Jones v. Halliburton Co.
| Citation | 625 F.Supp.2d 339 |
| Decision Date | 09 May 2008 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 4:07-cv-2719. |
| Parties | Jamie Leigh JONES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HALLIBURTON COMPANY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Lannie Todd Kelly, Attorney at Law, Paul F. Waldner, III, Vickery and Waldner, Houston, TX, Stephanie Morris, The Law Office of Stephanie M. Morris, PLLC, John Vail, Center for Constitutional Litigation, PC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
M.C. Carrington, Mehaffy Weber, Beaumont, TX, Shadow Marie Sloan, Vanetta Loraine Christ, Vinson and Elkins LLP, Daniel David Hu, Office of the U.S. Attorneys Office, Houston, TX, for Defendants.
Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings.1 After considering the parties' submissions, arguments presented at a hearing on the pending motion, and the relevant law, the Court finds that Defendants' motion, Doc. No. 45, should be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Specifically, the Court will not compel to arbitration Plaintiffs claims for assault and battery; intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of the alleged assault; negligent hiring, retention, and supervision of employees involved in the assault; and false imprisonment. The Court will, however, stay litigation of these claims until parties complete arbitration of Plaintiff s arbitrable claims. The Court will compel to arbitration Plaintiff's remaining claims. Defendants' request for an award of sanctions is DENIED.
In 2004, at the age of 19, Plaintiff Jamie Leigh Jones began work for Halliburton/Kellogg Brown and Root in Houston, Texas as an administrative assistant. Plaintiff alleges that while employed by Defendants in Houston, she was sexually harassed by her direct supervisor, Eric Her.
On July 21, 2005, Ms. Jones signed a contract with Defendant Overseas Administrative Services, a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary of Defendant KBR, agreeing to work as an IT Customer Support Analyst in Baghdad, Iraq. Paragraph twenty-six of her Employment Agreement contained the following provision:
You also agree that you will be bound by and accept as a condition of your employment the terms of the Halliburton Dispute Resolution Program which are herein incorporated by reference. You understand that the Dispute Resolution Program requires, as its last step, that any and all claims that you might have against Employer related to your employment, including your termination, and any and all personal injury claim arising in the workplace, you have against parent or affiliate of Employer, must be submitted to binding arbitration instead of to the court system.
(Doc. 45, Ex. G.) Ms Jones' initials appear at the end of that paragraph.
Ms. Jones began work at Camp Hope, located in the "Green Zone" of Baghdad, on July 25, 2005.2 As part of her employment contract, Ms. Jones was provided housing in predominantly male barracks. Plaintiff alleges that she was subject to harassment by men in the barracks and that she complained about the sexually hostile living conditions two days after arriving. According to Ms. Jones, no action was taken in response to her request to be housed in a safer location, and she was instead advised to "go to the spa."
On the evening of July 28, 2005, just four days after she arrived in Iraq, Ms. Jones alleges that she was drugged and brutally raped by several Halliburton/KBR firefighters, including Defendant Charles Boartz, in her room in the barracks, resulting in serious injuries including torn pectoral muscles and ruptured breast implants. On the morning of July 29, 2008, Ms. Jones discovered Defendant Boartz lying in the bottom bunk of her bed, and he allegedly confessed to having unprotected sex with her. Ms. Jones reported the rape to another employee, who took her to see KBR medical personnel. A rape kit was administered at a hospital run by the U.S. Army. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants subsequently mishandled the rape kit. Ms. Jones also alleges that after reporting the rape, Defendants locked her in a trailer and denied her access to an outside phone line until Ms. Jones was able to convince a guard to allow her to call home. According to Plaintiff, she was also interrogated by management and human resource personnel for hours and was told that if she chose to return to the United States, she would not have the guarantee of a job upon return.
Ms. Jones subsequently filed a claim for sexual harassment with the Equal Employment and Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC conducted an investigation and credited Ms. Jones' claim of sexual harassment, finding cause to believe that the Halliburton defendants violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Doc. No. 48, Ex. 5.)
On February 15, 2006, Ms. Jones, represented by different counsel, filed a request for arbitration alleging many, though not all, of the same claims asserted in this lawsuit. While that arbitration was pending, on advice of new counsel, Ms. Jones filed the instant lawsuit in the Eastern District of Texas.3 The case was transferred to the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, on July 24, 2007. Ms. Jones now asserts claims of negligence; negligent undertaking; sexual harassment and hostile work environment under Title VII, retaliation; false imprisonment;4 breach of contract; fraud in the inducement to enter the employment contract; fraud in the inducement to enter the arbitration agreement; assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Ms. Jones contends that the Halliburton and KBR defendants are vicariously liable for the torts committed directly by its employees.
Defendants have asked the Court to compel all of Ms. Jones' claims to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement contained in her employment contract. Defendants also ask the Court to sanction Plaintiff for unreasonably multiplying proceedings.
In deciding whether to compel arbitration of a dispute, the Court is required to use a two-step inquiry. Will-Drill Res., Inc. v. Samson Res. Co., 352 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir.2003) (internal citation omitted). The Court does not consider the merits of the underlying action when conducting the two-step inquiry. Banc One Acceptance Corp. v. Hill, 367 F.3d 426, 429 (5th Cir. 2004).
The first step of the inquiry, whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute, requires the Court to determine "whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and whether the dispute in question falls within the scope of that arbitration agreement." Webb v. Investacorp, Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir.1996). The Court will consider each of these components in turn.
Plaintiff argues that the arbitration agreement is invalid because there was no meeting of the minds, the arbitration clause was fraudulently induced, the provision is contrary to public policy, and because enforcement of the arbitration provision would be unconscionable. Plaintiff also maintains that the Court should not enforce the arbitration agreement based on the equitable doctrine of unclean hands. After considering these arguments, and for the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the arbitration agreement in this case is valid.
Ordinary principles of state contract law govern the question of whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87, 116 S.Ct. 1652, 134 L.Ed.2d 902 (1996) () (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n. 9, 107 S.Ct. 2520, 96 L.Ed.2d 426 (1987) (emphasis in original)); Wash. Mut. Fin. Group, LLC v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 264 (5th Cir.2004) (); Fleetwood Enter., Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 1073 (5th Cir.2002). Thus, the Court looks to Texas law to determine the validity of the arbitration provision at issue in this case.
Plaintiff first argues that the arbitration agreement is invalid because there was no meeting of the minds between Plaintiff and Defendant at the time Plaintiff signed the agreement. "The determination of a meeting of the minds, and thus offer and acceptance, is based on the objective standard of what the parties said and did and not on their subjective state of mind." Copeland v. Alsobrook, 3 S.W.3d 598, 604 (Tex. App—San Antonio, 1999, pet. denied); see also 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 4:1 (4th ed.) ("[A]s a general principle, the inquiry will focus not on the question of whether the subjective minds of the parties have met, but on whether their outward expression of assent is sufficient to form a contract."). Here, Ms. Jones signed the Employment Agreement that included the arbitration provision and initialed the arbitration provision itself. Because she signed the agreement and initialed the arbitration provision, Ms. Jones is presumed to have read the provision. See EZ Pawn Corp. v. Mancias, 934 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Tex.1996). Nor is there any argument that Ms. Jones was unaware that she was signing an arbitration provision. See, e.g., Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Lang, 321 F.3d 533, 538 (5th Cir.2003). The arbitration provision is not invalid, therefore, on these grounds.
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