Jones v. Harrison
| Decision Date | 21 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:12-CV-90-D,4:12-CV-90-D |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
| Parties | MELISA JONES & TIMOTHY WILLIAMS, Co-Administrators of the Estate of Timothy Derris Williams, Plaintiffs, v. SHERIFF DONNIE HARRISON, et al., Defendants. |
On May 9, 2012, Melisa Jones and Timothy Williams (collectively "plaintiffs"), coadministrators of the estate of their son Timothy Denis Williams ("Williams"), filed this action against Wake County, Wake County Sheriff Donnie Harrison, and the Ohio Casualty Insurance Company as surety for the Wake County Sheriff [D.E. 1]. The action arises out of Williams's suicide while he was a pre-trial detainee at the Wake County Detention Center. On April 9, 2013, the court granted in part defendant Wake County's motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and dismissed all claims against Wake County other than counts one and eight of plaintiffs' complaint, as well as plaintiffs' claim against Wake County for exemplary or punitive damages [D.E. 19]. The court allowed counts one and eight to go forward against Wake County only to the extent they related to Wake County's medical care plan for inmates. Id.
On October 15, 2013, defendants Harrison and the Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (collectively, "the sheriff defendants") filed the affidavit of Dr. Obinnaya C. Umesi, the Medical Director for the Wake County Sheriff's Office [D.E. 26-1] ("1st Umesi Aff."). On December 20, 2013, all defendants moved for summaryjudgment [D.E. 31, 33]. On December 31, 2013, defendantWake County supplemented its motion for summary judgment [D.E. 36]. On January 3,2014, the sheriff defendants supplemented their motion for summary judgment [D.E. 37]. On February 2, 2014, plaintiffs responded in opposition to the motions [D.E. 3 9]. On February 10, 2014, the sheriff defendants filed a reply [D.E. 40], together with the affidavit of Heidi Steinbeck [D.E. 41] and several exhibits. As explained below, the court grants defendants' motions for summary judgment.
On April 20, 2011, officers from the Raleigh Police Department arrested Williams and charged him with several crimes. Compl. [D.E. 1] ¶¶ 18-20. Williams failed to post bond and was detained pending trial at the Wake County Detention Center ("WCDC"). Id. ¶¶ 21-22. While housed at the WCDC, Williams "verbally and physically expressed suicidal behavior." Id. ¶ 26. Between April 29 and May 3, 2011, "Williams was twice removed from the general population . . . and placed on suicide watch." Id. ¶ 30; see 1st Umesi Aff. [D.E. 26-1] ¶ 4.a., d.
On April 29, 2011, after jail staff placed Williams on suicide watch, a psychiatrist examined Williams, concluded Williams was not a harm to himself, and removed Williams from suicide watch. 1st Umesi Aff. ¶ 4.c. On April 30, 2011, after Williams told a nurse he wanted to hurt himself, he was returned to suicide watch. Id. ¶ 4.d. On May 2, 2011, another psychiatrist examined Williams and concluded that Williams was not suicidal and could return to general population. Id. ¶ 4.e., f.
On May 2, 2011, Williams returned to general detainee housing at the WCDC. Compl. ¶ 31. The following day, Williams hanged himself in his cell with a WCDC-issued bed sheet tied to a ceiling vent. See id. ¶¶ 37-39. WCDC policy requires detention officers "to make supervision rounds and directly observe each inmate in person at least twice per hour on an irregular basis." 1st Umesi Aff. ¶ 4.j. (citing 10(a) N.C.A.C. 14J.0601(a)). On the date in question, WCDC detentionofficers performed these checks as required, and observed Williams's housing unit between 10:53 a.m. and 10:54 a.m. and again from 11:21 a.m. through 11:24 a.m. Id. ¶¶ 4.m.-n.; Sheriff Defts.' Mot. Summ. J., Exs. [D.E. 32-1] 10-13 (guard tour history report). At 11:25 a.m., WCDC detention officers discovered Williams hanging from a vent in his cell, cut him down, performed CPR, and contacted Wake County EMS. 1 st Umesi Aff. ¶ 4.o.; Compl. ¶¶ 39-41; Sheriff Defts.' Mot. Summ. J., Exs. [D.E. 32-1] 8 (witness statement). Wake County EMS transported Williams to WakeMed hospital for treatment. Compl. ¶ 42. On May 10, 2011, Williams died at WakeMed. Id. ¶ 46.
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 153A-221, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services must "develop and publish minimum standards for the operation of local confinement facilities," including standards for the "supervision of prisoners" and "[m]edical care for prisoners, including mental health, mental retardation, and substance abuse services." The Secretary has promulgated minimum standards at 10A N.C. Admin. Code 14J.1001, and the WCDC's medical plan complies with these standards. See 2nd Umesi Aff. [D.E. 33-2] ¶¶ 4-7.
On June 4, 2013, Wake County served requests for admissions on counsel for plaintiffs. Wake Co.'s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 3 [D.E. 33-3]. The requests included requests asking plaintiffs to admit that they "ha[ve] no evidence or factual basis to support the allegation in plaintiffs' complaint that the medical plan was 'inadequate'" and that plaintiffs "have no evidence or factual basis to support a conclusion that any part of or omission from the medical plan of the Wake County Jail would have prevented the incident or [Williams]'s death." Id. On December 20, 2013, the same day Wake County filed its motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs served Wake County with their untimely responses to the requests for admission, which denied the two cited requests. Supp. Wake Co.'s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 1 [D.E. 36-1] 14.
Plaintiffs allege eight claims, some under federal law and some under North Carolina law. As for the federal claims, plaintiffs assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Wake County and Sheriff Harrison for violating Williams's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See Compl. ¶¶ 62-74. As for the state law claims, plaintiffs assert claims against both Wake County and Sheriff Harrison for negligence, id. ¶¶ 75-80, wrongful death, id. ¶¶ 104-05, and under article I, sections 1, 19, and 27 of the North Carolina Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 99-103. Plaintiffs assert claims solely against Sheriff Harrison for negligent failure to train, id. ¶¶ 81-85, and for causing injury to a prisoner in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 162-55. Id. ¶¶ 86-92. Plaintiffs also bring a claim against the Ohio Casualty Insurance Company as the surety for Sheriff Harrison. Id. ¶¶ 93-98.
Summary judgment is proper if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence and the inferences drawn from that evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1863 (2014) (per curiam); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. That is, the moving party must show the existence of a "dispute [] over [a] fact[] that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party "must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis andquotation omitted). The nonmoving party must do more than present a "scintilla of evidence" in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Rather, the nonmoving party must present "sufficient evidence" such that reasonable jurors could find for it. Id. at 249. Accordingly, a court may grant summary judgment if the nonmoving party's evidence is "merely colorable" or "not significantly probative." Id. at 249-50.
Count one asserts a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on purported deficiencies in the medical-care plan for suicidal inmates at the WCDC. Compl. ¶¶ 62-66; see [D.E. 19] 3-5. Wake County responds that plaintiffs have "produced no evidence through discovery or otherwise that the medical plan put into place by the county was inadequate in any way or failed to address the [regulatory] requirements." Mem. Supp. Wake Co.'s Mot. Summ. J. 6. Wake County also relies on plaintiffs' failure to timely respond to their requests for admissions. Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a)(3) provides, in relevant part, that unless the court sets a different deadline, "[a] matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after being served, the party to whom the request is directed serves on the requesting party a written answer or objection addressed to the matter and signed by the party or its attorney." "A matter admitted under [Rule 36] is conclusively established unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended." Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b). Moreover, "[a] party's failure to respond to a request for admissions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36 may result in a material fact being deemed admitted and subject the party to an adverse grant of summary judgment." United States v. Renfrow, 612 F. Supp. 2d 677, 682 (E.D.N.C. 2009) (citations omitted); see Adventis, Inc. v. Consol. Prop. Holdings, Inc., 124 F. App'x 169, 173 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (unpublished) .
Plaintiffs never sought or received an extension of time from this court to answer defendants' requests for admission, and plaintiffs do not address the timeliness issue now. Rather, in opposing Wake County's motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs focus on whether a psychiatric...
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