Jones v. Gale

• Decision Date: 15 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. 8:04CV645.,8:04CV645.
• Parties: Jim JONES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. John GALE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska

405 F.Supp.2d 1066

Jim JONES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. John GALE, et al., Defendants.

No. 8:04CV645.

United States District Court, D. Nebraska.

December 15, 2005.

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David A. Jarecke, Jeffrey A. Gaertig, Crosby, Guenzel Law Firm, Stephen D. Mossman, Mattson, Ricketts Law Firm, Lincoln, NE, L. Steven Grasz, Michael S. Degan, Rebecca B. Gregory, Thomas H. Dahlk, Blackwell, Sanders Law Firm, Omaha, NE, for Plaintiffs.

David D. Cookson, Justin D. Lavene, Katherine J. Spohn, Attorney General's Office, John W. Decamp, Decamp Legal Services, Patricia A. Knapp, Lincoln, NE, Robert V. Broom, Broom, Johnson Law Firm, Steven M. Virgil, Creighton Legal Clinic, Omaha, NE, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SMITH CAMP, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 68), and the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 82). For the reasons stated below, both motions will be granted in part and denied in part.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Jones, et al., have challenged the constitutionality of Neb. Const. art. XII, § 8 ("Initiative 300"), alleging that its enforcement violates the Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"). (Complaint, ¶ 12, Filing No. 1, 4:04cv3194). They seek declaratory and injunctive relief against two Defendants: Nebraska Attorney General Jon Bruning in his official capacity, and Nebraska Secretary of State John Gale in his official capacity.

The Defendants have moved for summary judgment, alleging that the Plaintiffs do not have standing to argue that Initiative 300 violates the Commerce Clause; Initiative 300 does not violate the Commerce Clause; certain of the Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring a Privileges and Immunities claim; Initiative 300 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause; the Plaintiffs have failed to establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; certain Plaintiffs lack standing to bring a claim under the ADA; and one Plaintiff's claim under the ADA lacks merit. The Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment, alleging that Initiative 300 does violate the Commerce Clause, the ADA, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and, as a result, the Plaintiffs' rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Philip v. Ford Motor Co., 328 F.3d 1020, 1023 (8th Cir.2003). The proponent of a motion for summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The proponent need not, however, negate the opponent's claims or defenses. Id. at 324-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

In response to the proponent's showing, the opponent's burden is to "come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). A "genuine" issue of material fact is more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348.

"[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "If the evidence is merely colorable ... or is not significantly probative ... summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted).

Summary judgment is "properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

"[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

Neb. Const. art. XII, § 8, popularly known as "Initiative 300," states, in part: "No corporation or syndicate shall acquire, or otherwise obtain an interest, whether legal, beneficial, or otherwise, in any title to real estate used for farming or ranching in this state, or engage in farming or ranching." Initiative 300 defines "farming or ranching" as "(i) the cultivation of land for the production of agricultural crops, fruit, or other horticultural products, or (ii) the ownership, keeping or feeding of animals for the production of livestock or livestock products." Initiative 300 provides a wide variety of exceptions to its general prohibition, including an exception for "family farm or ranch corporation[s]." Id. at (1)(A). A "family farm or ranch corporation" is defined as:

a corporation engaged in farming or ranching or the ownership of agricultural land, in which the majority of the voting stock is held by members of a family, or a trust created for the benefit of a member of that family, related to one another within the fourth degree of kindred according to the rules of civil law, or their spouses, at least one of whom is a person residing on or actively engaged in the day to day labor and management of the farm or ranch and none of whose stockholders are non-resident aliens and none of whose stockholders are corporations or partnerships, unless all of the stockholders or partners of such entities are persons related within the fourth degree of kindred to the majority of stockholders in the family farm corporation.

Id. Initiative 300 provides a similar family-limited-partnership exemption, requiring that at least one of the partners be "a person residing on or actively engaged in the day to day labor and management of the farm or ranch...." The Nebraska Supreme Court has interpreted the term "actively" to mean "constantly engaged," and the language "engaged in the day to day labor and management" as requiring that "such person be involved on a daily or routine basis in all aspects of the farm or ranch activities, be it labor or management." Hall v. Progress Pig, Inc., 259 Neb. 407, 610 N.W.2d 420, 428 (2000), emphasis added. According to the Nebraska Supreme Court, "[l]abor would encompass the physical chores attendant to the farm," and should be understood as "associated with physical activity," and meaning "`work, esp. of a hard or fatiguing kind; toil.'" Id. "`In legal significance labor implies toil; exertion producing weariness; manual exertion of a toilsome nature.'" Id., quoting American Surety Co. of New York v. Stuart, 151 S.W.2d 886, 887 (Tex. Civ.App.1941).

The Plaintiffs allege that Initiative 300 violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides that "Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce ... among the several States...." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.3. The dormant Commerce Clause is the negative implication of the Commerce Clause, pursuant to which states may not enact laws that discriminate against or unduly burden interstate commerce. Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992).

Certain of the Plaintiffs also allege that Initiative 300 violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause, which provides: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States," (U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2), and the Equal Protection Clause, which provides: "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the law," (U.S. Const. amend.14, § 1).

Initiative 300 requires the Nebraska Secretary of State to "monitor corporate and syndicate agricultural land purchases and corporate and syndicate farming and ranching operations, and notify the Attorney General of any possible violations." If the Nebraska Attorney General has reason to believe that a corporation or syndicate is violating the terms of Initiative 300, the Attorney General is required to "commence an action in district court to enjoin any pending illegal land purchase, or livestock operation, or to force divestiture of land held in violation of [Initiative 300]." Consequently, the Plaintiffs brought their action, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, against Nebraska Secretary of State John Gale and Nebraska Attorney General Jon Bruning, in their official capacities; and certain of the Plaintiffs claim that Initiative 300's alleged constitutional infirmities also give rise to a cause of action against Gale and Bruning under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and the laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

Finally, two Plaintiffs allege that Initiative...