Jones v. Hamilton Cnty.

• Decision Date: 29 August 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:12–cv–190.
• Citation: 891 F.Supp.2d 870
• Parties: Randon Raymond JONES and Thomas Joseph Coleman, III, Plaintiffs, v. HAMILTON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

891 F.Supp.2d 870

Randon Raymond JONES and Thomas Joseph Coleman, III, Plaintiffs,

v.HAMILTON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, Defendant.

Case No. 1:12–cv–190.

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee.

Aug. 29, 2012.

Robin R. Flores, Law Office of Robin R. Flores, Chattanooga, TN, for Plaintiffs/Defendant.

Brett Harvey, Alliance Defending Freedom, Scottsdale, AZ, Bryan H. Beauman, Alliance Defending Freedom, Paris, KY, Stephen S. Duggins, Law Office of Scott D. Bergthold, PLLC, Chattanooga, TN, for Defendant.

ORDER

HARRY S. MATTICE, JR., District Judge.

Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. 16). Plaintiffs move the Court to enjoin Defendant Hamilton County, Tennessee (“Hamilton County” or “the County”) from continuing its practice of commencing meetings of the Hamilton County Commission (“the Commission”) with a prayer. This case presents a unique question, the legal underpinnings of which the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has yet to address. For the reasons explained below, Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 16) will be DENIED.

I.

In large measure, the parties have stipulated to the relevant facts in this case. (Doc. 38). Their stipulation binds the parties and the court alike. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 444 n. 2 (6th Cir.2003).

Hamilton County is a political subdivision of the State of Tennessee, and the Commission is its elected legislature and final policymaker. The Commission conducts the County's business during its regularly scheduled public meetings. It begins those meetings with a prayer.

Prior to July 3, 2012, the Commission had no formal written prayer policy, but according to the parties, “invocation speakerscame from a variety of faith traditions, including non-Christian faith traditions, and some speakers were invited by the County without knowing the faith tradition followed by the speaker.” Invocations were offered by various individuals, including private citizens, local clergy, and the commissioners themselves. Some of the invocations “referred to a deity in a way consistent with the Christian faith.”

In May 2012, the Freedom From Religion Foundation (“the Foundation”) sent a letter to the Commission, objecting to the Commission's practice of beginning its meetings with prayer. (Doc. 17–2). The Foundation requested that the Commission discontinue all prayer before meetings.

The prayers continued, however, and at the Commission's June 14, 2012 meeting, a Christian pastor recited the “Lord's Prayer” as the invocation. (Doc. 38). During the prayer, some commissioners (as well as members of the audience) stood and joined in the spoken recitation of the prayer. Others bowed their heads. On June 15, 2012, Plaintiffs filed the instant suit. (Doc. 1).

The record demonstrates that prayers (both of which were invoked “in the name of Jesus”) were also offered at the June 20 and June 28, 2012 Commission meetings. (DVD, June 20 & June 28 invocations).¹ On July 3, 2012, the invocation speaker recited the “Lord's Prayer,” during which all visible commissioners are standing, and some are participating in the spoken recitation. (DVD, July 3 invocation).

Also on July 3, 2012— after the recitation of the “Lord's Prayer”—the Commission adopted Resolution 712–13, entitled “A Resolution Adopting a Policy Regarding Opening Invocations Before Meetings of the Hamilton County Commission” (“the prayer policy” or “the policy”). (Doc. 38–1). It expressly repealed and replaced any prior practices concerning opening invocations at Commission meetings. ( Id. at 5). The resolution is nine pages in length, and it contains approximately five pages of preamble, in which various clauses set forth, inter alia, the Commission's intention to “invoke divine guidance”; quotes from Supreme Court and federal appellate cases concerning the constitutionality of legislative prayer; and the resolution's goal of adopting a policy that does not “proselytize or advance any particular faith, or show any purposeful preference of one religious view to the exclusion of others.” ( Id. at 1–5).

The policy permits “an eligible member of the clergy in Hamilton County, Tennessee,” to give an invocation at the opening of Commission meetings. ( Id. at 5). The invocation speakers are drawn from a list of “all the religious congregations with an established presence in Hamilton County.” ( Id.). Legislative Administrator Chris Hixson testified at the hearing on the instant Motion that she compiled the list based on local listings for religious institutions found within the Yellow Pages. The denominational character of all institutions on the list is not clear from the evidence of record, but the substantial majority is comprised of Christian churches. Institutions representing Muslim, Jewish, and Baha'i faiths, as well as others, are also included. ( See Doc. 38–2). If an institution is not represented on the list, it may request inclusion via letter, with any dispute as to an organization's religious bona fides being resolved by reference to the Internal Revenue Code's guidelines for tax-exempt status. (Doc. 38–1 at 6).

The Commission does not engage in any content review of the invocations, and it places no guidelines on what may be said, except: “[T]he Commission requests that no invocation should proselytize or advance any faith, disparage the religious faith or nonreligious views of others, or exceed five minutes in length.” (Doc. 38). To that end, the policy dictates the contents of a letter to be mailed to religious leaders. (Doc. 38–1 at 7–8). It states that:

This opportunity is voluntary, and you are free to offer the invocation according to the dictates of your own conscience. However, please try not to exceed no [sic] more than five (5) minutes for your presentation. To maintain a spirit of respect for all, the Commission requests only that the opportunity not be exploited as an effort to convert others to the particular faith of the invocation speaker, nor to disparage any faith or belief different than that of the invocation speaker.

( Id. at 7). Additionally, Commission agendas will include the following printed language:

Any invocation that may be offered before the official start of the Commission meeting shall be the voluntary offering of a private citizen, to and for the benefit of the Commission. The views or beliefs expressed by the invocation speaker have not been previously reviewed or approved by the Commission and do not necessarily represent the religious beliefs or views of the Commission in part or as a whole. No member of the community is required to attend or participate in the invocation and such decision will have no impact on their right to actively participate in the business of the Commission.

( Id. at 8) (emphasis original).

Religious leaders will notify the Commission of their willingness to offer an invocation via reply letter. ( Id. at 7–8). The policy provides that religious leaders will then be selected on a “first-come, first-serve basis.” ( Id. at 8). Since the adoption of the policy, religious leaders of various congregations—including Baptist, Lutheran, Church of God, Presbyterian, Jewish, and Unitarian Universalist—have volunteered to be placed on future meetings' agendas as the invocation speaker. (Doc. 38).

Since the adoption of the policy, the Commission's invocation practice has continued to involve Christian prayer, though the record contains evidence of invocations offered at only two subsequent meetings. The July 12, 2012 prayer asks for divine guidance and blessings on the Commission “in Jesus' name.” (DVD, July 12 invocation). The July 18 prayer seeks the same, but it is sought “in the name of Jesus Christ, our savior, your son, and our only hope, in Jesus' name.” (DVD, July 18 invocation).

Plaintiffs have moved the Court to issue a preliminary injunction. (Doc. 16). They ask the Court to “halt the prayer activities of the defendant[ ] pending a final disposition of this matter.” Plaintiffs essentially contend that, under Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S 602, 612, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), the Commission's practice of beginning its meetings with an invocation is unconstitutional. ( Id.;see Docs. 17, 19, 21, 24, 60). They characterize the prayer policy as a “sham,” and they therefore ask the Court to temporarily enjoin the County from beginning Commission meetings with a prayer. ( See, e.g., Docs. 24, 60).

Defendant opposes Plaintiffs' Motion. (Docs. 39, 63). Succinctly put, it asserts that the challenge to the policy is necessarily facial and that the policy, as written, withstands constitutional scrutiny. ( See Doc. 63 at 3–5). It further asserts that the Supreme Court has “clearly approved legislative prayers that are explicitly Christian,” and, alternatively, that the entire question before the Court may be non-justiciable. ( Id. at 11–15).

II.

A.

At this stage of litigation, the only relief sought is Plaintiff's requested preliminary injunction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently reiterated that, when reviewing motions for preliminary injunctions, courts must consider:

(1) the movant's likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will suffer irreparable injury without a preliminary injunction; (3) whether issuance of a preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of a preliminary injunction.

McNeilly v. Land, 684 F.3d 611, 615 (6th Cir.2012) (citing Am. Imaging Svcs., Inc. v. Eagle–Picher Indus., Inc. ( In re Eagle–Picher Indus., Inc.), 963 F.2d 855, 858 (6th Cir.1992)). In First Amendment cases, “the crucial inquiry is usually whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. This is so because the issues of the public interest and harm to the respective parties largely depend on the constitutionality of the state action.” Bays v. City of Fairborn...