Jones v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 October 1992
• Docket Number: Nos. 90-7499,90-7755,s. 90-7499
• Citation: 977 F.2d 527
• Parties: 60 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 456, 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,845, 24 Fed.R.Serv.3d 335 Ben JONES, Plaintiff, John Issac; Harvey Echols; Jim Thornton; Sherman Jones; Henry Washington, Plaintiffs-Intervenors, Appellants, v. FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee. Ben JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, John Issac; Harvey Echols; Jim Thornton; Sherman Jones; Henry Washington, Plaintiffs-Intervenors, v. FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 527

977 F.2d 527

60 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 456,

60 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,845, 24 Fed.R.Serv.3d 335

Ben JONES, Plaintiff,

John Issac; Harvey Echols; Jim Thornton; Sherman Jones;

Henry Washington, Plaintiffs-Intervenors, Appellants, v. FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

Ben JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant,

John Issac; Harvey Echols; Jim Thornton; Sherman Jones;

Henry Washington, Plaintiffs-Intervenors, v. FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 90-7499, 90-7755.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Oct. 27, 1992.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc

Denied Dec. 29, 1992.

Robert L. Wiggins, Jr., Anna K. Norton, Gordon, Silberman, Wiggins & Childs, P.C., Birmingham, Ala., for Ben Jones.

C. Daniel Karnes, Katie J. Colopy, Ross W. Townsend, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Chicago, Ill., Glen D. Nager, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Washington, D.C., for Firestone in No. 90-7499.

Glen D. Nager, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Washington, D.C., for Firestone in No. 90-7755.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, BIRCH, Circuit Judge, and HILL, Senior Circuit Judge.

TJOFLAT, Chief Judge:

This case consolidates the appeals of Ben Jones (Jones) (No. 90-7755) and John Issac, Harvey Echols, Jim Thorton, Sherman Jones, and Henry Washington (Intervenors) (No. 90-7499) from discovery, class certification, and summary judgment orders, and from trial verdicts in favor of defendant Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (Firestone). This case is among the diminishing number of employment discrimination cases that must be decided under the rulings of the Supreme Court prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Firestone is organized into various regions across the country. The Southeast Region encompasses eight states and is subdivided into five "zones": the Metro Market Zone, the Non-Metro Market Zone, and the three Major Metro Market Zones of Atlanta, Miami, and Tampa-Orlando. The Metro Market and Non-Metro Market Zones are further subdivided into five and eight markets respectively. Each of these markets comprises a group of stores in a particular geographical region. Each store employs a store manager, one or more assistant store managers, service managers, and retail salespersons ("pivotal employees"); and several technicians, installers, and general service persons ("non-pivotal employees").

The Southeast Region is headed by a Regional Director. Each Zone is headed by a Zone Manager. Each Market is headed by a Store Supervisor (in the Major Metro Market Zones) or a Market Manager (in the Metro and Non-Metro Market Zones). The Store Supervisors and Market Managers are assisted by Sales Administrators in each market.

Ben Jones was employed by Firestone from 1968 to 1986. In 1971, he became the first black Store Manager employed by Firestone in the Birmingham Market in the Metro Market Zone. He served in this position until 1983, when he was demoted to Assistant Store Manager. He was promoted to the position of Store Manager at Firestone's downtown Birmingham store in June 1984.

Chip Franklin became Market Manager of the Birmingham Market, and thus Jones' direct supervisor, in March 1985. In February 1986, Franklin instituted a policy that Store Managers were to remain in their stores during all business hours unless they had received Franklin's permission to leave. On Friday, August 15, 1986, Jones left his store for a dental appointment without Franklin's permission. He was also absent from the store on Saturday. The parties presented conflicting evidence about the measures which Jones took to notify Franklin of his dental appointment and continued absence.

On Monday, August 18, 1986, Franklin called Jones to his office to reprimand him for this incident. Franklin removed Jones from his position as Store Manager and offered him a choice between termination and a position as an Assistant Manager. On Tuesday, August 19, 1986, Franklin informed Jones that he had been unsuccessful in finding a Store Manager who wanted Jones as an assistant. Franklin offered him a position as a "floating" Assistant Manager. Jones accepted termination on August 20, 1986, rather than acquiesce to the demotion.

On October 12, 1986, Jones filed an EEOC charge in which he asserted (i) that his threatened demotion was based on his race and was in retaliation for an earlier EEOC charge he had filed, (ii) that Firestone had a practice of assigning managers to stores based on "the racial composition of a particular store's clientele," and (iii) that Firestone discriminated on the basis of race with regard to "job assignments, promotions, discipline, discharges, and other terms and conditions of employment." Jones asked the EEOC for a right-to-sue letter and received one in August 1987.

On February 1, 1988, Jones filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988) (Title VII), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988), based on these charges. He sued individually and on behalf of a class of "black persons who applied for employment, have been employed, or who may in the future be employed and who [suffered discrimination] because of their race in discipline, discharge, job assignments, promotions, demotion, and other terms and conditions of employment." He sought (i) a declaratory judgment that Firestone's employment procedures were in violation of Title VII, (ii) a permanent injunction against continuing violations, and (iii) reinstatement, back pay, damages, lost seniority, and lost pension and fringe benefit credits. ¹

Five members of the proposed class--John Issac, Harvey Echols, Jim Thorton, Sherman Jones, and Henry Washington--were later permitted to intervene to assert claims on behalf of themselves and the class. None of the Intervenors had filed EEOC charges.

On November 28, 1989, the district court denied class certification for the putative class alleging racial discrimination in promotions. ² In June 1990, the district court granted summary judgment for Firestone with regard to all claims of the Intervenors and, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), entered final judgments against them. The Intervenors appeal in No. 90-7499.

The district court also granted summary judgment for Firestone with regard to the claims of Jones "concerning discriminatory failure to promote, discrimination in job assignment, and constructive discharge." The court declined to enter final judgment on these claims pursuant to Rule 54(b). Jones proceeded to trial on his remaining claims: demotion and retaliation. On September 24, 1990, the judge conducted a bench trial and ruled in favor of Firestone on both claims. Jones appeals in No. 90-7755.

Three groups of issues are before this court. Part II discusses the issues involved in the district court's decision not to certify a class. Part III examines the summary judgments granted to the defendant. Part IV addresses the trial verdicts rendered. We affirm the denial of class certification and the trial verdicts. We reverse the summary judgments as to the promotion claims of Jones and the Intervenors, but affirm all other summary judgments. We remand for further proceedings concerning the promotion claims.

II.

A district court's denial of class certification will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See Washington v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 959 F.2d 1566, 1569 (11th Cir.1992); Coon v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 829 F.2d 1563, 1566 (11th Cir.1987); Gilchrist v. Bolger, 733 F.2d 1551, 1555 (11th Cir.1984).

A plaintiff who seeks to represent a class must meet the requirements of both Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 and the underlying substantive law. At the time of the class certification hearing, Jones sought to represent a class of black Firestone employees who had suffered racial discrimination with respect to promotions. As we have noted before,

any analysis of class certification must begin with the issue of standing and the procedural requirements of Title VII. Thus, the threshold question is whether the named plaintiffs have individual standing, in the constitutional sense, to raise certain issues. Only after the court determines the issues for which the named plaintiffs have standing should it address the question whether the named plaintiffs have representative capacity, as defined by Rule 23(a), to assert the rights of others.

Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1482 (11th Cir.1987) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005, 108 S.Ct. 1729, 100 L.Ed.2d 193 (1988); see also Brown v. Sibley, 650 F.2d 760, 771 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) ("This constitutional threshold must be met before any consideration of the typicality of claims or commonality of issues required for procedural reasons by Fed.R.Civ.P. 23."). ³ Here Jones seeks to represent a class based on his Title VII and section 1981 claims. He may do so only to the extent that he has standing to bring individual claims.

A.

One who seeks to represent a class in a private Title VII suit must have standing to raise the claims of the class and must satisfy the procedural requirements of Title VII. Griffin, 823 F.2d at 1482. Title VII requires a plaintiff to file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unfair labor practice. ⁴ Pursuant to the "single-filing rule," "[a]s long as at least one named plaintiff timely filed an EEOC charge, the precondition to a Title VII action is met for all other named plaintiffs and class members." Id. This rule encompasses two essential requirements: "First, at least one plaintiff must have timely filed an EEOC complaint that is not otherwise defective.... Second, the individual claims of the filing and non-filing plaintiffs must have arisen out of similar discriminatory treatment in the same time frame." Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992, 1011-12 (11th Cir.1982); see also Griffin, 823 F.2d at...