Jones v. Halun, 16333.
| Decision Date | 22 November 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 16333.,16333. |
| Citation | 111 US App. DC 340,296 F.2d 597 |
| Parties | Emory M. JONES, Sr., Appellant v. John HALUN, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Mr. William H. Clarke, Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Richard W. Galiher and William E. Stewart, Jr., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellant.
Before EDGERTON, BAZELON and FAHY, Circuit Judges.
Petition for Rehearing En Banc Denied En Banc January 11, 1962.
Petition for Rehearing before the Division Denied January 11, 1962.
Appellant Emory M. Jones, Sr., owned a car which he allowed his son, Emory M. Jones, Jr., to use. On October 7, 1957, in the District of Columbia, one Eugene Griffin, a stranger to appellant, drove the car recklessly and collided with appellee Halun. Appellant's son was in the back seat. Halun sued appellant, the car owner. The court left to the jury only the question of damages, ruling as a matter of law that Griffin was operating the car with appellant's "implied consent" and that appellant was therefore liable for Griffin's negligence. This appeal is from a judgment for the plaintiff.
Appellant, his wife, and his son testified without dispute that appellant repeatedly forbade the son to let anyone else drive the car. On the night of the accident the son drove to Boonestown, Maryland, with Griffin and three girls as passengers. On the way back to Washington, the son stopped the car at a filling station and got out. Griffin got into the driver's seat. The son told him to get in the back seat. Griffin said he wanted to drive. The son said His testimony continued: Griffin was driving at about 70 miles an hour when the car struck the one appellee was driving. Appellant's son had told Griffin to stop and had tried to grab the keys. All this is uncontradicted.
The Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act of the District of Columbia provides that "Whenever any motor vehicle * * * shall be operated * * by any person other than the owner, with the consent of the owner, express or implied, the operator thereof shall in case of accident, be deemed to be the agent of the owner * * *, and the proof of the ownership * * * shall be prima facie evidence that such person operated said motor vehicle with the consent of the owner." D.C.Code § 40-424 (1961). An "implied" consent is not a fictitious consent. It is a consent that is not plainly expressed but is inferred as a fact from words or conduct. Making ownership "prima facie evidence" of consent does not dispense with the requirement of consent. It affects only the way consent may be proved. Prima facie evidence is, as Webster's New International (1961) says, "evidence sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact in question unless rebutted." The statute creates a rebuttable presumption that the driver of a car involved in an accident had the owner's consent to drive. This means that ownership is sufficient proof of consent until evidence is introduced that the owner did not consent. Since the driver of a car has the owner's consent much more often than not, there is a rational basis for the presumption. But when substantial evidence of nonconsent is introduced, the presumption ceases to operate. Mere ownership is then no longer sufficient proof of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Gaither v. Myers
...v. Jerman, 67 App.D.C. 167, 90 F.2d 412 (1937). The owner may only escape liability by proving nonconsent. See Jones v. Halun, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 340, 296 F.2d 597 (1961); Hudson v. Lazarus, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 16, 217 F.2d 344 (1954). In the absence of statute, consent is a mere ingredient of, a......
-
Agomo v. Fenty
...entirely rational to presume that a vehicle is in the custody, care, or control of its registered owner. Cf. Jones v. Halun, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 340, 341, 296 F.2d 597, 598 (1961) (stating that because the driver of a car has the owner's consent more often than not, there is a rational basis f......
-
Athridge v. Iglesias
...rebuttable by uncontradicted and conclusive evidence of non-consent. Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216, 218 (D.C.Cir.1968); Jones v. Halun, 296 F.2d 597 (D.C.Cir.1961), cert denied 370 U.S. 904, 82 S.Ct. 1249, 8 L.Ed.2d 401 (1962); Simon v. Dew, 91 A.2d 214, 215-16 (D.C.Mun.App.1952). On the o......
-
Curtis v. Cuff
...of liability resolves itself into a question of fact. Simon v. Dew, 91 A.2d 214, 215-16 (D.C. 1952). See Jones v. Halun, 111 U.S.App.D. C. 340, 341, 296 F.2d 597, 598 (1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 904, 82 S.Ct. 1249, 8 L.Ed. 2d 401 Appellant testified that she and Mr. Curtis were not commu......