Jones v. Erie Insurance Exchange
| Decision Date | 07 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 690 WDA 2020,No. 690 WDA 2020 |
| Citation | 282 A.3d 1139 |
| Parties | John JONES and Tanya Jones, Appellants v. ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Craig R. F. Murphey, Erie, for appellants.
Glen Shikunov, Philadelphia, for appellee.
In this underinsured motorist (UIM) automobile insurance action, John Jones and Tanya Jones (Appellants) appeal from the judgment entered against them and in favor of Erie Insurance Exchange (Erie). At issue is whether a certain contractual exclusion, contained in Appellants’ personal automobile insurance policy issued by Erie, violates Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL),1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1701, et seq. Upon careful review, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The trial court summarized the factual history as follows:
This case stems from a motor vehicle accident wherein Appellant John Jones [(Jones or Mr. Jones)] was operating his employer's, Time Warner Cable's, bucket truck when he became involved in a motor vehicle accident with a third party driver. [Mr.] Jones suffered various injuries due to this accident. The third party driver's insurer paid to [Appellants] the $100,000.00 maximum allowed under the third party driver's [automobile insurance] policy. However, Appellants subsequently filed a supplemental claim for ... [UIM] coverage with [Erie], their own personal automobile insurer. [Erie] denied Appellants’ UIM claim pursuant to the "regularly used, non-owned vehicle exclusion" [(or "regular use exclusion")2 ] contained in Appellants’ policy because ... Jones was operating his employer's vehicle, for which Appellants had not purchased insurance.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/11/20, at 1-2 (footnote 2 added); see also id. at 2 ().
On August 30, 2019, Appellants filed a complaint against Erie asserting one count of breach of contract. Erie filed an answer, new matter, and counterclaim on October 4, 2019. Erie filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on February 3, 2020, claiming "pursuant to Pennsylvania law ..., [Appellants’ UIM] claim is barred by the ‘regular use’ exclusion." Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, 3/3/20, at ¶ 29. Appellants filed a brief in opposition on March 2, 2020, arguing the regular use exclusion was unenforceable as being contrary to the provisions of the MVFRL and public policy. The trial court held a hearing and considered argument on the matter on June 4, 2020.
On June 17, 2020, the trial court issued an opinion and order granting Erie's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Judgment was entered in Erie's favor on June 30, 2020. This timely appeal followed. Appellants timely filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. In its Opinion, the trial court rejected all of Appellants’ claims, and opined it properly granted judgment on the pleadings, reasoning in relevant part:
Trial Court Opinion, 9/11/20, at 3, 6.
On October 15, 2020, Appellants and Erie filed in this Court a joint application to stay the appeal (Application), until a separate panel of this Court issued its decision in a related case, Rush v. Erie Ins. Exch. , 1443 EDA 2020. The parties asserted in the Application that Rush implicated the "viability of the regular use exclusion under the MVFRL, which is the same question at issue in this case." Application, 10/15/20, at ¶ 9; see also id. at ¶ 10 (). This Court granted the Application on October 21, 2020.
On October 22, 2021, the panel in Rush issued a precedential decision, in a Rush v. Erie Ins. Exch. , 265 A.3d 794, 795 (Pa. Super. 2021) (opinion by Dubow, J., joined by Bender, P.J.E., and Stevens, P.J.E.).3 We discuss Rush in greater detail below. Briefly, the panel held that the regular use exclusion in plaintiffs’ personal automobile insurance policy, issued by Erie, conflicted with the clear language of the MVFRL, and was therefore unenforceable. Id. at 797.
On February 25, 2022, Appellants and Erie filed another joint application to stay, acknowledging the decision in Rush . Joint Application to Stay, 2/25/22, at ¶ 6. The parties stated:
Although an opinion in Rush has been issued, a petition for allocatur to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was filed thereafter and currently remains pending. The resolution of Rush by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is likely to affect the resolution of this matter.
Id. at ¶¶ 7-8. This Court denied the joint application on March 11, 2022, stating: Order, 3/11/22.
On June 27, 2022, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, at 37 MAL 2022, granted allowance of appeal of this Court's decision in Rush . Rush v. Erie Ins. Exch. , 281 A.3d 298 (Pa. 2022) ( Rush - Allocatur ). The Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal on the following issue, as stated by the petitioner, Erie:
Whether the decision of the three-judge panel of the Superior Court is in direct conflict with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions in Burstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. , 809 A.2d 204 (2002) and Williams v. GEICO Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. , 32 A.3d 1195 (2011) and whether the Superior Court erred as a matter of law by finding that the "regular use exclusion" contained in Pennsylvania auto insurance policies violates the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1701, et. seq.
Id. at *1 (brackets omitted).
On appeal, Appellants present three issues for our review:
Appellants’ Brief at 3-4 (some capitalization omitted).
The standard we apply when reviewing the grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is as follows:
Kote v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon , 169 A.3d 1103, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
In their first issue, Appellants argue this Court's decision in Rush "is squarely on point and controls the outcome of this appeal." Reply Brief for Appellants at 1; see also Appellants’ Brief at 11 (). Appellants claim:
As in Rush , here there is no dispute that Mr. Jones has satisfactorily plead all three of the Section 1731 requirements [discussed in Rush , infra ], and that he would therefore be eligible to recover UIM benefits from Erie absent the "regular use" exclusion. Thus, this Court must find that the trial court erred in concluding that the "regular use" exclusion is enforceable because, to quote Rush , "since the ‘regular use’ exclusion limits the scope of UIM coverage that the MVFRL requires Erie [ ] to provide to Insureds, it is unenforceable." Rush , 265 A.3d at 798.
Appellants’ Brief at 13-14. This claim presents a pure question of law; accordingly, "our scope of review is plenary, and our standard of review is non-deferential." Quigley v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review , ––– Pa. ––––, 263 A.3d 574, 589 (2021).
In Rush , a City of Easton Police detective (Mr. Rush) suffered serious injuries when two other motorists crashed into his police cruiser. Rush , 265 A.3d at 795. Mr. Rush did not own or insure the police cruiser, but he and his wife (collectively, Insureds) owned two personal automobile insurance policies issued by Erie (collectively, the Erie Policies). Id. The Erie Policies both provided for UIM coverage, and both included regular use exclusion clauses (containing nearly identical language to that of the regular use exclusion clause in the instant appeal). Id. ; see also footnote 2, supra . Insureds sought a declaratory judgment that the regular use exclusion violated the MVFRL and was thus unenforceable. Rush , 265 A.3d at 795. The trial court granted Insureds’ motion for summary judgment, holding the regular use exclusion violated the MVFRL. Id.
On appeal, this Court affirmed, reasoning as follows:
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...the court determines if the issue was preserved, it shall then determine if Rush applies. See, e.g., Jones v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 282 A.3d 1139, 1141-45 (Pa. Super. 2022) (applying Rush to an appeal from an order granting judgment on the pleadings that was pending when Rush was decided......