to curb the repetitive or abusive activities; (3) make substantive findings as to the frivolous or harassing nature of the litigant's actions; and (4) narrowly tailor the restrictions to address the specific problem and set an appropriate standard by which to measure future filings. Under the facts presented in this case, we conclude that the district court acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it determined that Jones was a vexatious litigant and entered an order restricting his access to the court. We therefore grant the petition.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Jones was convicted, pursuant to a jury verdict, of five counts of burglary, one count of attempted theft, five counts of obtaining and using the personal identification information of another, four counts of theft, two counts of grand larceny auto, two counts of obtaining property under false pretenses, and one count of possession for sale of a document or personal identifying information to establish false status or identity. He was sentenced to a total of approximately 51 to 134 years in prison. On direct appeal, this court reversed the judgment of conviction as to four counts but affirmed as to the remaining counts. Jones v. State, Docket No. 55508, 2010 WL 4514363 (Order Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part, and Remanding, November 5, 2010).

After his appeal, Jones filed a timely post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus on December 21, 2010. At the time, he was not represented by counsel. He filed amendments to the petition in proper person on January 24, 2011, and February 3, 2011.

Jones filed in proper person a motion for the production of documents on April 14, 2011, and a motion to extend his prison copy limit on April 20, 2011. On April 28, 2011, the State filed a consolidated opposition and a request for vexatious litigant determination. At a hearing held on May 11, 2011, regarding Jones' motion for the production of documents, the district court stated in passing that Jones was a vexatious litigant and that he would be referred to the chief judge for an official determination. Jones was not present at this hearing, nor was he represented by counsel at the hearing.

A cursory order designating Jones a vexatious litigant was entered on June 16, 2011. The order lists four orders as proof that Jones is a vexatious litigant: a March 14, 2011, order denying Jones' motion for the appointment of counsel; a May 2, 2011, order denying Jones' motion to extend prison copy work and motion for the production of documents; a May 9, 2011, order denying Jones' post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus; ¹ and the order finding that Jones was a vexatious litigant. It further states in a conclusory fashion that Jones' filings have not been made in good faith and that they have been filed solely for the purpose of harassing the State and the district court. Finally, the order states “that all future filings by defendant in this matter are referred to the Chief Judge for review and approval before they may come before this Department.” Jones filed this petition for a writ of mandamus to challenge the order designating him as a vexatious litigant and restricting his access to the court.

DISCUSSION

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and the decision to entertain a petition for a writ of mandamus rests within our discretion. See Poulos v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 98 Nev. 453, 455, 652 P.2d 1177, 1178 (1982); see also State ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Thompson, 99 Nev. 358, 360, 662 P.2d 1338, 1339 (1983). We have indicated that mandamus is the appropriate vehicle for challenging orders that restrict a litigant's access to the courts. Peck v. Crouser, 129 Nev. ––––, ––––, 295 P.3d 586, 588 (2013). Because Jones has no other remedy at law and the petition raises an important issue involving his right to access the courts, we exercise our discretion to entertain the petition. See State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Armstrong), 127 Nev. ––––, ––––, 267 P.3d 777, 779–80 (2011).

In 2005, in a civil case, this court recognized that Nevada courts have “the power to permanently restrict a litigant's right to access the courts,” Jordan v. State ex rel. Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Public Safety, 121 Nev. 44, 59, 110 P.3d 30, 41–42 (2005), and approved procedures to guide courts in determining whether to restrict a litigant's access to the courts and in narrowly tailoring a restrictive order, id. at 60–62, 110 P.3d at 42–44. The court also recognized that constitutional considerations preclude courts from imposing a complete ban on filings by an indigent proper person litigant “if the ban prevents the litigant from proceeding in criminal cases and in original civil actions that sufficiently implicate a fundamental right.” Id. at 62, 110 P.3d at 43. Jordan did not discuss the propriety of restrictive orders that limit filings that challenge a judgment of conviction or the computation of time served pursuant to a judgment of conviction.

While Nevada has not considered restrictive orders in the criminal or post-conviction context, many other jurisdictions have concluded that the courts may issue restrictive orders to curb repetitive or abusive activities by litigants in challenging a judgment of conviction. Courts in some jurisdictions have determined that they have the inherent authority to impose sanctions and that injunctive restrictions on filings by vexatious litigants are necessary and prudent to curb conduct that would impair the rights of other litigants and the court's ability to carry out its functions. See Alexander v. United States, 121 F.3d 312, 315–16 (7th Cir.1997); Carter v. United States, 733 F.2d 735, 737 (10th Cir.1984); Rivera v. State, 728 So.2d 1165, 1166 (Fla.1998); Howard v. Sharpe, 266 Ga. 771, 470 S.E.2d 678, 680 (1996). Other states, like Ohio, have vexatious-litigant statutes that allow courts to find criminal defendants filing post-conviction petitions for writs of habeas corpus to be vexatious litigants.²SeeOhio Rev.Code Ann. § 2323.52; Baumgartner v. Duffey, 121 Ohio St.3d 356, 904 N.E.2d 534, 535 (2009) (applying Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2323.52 to petitions for writs of habeas corpus).

Although Nevada does not have a specific vexatious-litigant statute, we conclude that the district courts have inherent authority to issue orders that restrict a litigant's filings that challenge a judgment of conviction and sentence if the court determines that the litigant is vexatious. Similar to the federal and state courts and this court's conclusions in Jordan, the authority to issue a restrictive order is based on the fact that the courts are constitutionally authorized to issue all writs proper and necessary to complete the exercise of their jurisdiction and that “courts possess inherent powers of equity and of control over the exercise of their jurisdiction.” Jordan, 121 Nev. at 59, 110 P.3d at 41 (citing Nev. Const. art. 6 §§ 4, 6(1)...