Jones v. Gregory

• Decision Date: 14 May 1923
• Docket Number: 17622.
• Citation: Jones v. Gregory, 125 Wash. 46, 215 P. 63 (Wash. 1923)
• Parties: JONES v. GREGORY et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

215 P. 63

125 Wash. 46

JONES v. GREGORY et al.

No. 17622.

Supreme Court of Washington

May 14, 1923

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Otis W. Brinker, Judge.

Action by Isabella Jones against George W. Gregory and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

H. E Foster, of Seattle, for appellant.

Poe &amp Falknor, of Seattle, for respondents.

PARKER J.

The plaintiff, Mrs. Jones, seeks recovery of damages from the defendants, attorneys at law, engaged as partners in the practice of law in this state, which she claims to have suffered as the result of their negligence and the want of the proper exercise of professional skill and learning in advising her as to her inheritance rights in the administration and distribution of the estate of her deceased husband. The defendants demurred to the plaintiff's complaint, upon the ground that it does not state facts constituting a cause of action, and that the action has not been commenced within the time limited by law. The demurrer being by the superior court sustained, and the plaintiff electing to not plead further, judgment of dismissal was rendered against her, from which she has appealed to this court.

The controlling facts may be summarized from the allegations of the complaint, as follows: On October 8, 1917, M. F. Jones, a resident of King county, in this state, died intestate leaving no children, nor direct descendants, nor father nor mother, but leaving appellant, his wife, and twelve nephews and nieces, and leaving a separate estate of substantial value in this state. Soon thereafter appellant employed respondents as attorneys for herself and for the estate. They procured her appointment as administrator by the usual proceedings, and when the estate was ready for final settlement and distribution, they prepared the usual final account and petition for distribution; thereby showing to the court, among other things, that the deceased died leaving heirs as we have already noticed, and praying that the estate be distributed, one-half to appellant, and one-half to the twelve nephews and nieces; respondents advising appellant that such was the law under the statutes of descent of this state (section 1341, Rem. Comp. Stat.), and thereby inducing her to sign such petition for distribution. Such proceedings were had upon the filing of such final account and petition for distribution that on the 4th day of December, 1918, the final account was settled and the estate distributed by a decree entered in accordance with the allegations and prayer of the petition for distribution, resulting in appellant receiving one-half of the property of the estate and the twelve nephews and nieces of the deceased receiving the other half; which distribution of the property of the estate is now claimed by appellant to have been erroneous and induced by the advice negligently given to her by respondents as her attorneys, and the presentation of the question of distribution to the court in the manner in which it was done by the petition for distribution. Thereafter, on July 31, 1919, the defendants filed in the superior court on behalf of appellant a motion and petition seeking the vacating and setting aside of the decree of distribution and the awarding to her of all of the property of the estate, claiming the original decree of distribution to have been erroneous in not so having awarded her all the property of the estate. Such proceedings were had upon that motion and petition that on January 10, 1920, judgment and decree of the superior court was entered, setting aside the original decree of distribution and thereupon decreeing distribution of all of the property of the estate to appellant. Thereafter the nephews and nieces, to whom one-half of the property had been distributed by the original decree of distribution, appealed from the order and judgment setting aside that decree. Thereafter, on July 28, 1921, this court reversed the order and judgment of the superior court setting aside the original decree of distribution, which had the result of leaving that decree in full force and effect, in In re Jones' Estate, 116 Wash. 424, 199 P. 734. Thereafter, in March, 1922, which, it will be noticed, was three years and three months after the rendering of the original decree of distribution, this action was commenced by appellant against respondents claiming damages from them, which terminated in the superior court by the judgment of dismissal here appealed from.

Whether or not respondent correctly construed our statute (section 1341,...