Jones v. Federal Bureau of Investigation

Citation139 F. Supp. 38
Decision Date08 March 1956
Docket NumberCiv. No. 8703.
PartiesOttis Mayo JONES v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION — United States of America.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

Ottis Mayo Jones, pro se.

George Cochran Doub, U. S. Atty., and Robert R. Bair, Asst. U. S. Atty., Baltimore, Md., for defendants.

THOMSEN, Chief Judge.

Appearing specially by the United States Attorney, the government has moved, inter alia, to dismiss the complaint filed by the plaintiff in proper person against Federal Bureau of Investigation — United States of America. The questions presented are: whether the action is against the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the United States; whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation is suable; whether the venue is properly laid in the District of Maryland; and whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The complaint contains nine "points", a preliminary paragraph and a concluding paragraph. It begins: "Plaintiff, Ottis Mayo Jones, for himself, and in behalf of Florence, his wife, Michael, his 8-year-old son, David and Davida, his one-year-old twins, come now & respectfully shows: That, he and his family are citizens of the United States of America and that they now reside in the City of Baltimore, Maryland, within the jurisdiction of this Court."

Point One alleges: "On October 27, 1955 at Motel `66', in Monrovia, California, J. Robert Sullivan and Ira J. Kellogg, both Special Agents of the F. B. I., along with two other unidentified men and Mr. Chew, Mgr. of Motel `66', did, then and there, illegally, feloniously and without legal process, steal, rob and carry away more than 40 pieces of property, belonging to Plaintiff and his family, with intent to convert said property to their own use."

Point Two alleges that at the same time and place "J. Robert Sullivan, Ira J. Kellogg and two other unidentified men did abuse, threaten and horrify Plaintiff's very sick wife and three little children for a period of 20 to 30 minutes, behind closed doors, while they held Plaintiff helplessly bound in a nearby car under guard of Mr. Chew and an unidentified man. Said cruel and inhuman treatment continued in full force and effect until Plaintiff's very sick wife came from apartment #9, staggered and fell face down on the pavement — completely and limply fainted."

Points Three to Seven, inclusive, are similar to Point Two in that they make no reference to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, but allege that "on October 27, 1955, at Motel `66', aforesaid," Sullivan and Kellogg (Three) did "cruelly, beastly and with blind disregard for sex or sanity, pick up Plaintiff's very sick wife from the pavement" and carried her into apartment #9; (Four) did "abuse, frighten and criminally horrified" Michael, David and Davida "by dragging their very sick and fainted mother into their presence"; (Five) did "with force and threat of violence kidnap Plaintiff and Plaintiff's family in two respects: (A) By refusing to allow any member of Plaintiff's family to leave apartment #9 and watch as they robbed, stole and carried away property, without legal process, from apartment #7 and from an inclosed trailer, which also belonged to Plaintiff. And, (B) By carrying Plaintiff away during the nighttime without legal process while leaving Plaintiff's very sick wife lay helplessly in a fainted condition and three little children confined without any sane measurement of protection"; (Six) with Chew and two unidentified men, did "create circumstances which caused Plaintiff to solicit the cooperation of the United States Commissioner to obtain welfare care" for his wife and children, as a result of which "little tiny Davida's hair was cut without permission"; and (Seven) with Chew and the two unidentified men, did "create and commence a chain of driving circumstances which caused Plaintiff to beg money from the Los Angeles County Welfare" for his family, and caused the family to travel by train from Los Angeles to Baltimore.

Point Eight alleges that "On January 6, 1955 in Baltimore, Maryland, in the office and presence of the United States Marshal, Plaintiff gave to Mr. D. K. Brown a full statement of facts reflecting a true description of each and every act by said Agents and that statement of facts, as far as Plaintiff knows, was either ignored or `pigeon holed' by the Baltimore Branch of the Federal Bureau of Investigation". Point Nine alleges that "The United States Government has refused to give any financial assistance to Plaintiff's very sick wife and three little children while they hold Plaintiff confined to jail under an excessive bond and fictitious charges lodged against him through perjury and criminal conspiracy by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation".

The concluding paragraph "asks for the return of Plaintiff's property and Judgment against Respondent in the amount of One Hundred Thousand, ($100,000.00) plus all cost and attorney fees".

It is difficult to tell from the complaint whether the plaintiff intended to sue the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the United States. At the hearing he stated that he did not understand the distinction; that he thought in order to sue the United States, he had to name the agency involved. I will therefore treat this action as against the United States under the Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 1402, 2671-2680. If it should be considered a claim against the Federal Bureau of Investigation, it would have to be dismissed, since Congress has not constituted the Federal Bureau of Investigation a body corporate nor authorized it to sue or be sued. Cf. Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512, 72 S.Ct. 410, 96 L.Ed. 534.

Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 1402(b) provides: "Any civil action on a tort claim against the United States under subsection (b) of section 1346 of this title may be prosecuted only in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omission complained of occurred."

Most of the acts complained of occurred in California, although the acts and omissions alleged in Points Eight and Nine occurred in Maryland. Determining the judicial district where plaintiff resides is not an easy matter. Testimony was taken on this question at the hearing held on the government's motion. Plaintiff was born in West Virginia in 1913; his mother still lives there, but his father, Erastus E. Jones, came to Maryland about five years ago and still lives here. Plaintiff lived in Michigan in the late 1930's, was convicted of crime there in 1939, and was in and out of prison from 1939 to 1952, when he was released on parole from Atlanta. He visited his mother in West Virginia for three weeks, and then "transferred" to Baltimore, and went to live with his father here. Plaintiff worked at Sparrows Point for a few weeks, and then sold automobiles and insurance in Baltimore for about a year. He met his "wife" here, and began to live with her, but there was no marriage ceremony, since she is married to someone else. Sometime in 1953 or 1954 the insurance company for which he had been selling ordered him to cancel all the policies he...

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12 cases
  • Kundrat v. District of Columbia, Civ.A. 99-2085 RMU.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • May 24, 2000
    ...dismissed as non sui juris because "Congress has not specifically declared [them] to be suable") (citing Blackmar); Jones v. FBI, 139 F.Supp. 38, 41 (D.Md.1956) (if plaintiff's claim were considered to be claim against FBI instead of the United States, "it would have to be dismissed" becaus......
  • Dunbar v. U.S., 73-3804
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • October 7, 1974
    ...243 F.Supp. 110; Van Buskirk v. United States, E.D.Tenn., 1962, 206 F.Supp. 553, aff'd, 6 Cir., 304 F.2d 871; Jones v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, D.Md., 1956, 139 F.Supp. 38; Hildebrandt v. Harris, S.D.N.Y., 1955, 130 F.Supp. 1.4 The United States' complaint cited both the Interpleade......
  • Alliance Assurance Company v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • February 10, 1958
    ...asserted reveals that it is normally used to bar actions based upon the illegal seizure of goods. See, e.g., Jones v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, D.C., 139 F.Supp. 38, 39; United States v. One 1951 Cadillac Coupe De Ville, D.C., 125 F.Supp. 661. That the exception does not and was not ......
  • Jones v. Iowa State Highway Commission
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • April 25, 1973
    ...manner in which plaintiffs entitled their suit and decide the case on the second ground of the motion. See Jones v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, (D.C.Md.1956), 139 F.Supp. 38, 41. II. Plaintiffs concede their action is one for abuse of process, but they say such an action is not barred ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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