Jones v. General Motors Corp.

• Citation: 939 P.2d 608,325 Or. 404
• Parties: , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 15,029 Jerrold W. JONES, Petitioner on Review, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation and Wentworth Chevrolet Co., an Oregon corporation, Respondents on Review. CC 9304-02799; CA A84036; SC S43153.
• Decision Date: 26 June 1997
• Court: Supreme Court of Oregon

Page 608

939 P.2d 608

325 Or. 404, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 15,029

Jerrold W. JONES, Petitioner on Review, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation and Wentworth Chevrolet Co., an Oregon corporation,

Respondents on Review.

CC 9304-02799; CA A84036; SC S43153.

Supreme Court of Oregon.

Argued and Submitted Jan. 16, 1997.

Decided June 26, 1997.

Robert K. Udziela, of Pozzi Wilson Atchison, Portland, argued the cause and filed the petition for petitioner on review.

Charles F. Adams, of Stoel Rives LLP, Portland, argued the cause for respondents on review and filed a brief. With him on the response to the petition was John V. Acosta.

Anthony A. Allen, Salem, and Phil Goldsmith, Portland, filed briefs on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.

James N. Westwood, of Miller, Nash, Wiener, Hager & Carlsen LLP, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Association of Defense Counsel.

Before CARSON, C.J., and GILLETTE, VAN HOOMISSEN, FADELEY, DURHAM and KULONGOSKI, JJ. ^*

DURHAM, Justice.

This is an action for damages for negligence and strict liability. Plaintiff appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. The dispositive question is whether a 1995 amendment to ORCP 47 C permits entry of a summary judgment for defendants on this record. We agree with the Court of Appeals that defendants are not entitled to a summary judgment, although we disagree with its reason for reaching that conclusion. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, in part on different grounds, reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings.

ORCP 47 C, with the 1995 amendment emphasized, provides:

"The motion and all supporting documents shall be served and filed at least 45 days before the date set for trial. The adverse party shall have 20 days in which to serve and file opposing affidavits and supporting documents. The moving party shall have five days to reply. The court shall have discretion to modify these stated times. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. No genuine issue as to a material fact exists if, based upon the record before the court viewed in a manner most favorable to the adverse party, no objectively reasonable juror could return a verdict for the adverse party on the matter that is the subject of the motion for summary judgment. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages." Or Laws 1995, ch. 618, § 5 (bold in original).

The parties agree that the 1995 amendment applies to this case. See Or.Laws 1995, ch. 618, § 140(2) ("The amendments to ORCP * * * 47 C * * * apply to all actions, whether commenced before, on or after the effective date [September 9, 1995] of this Act.").

The Court of Appeals' opinion states the facts in detail. Jones v. General Motors Corp., 139 Or.App. 244, 911 P.2d 1243 (1996). We summarize here only those facts necessary to explain our disposition on review. Because this is a summary judgment proceeding, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, who is the party opposing the motion. Double Eagle Golf, Inc. v. City of Portland, 322 Or. 604, 606, 910 P.2d 1104 (1996).

Plaintiff, a Portland police officer, developed a permanent illness when he was exposed to a contaminant in the air inside a patrol car furnished to him by the City of Portland (City). Plaintiff's medical records described the condition as a "predisposition to sensitivity to these substances." ¹ Defendant General Motors Corporation (GMC) manufactured the car. Defendant Wentworth Chevrolet Co. (Wentworth) sold the car to City in 1991.

City mechanics installed a radio and other electrical equipment in the car by drilling holes in the bulkhead that separated the engine and the passenger compartments. A Wentworth mechanic examined the car, smelled a musty odor, and determined that the odor resulted from water leaking into the passenger compartment through holes drilled in the firewall by City.

A City mechanic, Schenfeld, also examined the car and opined that the leak resulted from a gap in the sealant around the bulkhead below the windshield. He did not agree that the leak resulted from the holes drilled in the bulkhead for electrical wiring. Schenfeld also discovered a white substance growing under the floor coverings as a result of the leak. He said that the white substance caused the odor in the car. After Schenfeld sealed the gap with silicone, there were no further reports of moisture in the car.

Plaintiff alleged that defendants were negligent in distributing the car without a seal adequate to prevent leakage of water into the passenger compartment and in failing to inspect the car adequately. He further alleged that those were unreasonably dangerous, defective conditions for which defendants were strictly liable under ORS 30.920. ²

Defendants moved for summary judgment. They argued, first, that the product liability claim lacked merit because no proof existed that the car was unreasonably dangerous and because the car had undergone a substantial post-sale modification after defendants delivered it to City. ³ Second, defendants argued that plaintiff had no evidence demonstrating that defendants were negligent in manufacturing or selling the car. Third, defendants argued that the court should dismiss both the negligence and product liability claims because plaintiff's injury was an idiosyncratic reaction to a contaminant in the car--a result of his own peculiar sensitivity--and not a reaction that an ordinary consumer would experience. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. Addressing defendants' first two arguments, the Court of Appeals held that Schenfeld's testimony was sufficient to create a dispute as to a material fact under plaintiff's theories that the car was unreasonably dangerous, that the injury did not result from a post-sale product modification of the car, and that defendants were negligent. Jones, 139 Or.App. at 261-62, 264-65, 911 P.2d 1243. The parties have not sought review with respect to those issues, and we do not address them further.

We turn to defendants' third argument, viz., that they are not liable for plaintiff's "idiosyncratic" reaction to a contaminant in the car. At the outset, we emphasize that our discussion of that argument should not be mistaken as a holding that such a "defense" exists, under Oregon law, in cases of this kind. In regard to defendants' argument, the Court of Appeals said:

"Instead, courts construing that 'defense' have recognized it involves a two-step process. First, the defendant has the burden of producing evidence that the plaintiff's injury from use of the defendant's product is the result of an allergic response. Second, after the defendant has satisfied that initial burden of production, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that his or her reaction, rather than being idiosyncratic, could be experienced by an identifiable class of consumers." Id. at 263, 911 P.2d 1243.

The Court of Appeals held that defendants "satisfied their burden of producing evidence that plaintiff's injuries were the result of an allergic reaction." ⁴ Id. at 264, 911 P.2d 1243. The court also held that "plaintiff was then obligated to present evidence that his reaction was not idiosyncratic. He failed to do so." Ibid. The court reasoned that the 1995 amendment to ORCP 47 C imposed on plaintiff the burden to produce evidence on which a reasonable juror could rely in returning a verdict on the non-idiosyncracy of the allergic response because, at trial, plaintiff would bear the burden of persuasion on that issue. The court then remanded the case for further proceedings because plaintiff did not have the opportunity to introduce evidence that would satisfy the burden of persuasion that amended ORCP 47 C imposed. Id. at 264-65, 911 P.2d 1243.

On review, plaintiff argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that, under amended ORCP 47 C, plaintiff must produce evidence to establish that his reaction was not idiosyncratic. Plaintiff contends that, under both the prior and amended versions of ORCP 47 C, the moving party has the initial burden to produce evidence establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that that party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to all issues. Plaintiff argues that the Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that the legislature intended to shift the burden of production from the moving party to the non-moving party when it amended ORCP 47 C.

Our task is to interpret ORCP 47 C to discern the legislature's intent when it amended that rule. See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993) (stating standards for interpreting legislation); ORS 174.010. ⁵ Specifically, we must determine whether the legislature intended, under the circumstances of a summary judgment proceeding, to shift the burden of production of evidence from the moving party to the adverse party. We first examine the text and context of the statute. PGE 317 Or. at 610, 859 P.2d 1143. As a part of context, this court considers, among other things, other provisions of the same statute, other related statutes, prior versions of the statute, and this court's decisions interpreting the statute. Id. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143 (context includes other provisions of same statute and related statutes); State ex rel. Penn v. Norblad, 323 Or. 464, 467, 918 P.2d 426 (1996) (context...