Jones v. Henderson
| Decision Date | 21 August 1987 |
| Citation | 513 So.2d 1020 |
| Parties | Mabel JONES, et al., v. Randall D. HENDERSON and Katrina H. Henderson. 86-169. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Jerry F. Tucker, Ashville, for appellants.
Hugh E. Holladay of Hereford, Blair and Holladay, Pell City, for appellees.
Mabel Jones, Louise J. Riker, Ralph H. Riker, and Harold W. Riker (appellants), filed a complaint against Randall Henderson and Katrina Henderson (appellees), seeking money damages and requesting injunctive relief to restrain the Hendersons from blocking or otherwise denying access to a right-of-way that the plaintiffs claim they were entitled to, either by deed or by adverse possession. The Hendersons denied the material allegations of the complaint and filed a counterclaim alleging that a dispute existed over the correct boundary between the parties. The Hendersons also claimed damages for the appellants' alleged trespass, and for mental distress.
The property of the Hendersons and the appellants was originally owned by Sam Jones, the father of appellants Mabel Jones and Louise J. Riker. The property now owned by the Hendersons was sold by Sam Jones to his brother, Doll Jones, who later conveyed the property to Dewey Jones and Carrie Mae Jones. Dewey and Carrie Mae Jones conveyed the property to Norman Jones and Imogene Jones, who then conveyed it to their son, Walter Jones. The Hendersons obtained possession of the property by warranty deed from Walter Jones and Sharon Jones.
Mabel Jones and Louise Riker own 62 acres of land that is north of and adjacent to the Hendersons' property. Mabel Jones and Louise J. Riker (along with three other family members) originally obtained possession of the property by inheritance from their father. They subsequently obtained possession to the entire 62 acres of the property by deed from the other family members.
In February 1986, the trial judge conducted an ore tenus hearing. At the hearing, the testimony showed that the disputed strip of property was originally used, as early as 1940, for access to a sawmill located on Sam Jones's property, but several witnesses testified that the strip of property had not been used as a right-of-way since the sawmill closed in the early 1940's. The Hendersons testified that the strip of property is part of their backyard and that they have maintained the property as such. They testified that they have used one end of the property for the parking of cars and have planted grass and flowers on it, piled firewood on it, and placed a swing on it. Other witnesses testified that the appellants had continuously used the strip of property since 1948. The appellants claimed to have used the disputed strip of property as often as five or six days a week during the summer months for access to their property.
Several weeks after the hearing, the trial judge visited the disputed strip of property, without giving the appellants' attorney notice or an opportunity to be present, but the attorney for the Hendersons was present when the trial judge viewed the properties. After viewing the property, the trial judge entered an order denying the appellants the relief they requested, and then issued an order setting the boundary between the parties' properties. The court ordered James McGinnis, a registered surveyor, to locate and place monuments fixing the boundaries of the parties' lands in accordance with his order. The court further ordered the appellants to remove a fence they had placed across the Hendersons' property and to do so within 30 days from the date of the decree.
The appellants filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that they were denied due process of law when the judge failed to give their attorney notice of the time set to view the property, and that the judgment was contrary to the law and evidence in the case. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial. This appeal followed.
The first issue raised is whether the appellants were denied...
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Hardy v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ.
...heard at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner, and a judgment entered in accordance with the notice and hearing. See Jones v. Henderson, 513 So.2d 1020 (Ala.1987); Opinion of the Justices, No. 238, 345 So.2d 1354 A review of the record in the present case indicates that there is no evid......
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Jones v. Henderson
...and Holladay, Pell City, for appellees. MADDOX, Justice. The facts of this case are set out in this court's earlier opinion at 513 So.2d 1020 (Ala.1987), wherein we reversed and remanded for a new trial. It would serve no useful purpose to recite the evidence in detail in this opinion; howe......
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Green v. Champion Intern. Corp.
...court did not rule on the motion within 90 days, so it was deemed denied by operation of law. Rule 59.1, Ala.R.Civ.P. In Jones v. Henderson, 513 So.2d 1020 (Ala.1987), the Court reversed a judgment in a boundary line dispute, because the circuit court had viewed the property with the defend......
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Dillard v. Southern States Ford, Inc., 87-700
...complaint. Dillard was given notice and "the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Jones v. Henderson, 513 So.2d 1020, 1022 (Ala.1987). The fact that she did not avail herself of this opportunity does not show that she was not given the Nor was there any ......